MindPapers: 1.4b. Self-Representational Approaches

Brook, Andrew (2006). Kant: A unified representational base for all consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Caston, Victor (2002). Aristotle on consciousness. Mind 111 (444):751-815. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive (On the Soul 3.2) has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issuethe primary focus of this paperhe argues that consciousness is both intrinsic and higher-order, due to its reflexive nature. This, in turn, has consequences for the second issue, where again Aristotle seeks out the middle ground. He is committed against qualia in any strong sense of the term. Yet he also holds that the phenomenal quality of experience is not exhausted by its representational content

Caston, Victor (2006). Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge". Psyche 12 (2). (Google | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson’s suggestion that our privileged access to our own conscious states is to be explained by “conceptual transformations” and argue in favor of an inner awareness view favored by Aristotle and Brentano

Caston, Victor (2004). More on Aristotle on consciousness: Reply to Sisko. Mind 113 (451):523-533. (Google | More links | Edit)

Coventry, A. & Kriegel, U. (forthcoming). Locke on consciousness. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25. (Google | Edit)

Drummond, John J. (2006). The case(s) of (self-)awareness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Gennaro, Rocco J. (2006). Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Harman, Gilbert (2006). Self-reflexive thoughts. Noûs 40 (1):334–345. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Alice has insomnia. She has trouble falling asleep and part of the problem is that she worries about it and realizes that her worrying about it tends to keep from falling asleep. It occurs to her that thinking that she will not be able to fall asleep may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps she even has a thought that might be expressed like this: “I am not going to fall asleep because of my having this very thought.” This thought (perhaps correctly) attributes to itself the property of keeping her awake

Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itself. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Hofstadter, Douglas R. (2006). What is it like to be a strange loop? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2006). Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Hossack, Keith (2002). Self-knowledge and consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Ismael, Jenann (2006). Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture. Psyche 12 (2). (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self- representational accounts

Janzen, Greg (2006). Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: One of the more refractory problems in contemporary discussions of consciousness is the problem of determining what a mental state's being conscious consists in. This paper defends the thesis that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has a certain reflexive character, i.e., if and only if it has a structure that includes an awareness (or consciousness) of itself. Since this thesis finds one of its clearest expressions in the work of Brentano, it is his treatment of the thesis on which I initially focus, though I subsequently bring in Sartre where he is required to improve on Brentano, i.e., where he addresses himself to an important point not considered by Brentano. As part of this investigation, the paper also, more specifically, aims to exhibit as perspicuously as possible the relationship between self-awareness and the phenomenal, or 'what-it- is-like', dimension of conscious experience. I attempt to show, in particular, that the phenomenal character of at least perceptual consciousness can be fully explained in terms of self- awareness, i.e., in terms of a low-level or 'implicit' self- awareness that is built into every conscious perceptual state

Kobes, Bernard W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132. (Cited by 24 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The word consciousness is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art intransitive self-consciousness and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious (i.e., intransitively self-conscious) iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a modernizing modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano

Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese 134 (3):477-504. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is thepeculiar self-awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. Accordingto a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence.According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinctrepresentation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-ordercontent. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by Mitself or by a different state. While theNeo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it isoften felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo-Brentanian andHigher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that theNeo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima faciepreferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory

Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring. Dialogue 41 (3):517-540. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):169-196. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Kriegel, Uriah (2004). Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief. Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Propositions such as are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore's paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently argued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker's own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is endorsed. At the core of the endorsed account is the claim that conscious beliefs are always partly about themselves; it will be shown to follow from this that conscious beliefs in Moorean propositions are self-contradictory

Kriegel, Uriah (2005). Naturalizing subjective character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Abstract. When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth

Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Self-representationalism and phenomenology. Philosophical Studies. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: To a ﬁrst approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more conﬁdently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism

Kriegel, Uriah & Williford, Kenneth (2006). Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Kriegel, Uriah (2006). The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: One of the promising approaches to the problem of consciousness has been the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory, a mental state M of a subject S is conscious iff S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. Recently, several philosophers have developed a Higher-Order Monitoring theory with a twist. The twist is that M and M* are construed as entertaining some kind of constitutive relation, rather than being logically independent of each other. We may call this the Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In this paper, I discuss the nature of the Same-Order Monitoring Theory and argue for its superiority over the more traditional Higher-Order Monitoring Theory

Kriegel, Uriah (online). The Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness. (Google | Edit)

Lehrer, Keith (1996). Consciousness. In Alfred Schramm (ed.), Philosophie in Osterreich. Vienna: Verlag Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Lehrer, Keith (1997). Evaluation and consciousness. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Lehrer, Keith (2004). Representation in painting and in consciousness. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):1-14. (Google | More links | Edit)

Lehrer, Keith (1996). Skepticism, lucid content, and the metamental loop. In A. Clark, Jesus Ezquerro & J. M. Larrazabal (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Kluwer. (Google | Edit)

Lehrer, Keith (2002). Self-presentation, representation, and the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):412-430. (Google | More links | Edit)

Levine, Joseph M. (2006). Conscious Awareness and (self-)representation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Levine, Joseph M. (ms). Conscious awareness and (self-)representation. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lurz, Robert W. (2006). Conscious beliefs and desires: A same-order approach. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Mijuskovic, Ben L. (1978). Brentano's theory of consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):315-324. (Google | More links | Edit)

