MindPapers: 1.3g. Consciousness and Dualism

Aranyosi, Istvan A. (2005). Type-A Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University (Google | Edit)

Banerjee, R.; Bhattacharya, A.; Genc, A. & Arora, B. M. (2006). Structure of twins in gaas nanowires grown by the vapour-liquid-solid process. Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816. (Google | More links | Edit)

Bennett, Karen (ms). Why I am not a dualist. (Google | Edit)

Birkett, Kirsten (2006). Conscious objections: God and the consciousness debates. Zygon 41 (2):249-266. (Google | More links | Edit)

Bricke, John (1973). The attribute theory of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):226-237. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Chakraborti, Chhanda (2002). Metaphysics of consciousness, and David Chalmers's property dualism. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84. (Google | Edit)

Chalmers, David J. (2007). Naturalistic dualism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Dietrich, Eric (1999). Fodor's gloom, or what does it mean that dualism seems true? Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem violate laws of physics (like the perpetual motion machine, for example), or until enough people fail so that declaring defeat is a reasonable move. The problem of consciousness is prototypical of this latter case. Indeed, one might say that it is the Platonic ideal of such a problem. The mere fact that philosophers wrestle with the problem of consciousness should be regarded by psychologists of all stripes as extremely bad news. If the philosophers can’t make any headway, psychologists are doomed

Dilley, Frank B. (2004). Taking consciousness seriously: A defense of cartesian dualism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):135-153. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Eccles, John C. (1987). Brain and mind: Two or one? In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Foster, John A. (1989). A defense of dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press. (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Honderich, Ted (1981). Nomological dualism: Reply to four critics. Inquiry 24 (December):419-438. (Google | Edit)

Honderich, Ted (1981). Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24 (October):277-303. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Kind, Amy (2005). The irreducibility of consciousness. Disputatio 1 (19). (Google | More links | Edit)

Lahav, Ran & Shanks, N. (1992). How to be a scientifically respectable 'property dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):211-32. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Latham, Noa (2000). Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):67-93. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lycan, William G. (2007). Recent naturalistic dualisms. In A Lange, E. Meyers & R. Styers (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the

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positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things

McGinn, Colin (1993). Consciousness and cosmology: Hyperdualism ventilated. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Meixner, Uwe (2004). The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psychophysical Dualism. Mentis. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Molenaar, Peter C. M. (2006). Psychophysical dualism from the point of view of a working psychologist. Erkenntnis 65 (1):47-69. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Cognitive neuroscience constitutes the third phase of development of the field of cognitive psychophysiology since it was established about half a century ago. A critical historical overview is given of this development, focusing on recurring problems that keep frustrating great expectations. It is argued that psychology has to regain its independent status with respect to cognitive neuroscience and should take psychophysical dualism seriously. A constructive quantum physical model for psychophysical interaction is presented, based on a new stochastic interpretation of the quantum potential in the de Broglie–Bohm theory. This model can be applied to analyze cognitive information processing in psychological experiments. It is shown that the quantum potential shares several features with Duns Scotus’ notion of contingent causality

Pauen, Michael (2000). Painless pain: Property dualism and the causal role of phenomenal consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):51-64. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Rosenberg, Jay F. (1988). On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism. Topoi 7 (March):57-63. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Beginning with Descartes'' caution not imprudently to take some other object in place of myself, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by variousamnesiacs, both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting thatcogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of body-switching thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of psychological connectedness or unity of consciousness as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to apply any notion of personal identity is parasitic upon the existence of a conceptual apparatus for individuating, identifying, and reidentifying objects. Finally, I argue that, if person is a proper sortal predicate to begin with, Descartes''res cogitans cannot be understood as a species of the (metaphysical) genusres, distinct fromres extensa and only problematically in interaction with it. Cartesian dualism is a multiply untenable doctrine

Ross, Don (2005). Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism: The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Smook, Roger (1988). Egoicity and twins. Dialogue 27:277-86. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Smythies, J. R. & Beloff, John (eds.) (1989). The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1994). Consciousness. Synthese 98 (1):73-93. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be necessary connections between distinct existences is assumed. It is more promising to see this relation as the falsification of this Humean principle and thus avoid what seems the main recommendation of behaviourism, functionalism etc. Some final reflections on the nature of the physical suggest that something like consciousness may be the noumenal essence of the physical in general

Strong, Charles A. (1934). A plea for substantialism in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 31 (12):309-328. (Google | More links | Edit)

Taliaferro, Charles (1996). Consciousness and the Mind of God. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Taliaferro, Charles (2001). Emergentism and consciousness: Going beyond property dualism. In Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Vendler, Zeno (1994). The ineffable soul. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

von Wright, Georg Henrik (1994). On mind and matter. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:101-10. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Wetherick, Norman E. (1992). Velmans on consciousness, brain and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):159-161. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

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