MindPapers: 1.4e. Eliminativism about Consciousness

Allport, A. (1988). What concept of consciousness? In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 47 | Google)

Braddock, Glenn (2002). Eliminativism and indeterminate consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54. (Google | More links)

Abstract: One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. Since this assumption is false, Dennett's argument is unsuccessful. Like most eliminativist arguments, Dennett's arguments may indicate that the subjective character of experience is different from how it is often described, but this leaves plenty of room for alternative models of consciousness

Churchland, Paul M. (1992). Activation vectors versus propositional attitudes: How the brain represents reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1983). Consciousness: The transmutation of a concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):80-95. (Cited by 38 | Annotation | Google)

Dennett, Daniel C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71. (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Dennett, Daniel C. (1979). The onus re experiences: A reply to Emmett. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):315-318. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Nikolinakos, Drakon (1994). General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical challenge. Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):88-104. (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Park Frost, Eliott (1913). The belief in consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (26):716-719. (Google | More links)

Rey, Georges (1986). A question about consciousness. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)

Rey, Georges (1982). A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3. New York: Plenum. (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)

Rey, Georges (1995). Toward a projectivist account of conscious experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)

Rivas, Titus & van Dongen, Hein (2001). Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge. Revista de Filosofia 57. (Google)

Robinson, William S. (online). Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Ross, Alf (1941). On the illusion of consciousness. Theoria 7:171-202. (Google)

Schneider, Susan (2007). Daniel Dennett on the nature of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google)

Abstract: One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Outside of consciousness studies, Dennett is well-known for his work on numerous topics, such as intentionality, artificial intelligence, free will, evolutionary theory, and the basis of religious experience. (Dennett, 1984, 1987, 1995c, 2005) In 1991, just as researchers and philosophers were beginning to turn more attention to the nature of consciousness, Dennett authored his Consciousness Explained. Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a theory of consciousness and a powerful critique of the then mainstream view of the nature of consciousness, which Dennett called,

Smith, David Woodruff (1987). Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Annotation | Google)

Sundström, Pär (2008). A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness. In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. (Google)

Tienson, John L. (1987). Brains are not conscious. Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93. (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)

Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1984). Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43. (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1995). Losing consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)

Williams, Donald C. (1959). Mind as a matter of fact. Review of Metaphysics 13 (December):205-25. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Williams, Donald C. (1934). Scientific method and the existence of consciousness. Psychological Review 41:461-79. (Google)

Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1988). Yishi, duh, um and consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)

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