MindPapers: 1.2d. `Hard' and `Easy' Problems

Alter, Torin (forthcoming). The hard problem of consciousness. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brainÃ¢ÂÂs activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness

Arvan, Marcus (1998). Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth. Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesis (Google | Edit)

Abstract: The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances." (Nagel, in Dennett, 1991, p. 372)

Block, Ned (2002). The harder problem of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425. (Cited by 23 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp”.² We do not see how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness.³

Brooks, David (2000). How to solve the hard problem: A predictable inexplicability. Psyche 6 (4):5-20. (Google | Edit)

Chalmers, David J. (1996). Can consciousness be reductively explained? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Chalmers, David J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19. (Cited by 499 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information

Chalmers, David J. (1997). Moving forward on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):3-46. (Cited by 37 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Second, I respond to nonreductive critiques, including those that argue that the problems of consciousness are harder than I have suggested, or that my framework for addressing them is flawed. Third, I address positive proposals for addressing the problem of consciousness, including those based in neuroscience and cognitive science, phenomenology, physics, and fundamental psychophysical theories. Reply to: Baars, Bilodeau, Churchland, Clark, Clarke, Crick & Koch, Dennett, Hameroff & Penrose, Hardcastle, Hodgson, Hut & Shepard, Libet, Lowe, MacLennan, McGinn, Mills, O'Hara & Scutt, Price, Robinson, Rosenberg, Seager, Shear, Stapp, Varela, Velmans

Chalmers, David J. (2007). The hard problem of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Chalmers, David J. (1995). The puzzle of conscious experience. Scientific American 273 (6):80-86. (Cited by 89 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science

Chalmers, David J. (1998). The problems of consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]]

Churchland, Patricia S. (1996). The hornswoggle problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8. (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Clark, Thomas W. (1995). Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:241-54. (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1995). Why neuroscience may be able to explain consciousness. Scientific American 273 (6):84-85. (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Dennett, Daniel C. (2003). Explaining the "magic" of consciousness. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1 (1):7-19. (Google | More links | Edit)

Dennett, Daniel C. (1996). Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6. (Cited by 29 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Eilan, Naomi M. (2000). Primitive consciousness and the 'hard problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39. (Google | Edit)

Gray, Jeffrey A. (1998). Creeping up on the hard question of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)

Harnad, Stevan (2000). Correlation vs. causality: How/why the mind-body problem is hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):54-61. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The Mind/Body Problem (M/BP) is about causation not correlation. And its solution (if there is one) will require a mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality is needed to show how/why M is not supererogatory; and that's the hard part

Harnad, Stevan (2001). Explaining the mind: Problems, problems. The Sciences 41:36-42. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Three of the books under review are about consciousness, one is about meaning, and one is about language, but the topics are inter-related, as we shall see. The reader may find it surprising to learn that it has lately become fashionable in cognitive science to call the problem of consciousness the "hard problem," and the problems of meaning and language (and brain function and behavior) the "easy problems." Everything is relative. The "easy problems" may be easier than the "hard one," but that certainly does not make them any easier than most other scientific problems

Hodes, Greg P. (2005). What would it "be like" to solve the hard problem?: Cognition, consciousness, and qualia zombies. Neuroquantology 1. (Google | Edit)

Hodgson, David (1996). The easy problems ain't so easy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):69-75. (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Hohwy, Jakob (2004). Evidence, explanation, and experience: On the harder problem of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 101 (5):242-254. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: * Thanks to the audience at the Danish Philosophical Association Annual Meeting 2003, especially Ned Block; and to the audience at a seminar at the Philosophy Program, RSSS, ANU. The research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Danish Research Council for the Humanities to the research programme Naturalised Mind – Cognisant Nature (namicona.au.dk)

Horst, Steven (1999). Evolutionary explanation and the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):39-48. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Hutto, Daniel D. (2006). Turning hard problems on their heads. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Much of the difﬁculty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advo- cates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon (or data) they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. In what follows, I will attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in ap- proaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely ﬁrst-personally or third-personally nor, concomitantly, can we start such investigations using either ﬁrst-personal or third-personal methods

Ismael, Jenann (1999). Science and the phenomenal. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):351-69. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lewis, Harry A. (1998). Consciousness: Inexplicable - and useless too? Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):59-66. (Google | Edit)

Libet, Benjamin W. (1996). Solutions to the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):33-35. (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1995). There are no easy problems of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:266-71. (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

MacLennan, Bruce J. (1996). The elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5):409-424. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Mandik, Pete (ms). An epistemological theory of consciousness? (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This article tackles problems concerning the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to brain processes that arise in consideration of specifically epistemological properties that have been attributed to conscious experiences. In particular, various defenders of dualism and epiphenomenalism have argued for their positions by assuming special epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness. Many physicalists have reacted to such arguments by denying the epistemological premises. My aim in this paper is to take a different approach in opposing dualism and argue that when we correctly examine both the phenomenology and neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness we will see that granting the epistemological premises of special access are the best hope for a scientific study of consciousness. I argue that essential features of consciousness involve both their knowability by the subject of experience as well as their egocentricity, that is, their knowability by the subject as belonging to the subject. I articulate a neuroscientifically informed theory of phenomenal consciousnessóthe Allocentric-Egocentric Interface theory of consciousnessówhereby states of recurrent cortical networks satisfy criteria for an epistemological theory of consciousness. The resultant theory shows both how the epistemological assumptions made by dualists are sound but lead to a reductive account of phenomenal consciousness