Mills, Frederick B. (2006). Intrinsic awareness in Sartre. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):1-16. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: II. An examination of a conception of consciousness 'subscript 4' as intrinsic, necessary, and concomitant. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (2006). The case for intrinsic theory: XIII. The role of the qualitative in a modal account of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):319-350. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (2006). The case for intrinsic theory: XII. Inner awareness conceived of as a modal character of conscious experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):183-214. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (2004). The case for intrinsic theory IX . further discussion of an equivocal remembrance account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):7-32. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (2004). The case for intrinsic theory XI: A disagreement regarding the kind of feature inner awareness is. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (2003). The case for intrinsic theory VIII: The experiential in acquiring knowledge firsthand of one's experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (3-4):289-316. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (1999). The case for intrinsic theory IV: An argument from how conscious mental-occurrence instances seem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (2001). The case for intrinsic theory V: Some arguments from James's varieties. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: I. An introduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (1998). The case for intrinsic theory: III. Intrinsic inner awareness and the problem of straightforward objectivation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Olivier, Abraham (2003). When pains are mental objects. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):33-53. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In Why pains are not mental objects (1998) Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects

Pasquerella, L. (2002). Phenomenology and intentional acts of sensing in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40:269-279. (Google | Edit)

Perrett, Roy W. (2003). Intentionality and self-awareness. Ratio 16 (3):222-235. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Prado, C. G. (1978). Reflexive consciousness. Dialogue 17:134-137. (Google | Edit)

Raymont, Paul (online). From HOTs to self-representing states. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: After briefly summarizing David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, I consider difficulties that arise for such accounts from the possibility of an ‘empty HOT’, a HOT that occurs in the absence of the mental state that it purports to represent. I argue that the difficulties that derive from the possibility of such misrepresentation are fatal for HOT-theory. I argue also that the lesson of the failure of HOT-theory is that we should adopt the view that has recently been proposed by Uriah Kriegel and others, according to which conscious states are self-representing states

Rutte, Heiner (1987). On the problem of inner perception. Topoi 6 (March):19-23. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Seager, William (2006). Is self-representation necessary for consciousness? Psyche 12 (2). (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I also advance a speculative proposal that we are never aware of any distinctively mental attributes of our own states of consciousness except via an independent act of reflective conceptualization, although this goes rather farther than the first-order theory strictly requires

Sisko, John (2004). Reflexive awareness does belong to the main function of perception: Reply to Victor Caston. Mind 113 (451):513-521. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Smith, David Woodruff (2005). Consciousness with reflexive content. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Smith, David Woodruff (2004). Return to consciousness. In David Woodruff Smith (ed.), Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge University Press. (Google | Edit)

Smith, David Woodruff (1989). The Circle of Acquaintaince. Cambridge University Press. (Google | Edit)

Smith, David Woodruff (1986). The structure of (self-)consciousness. Topoi 5 (September):149-156. (Cited by 30 | Google | Edit)

Textor, Mark (2006). Brentano (and some neo-brentanians) on inner consciousness. Dialectica 60 (4):411-432. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Thomasson, Amie L. (2000). After Brentano: A one-level theory of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):190-210. (Google | Edit)

Thompson, Brad J. (2006). Comments on Ismael's "double-mindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture?". Psyche 12 (2). (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Two general worries are raised for the dual content approach to consciousness as presented by Ismael in “Doublemindedness”. First, it is argued that something much like Ismael’s proposed explanations of subjectivity and the explanatory gap can be given in terms of phenomenal concepts rather than in terms of dual content. Furthermore, self- representation alone does not explain the “determinacy” and substantiveness of phenomenal concepts (or presentational content). The notion of “presentational content” and its use in explaining the subjectivity of experience seems at least as mysterious as subjectivity itself, and may in fact presuppose it

van Gulick, Robert (2006). Mirror, mirror -- is that all? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways or respects, and to varying degrees. Thus the real questions of linkage must be posed more specifically. We need to ask not whether the two are bound in general, but whether and how being conscious in some specific sense and degree relates to some particular sort of self-awareness. Only those more specific questions are likely to have fully determinate answers

Weisberg, Josh (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy

Wider, Kathleen (1993). Sartre and the long distance truck driver: The reflexivity of consciousness. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 24 (3):232-249. (Google | Edit)

Williford, Kenneth (2006). The self-representational structure of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Williford, Kenneth (2006). Zahavi versus Brentano: A rejoinder. Psyche 12 (2). (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness—the phenomenological datum upon which Zahavi and self-representationalists agree—according to which it is a primitive, _sui generis_, non-relational property of consciousness. I argue that some Brentano-style, self-representationalist theories of consciousness are not subject to Zahavi’s criticisms. I articulate a version according to which consciousness involves self- acquaintance. This allows one to account for primitive self-knowledge and still maintain that ubiquitous, prereflective self-consciousness has a relational structure. I also unearth the premise upon which the regress objection depends and show that no self- representationalist need be committed to it. I end by discussing the kinds of considerations that might allow one to decide between the two theories and the prospects for “naturalizing” them

Williford, Kenneth Wayne, The structure of self-consciousness: A phenomenological and philosophical investigation. (Google | Edit)

Zahavi, Dan (2004). Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano

Zahavi, Dan (2006). Thinking about consciousness: Phenomenological perspectives. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Zahavi, Dan (2006). Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness. Psyche 12 (2). (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences—I will mainly focus on the question of whether pre-reflective self-consciousness is to be understood as (i) an extraordinary object-consciousness or (ii) not as an object-consciousness at all—and argue in favour of the Husserlian account

1.4b	Self-Representational Approaches [69]

1.4e	Functionalism [17]

1.4f	Eliminativism [21]

1.4g	Panpsychism [75]

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