MindPapers: 1.4e. Functionalism

Antony, Michael V. (1994). Against functionalist theories of consciousness. Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Bode, Boyd H. (1918). Consciousness as behavior. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (17):449-453. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Dilworth, John (2007). Conscious perceptual experience as representational self-prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 (2007), pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively prompting the perceiver herself to do something (hence ”self-prompting”) via the monitoring activities of her executive control system. The theory explains both phenomenal consciousness and ”what it is like” to be perceptually conscious of an item. In addition, as applied to early perceptual attention, the self-prompting theory can explain how and why consciousness evolved

Levin, Janet (1991). Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states. Philosophical Studies 61 (March):211-38. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Lormand, Eric (2000). Comments on "a neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):260-266. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Mangan, Bruce (1998). Against functionalism: Consciousness as an information-bearing medium. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Marcel, Anthony J. (2000). On a neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness: Commentary on J. Prinz. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):267-273. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Marcel, Anthony J. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 50 | Google | Edit)

Myin, Erik (1998). Holism, functionalism and visual awareness. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):3-19. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Norris, Orland O. (1929). A behaviorist account of consciousness. II: Its qualitative aspect. Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):57-67. (Google | More links | Edit)

Perlis, Donald R. (1995). Consciousness and complexity: The cognitive Quest. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 14:309-21. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Prinz, Jesse J. (2005). A neurofunctional theory of consciousness. Cognition and the Brain. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are moving towards increasingly specific accounts of the neural basis of conscious experience. These efforts will leave some questions unanswered, but they are no less significant for that

Prinz, Jesse J. (2000). A reply to Marcel. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):279-287. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Prinz, Jesse J. (2000). A reply to Lormand. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):274-278. (Google | More links | Edit)

Schweizer, Paul (1996). Physicalism, functionalism, and conscious thought. Minds and Machines 6 (1):61-87. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods

Shoemaker, Sydney (1993). Functionalism and consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

van Gulick, Robert (1988). A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88. (Cited by 31 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

1.4e	Functionalism [17]

1.4f	Eliminativism [21]

1.4g	Panpsychism [75]

1.4i	Neutral Monism [26]

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