McLaughlin, Brian P. (2003). A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that (a) we are phenomenally consciousness, and that (b) there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated (non- circularly) in nonphenomenal terms (p.392).^1,2Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject “armchair philosophical reductive analyses” (p.393) of consciousness— such as analytical functionalism—“phenomenal realists have no brief against scientific reduction of consciousness” (p.393). His characterization of naturalism is complex:

Naturalism is the view that it is a default that consciousness has a scientific nature
(and that similarities in consciousness have scientific natures). I shall assume that
the relevant sciences include physics, chemistry, biology, computational theory,
and parts of psychology that do not explicitly involve consciousness. (The point
of the last condition is to avoid the trivialization of naturalism that would result if
we allowed the scientific nature of consciousness to be…consciousness.) I shall
lump these sciences together under the heading ‘physical’, thinking of naturalism
as the view that it is a default that consciousness is physical (and that similarities
in consciousness are physical). So naturalism = default physicalism, and is thus
partly an epistemic thesis…My naturalist is not a ‘die-hard’ naturalist, but rather
one who takes physicalism as a default, a default that can be challenged. My
rationale for defining ‘naturalism’ in this way is that this version of the doctrine is
plausible, widely held, and leads to the epistemic tension that I am expositing.
(p.398)

¹ Here and elsewhere in this paper, inserted pages references are to Block 2002. ² What is it to be phenomenally conscious? What are states of phenomenal consciousness?

Mills, Eugene O. (1996). Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32. (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Mills, Frederick B. (1998). The easy and hard problems of consciousness: A cartesian perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):119-40. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

O'Hara, Kieron & Scutt, Tom (1996). There is no hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):290-302. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Pharoah, Mark (ms). 'Thing-in-itself' - Exploring the relationship between phenomenal experience and the phenomenon of consciousness. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: If one were to provide a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience one would explain why there could be a phenomenal experience that identifies itself as an individual that possesses ‘consciousness’. Although not a requirement of reduction, such an explanation would be consistent with our understanding of evolution and, consequently, explain the physical origins and purpose of phenomenal experience. However, this explanation would not explain why a particular conscious individual identifies itself as itself rather than any other individual - Why is ‘my’ consciousness ‘mine’ (materially, or otherwise, irrespective of experiential detail and content) rather than anyone else? What is consciousness outside of phenomenal experience and phenomenal conceptualization? In this paper, I argue that the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics makes it a suitable candidate for exploring the answers to these questions.

Robinson, William S. (1996). The hardness of the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Rockwell, Teed (ms). The hard problem is dead: Long live the hard problem. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I have assumed that consciousness exists, and that to redefine the problem as that of explaining how certain cognitive and behavioral functions are performed is unacceptable. . . .Like many people (materialists and dualists alike), I find this premise obvious, although I can no more "prove" it than I can prove that I am conscious. . . .there is no denying that such arguments - on either side - ultimately come down to a bedrock of intuition at some point. (Chalmers undated)

Samsonovich, Alexei V.; Ascoli, Giorgio A.; Morowitz, Harold & Kalbfleisch, M. Layne (forthcoming). A scientific perspective on the hard problem of consciousness. In Benjamin Goertzel & Pei Wang (eds.), Advances in Artificial General Intelligence: Concepts, Architectures and Algorithms. Proceedings of the AGI Workshop 2008. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press: Amsterdam. (Google | Edit)

Shear, Jonathan (ed.) (1997). Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press. (Cited by 60 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Shear, Jonathan (1996). The hard problem: Closing the empirical gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):54-68. (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Smart, J. J. C. (2004). Consciousness and awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):41-50. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Varela, F. (1995). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49. (Cited by 248 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Velmans, Max (1995). The relation of consciousness to the material world. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):255-65. (Cited by 28 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a nonreductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term "awareness." I do not agree that functional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving "psychological complementarity." I also suggest that the hard problem posed by "qualia" has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism

Velmans, Prof Max (2008). How to separate conceptual issues from empirical ones in the study of consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind, Physical, Computational and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in cognitive science, neuroscience, and related sciences, using relatively conventional third-person research methods. However not all the problems of consciousness can be resolved in this way. These problems may be grouped into problems that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance, and those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assumptions. I give examples of these, and focus on two problems — what consciousness is, and what consciousness does — that requires all three. In this, careful attention to conscious phenomenology and finding an appropriate way to relate first-person evidence to third-person evidence appears to be central to progress. But we may also need to re-examine what we take to be ‘‘natural facts’’ about the world, and how we can know them. The same appears to be true for a trans-cultural understanding of consciousness that combines classical Indian phenomenological methods wit

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