MindPapers: 1.4h. Russellian Monism

Blackburn, Simon W. (1992). Filling in space. Analysis 52 (2):62-3. (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Chalmers, David J. (1996). The metaphysics of information. In The Conscious Mind. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Demopolous, W. & Friedman, Michael (1989). The concept of structure in Russell's The Analysis of Matter. In C. Wade Savage & C. Anthony Anderson (eds.), Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology. University of Minnesota Press. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Feigl, Herbert (1975). Russell and Schlick: A remarkable agreement on a monistic solution of the mind-body problem. Erkenntnis 9 (May):11-34. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Feigl, Herbert (1971). Some crucial issues of mind-body monism. Synthese 22 (May):295-312. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Feigl, Herbert (1958). The 'mental' and the 'physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497. (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Feigl, Herbert (1960). The mind-body problem: Not a pseudo-problem. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Feser, Edward (1998). Can phenomenal qualities exist unperceived? Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):405-14. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Foster, John A. (1991). Lockwood's hypothesis. In John A. Foster (ed.), The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Freeman, Anthony (2006). Special issue on realistic monism - editorial introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):1-2. (Google | Edit)

Hohwy, Jakob (2005). Explanation and two conceptions of the physical. Erkenntnis 62 (1):71-89. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Any position that promises genuine progress on the mind-body problem deserves attention. Recently, Daniel Stoljar has identified a physicalist version of Russells notion of neutral monism; he elegantly argues that with this type of physicalism it is possible to disambiguate on the notion of physicalism in such a way that the problem is resolved. The further issue then arises of whether we have reason to believe that this type of physicalism is in fact true. Ultimately, one needs to argue for this position by inference to the best explanation, and I show that this new type of physicalism does not hold promise of more explanatory prowess than its relevant rivals, and that, whether it is better than its rivals or not, it is doubtful whether it would furnish us with genuine explanations of the phenomenal at all

Holman, Emmett L. (1986). Maxwell and materialism. Synthese 66 (March):505-14. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In a recent article, Grover Maxwell presents a case for a kind of mind-brain identity theory which he claims precludes materialism. His case is based on some views about meaning which I find plausible. However, I will argue that, by adopting certain assumptions about the nature of sensory experience, and extending some of Maxwell's views about meaning in a plausible way, the issue of a materialistic identity theory is reopened. Ultimately, I will agree that such a theory is not true, but more is needed to show this than Maxwell gives us. But the question of materialism is not thereby closed, because it has become axiomatic these days that materialism does not require an identity theory. So I will go on to consider if all forms of materialism have been ruled out by Maxwell's theory, as extended by me. I will end with a tentative affirmative answer but also with a proposal which, if it can be worked out, would reverse the decision

Lockwood, Michael (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 115 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Lockwood, Michael (1993). The grain problem. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Lockwood, Michael (1998). Unsensed phenomenal qualities: A defence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):415-18. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Maxwell, Grover (1979). Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Maxwell, Grover (1971). Structural realism and the meaning of theoretical terms. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. (Cited by 54 | Google | Edit)

Maxwell, Grover (1978). Unity of consciousness and mind-brain identity. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House. (Google | Edit)

Newman, M. H. A. (1928). 2.0.CO;2-H');return true;"href='http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(192804)2:37:146<137:MR"TOP>2.0.CO;2-H'>Mr. Russell's causal theory of perception. Mind 5 (146):26-43. (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Robinson, Howard M. (1982). Matter: Turning the tables. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Google | Edit)

Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1997). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Dissertation, Indiana University (Cited by 45 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Consciousness is a refugee. It gathers the interest and sympathy of many disciplines without claiming a true home in any of them. Often abused by skeptics, it has been protected by moralists and exploited by dreamers. Until recently it was ignored by experimentalists, and theorists have not always taken it seriously. If any important and fundamental piece of nature could lay claim to being an intellectual exile, consciousness has been it. The purpose of this book is to find a place for consciousness

Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1999). On the Intrinsic Nature of the Physical. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: In its original context Hawking was writing about the significance of physics for questions about God's existence and responsibility for creation. I am co-opting the sentiment for another purpose, though. As stated Hawking could equally be directing the question at concerns about the seemingly abstract information physics conveys about the world, and the full body of facts contained in the substance of the world. Would even a complete and adequate physics tell us all the general facts about the stuff the world is made of? In this chapter I am going to argue that the answer is "no." I am also going to argue that the missing facts are like the kinds of facts we can use to cross the explanatory gap. I am going to argue, in short, that we have reasons to re-enchant matter that are independent of the mind-body problem. In a recent anthology on consciousness (1997) Güven Güzeldere has wrote,

a principle reason underlying the confusion and seeming mystery surrounding the concept and phenomenon
of consciousness lies in the presence of two influential, equally attractive, pretheoretic characterizations. . . .
They can be summarized in the following mottos: "Consciousness is as consciousness does" and
"Consciousness is as consciousness _seems._"

Güzeldere calls these the "two faces" of consciousness. Face one of consciousness concerns the causal role that being conscious enables a cognitive element to play in our mental economy. Face two of consciousness concerns the way conscious elements feel or appear to the experiencer. These two faces correspond to the functional and experiential aspects of the problem, respectively

Russell, Bertrand (1927). The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul. (Cited by 138 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Schlick, M. (1925). General Theory of Knowledge. La Salle: Open Court. (Cited by 28 | Google | More links | Edit)

Stoljar, Daniel (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson - 'realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):170-176. (Google | More links | Edit)

Stoljar, Daniel (forthcoming). Strawson's realistic monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: There is at least one element in Strawson’s extremely rich paper that seems to me be correct and important, and Strawson is absolutely right to bring it out. This is the point that people in philosophy of mind go around assuming that they know what the physical facts are, if not in detail then in outline: “…they think they know a lot about the nature of the physical” (p.2). This assumption is false, or at any rate implausible, or at any rate un-argued for. To make the assumption, Strawson says, is a “very large mistake. It is perhaps Descartes’s, or perhaps rather ‘Descartes’s’, greatest mistake, and it is funny that in the past fifty years it has been the most fervent revilers of the great Descartes, the true father of modern materialism, who have made the mistake with most intensity” (p.2; footnote omitted.)

Stoljar, Daniel (2001). Two conceptions of the physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-81. (Cited by 30 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception

Strawson, Galen (2003). Realistic materialism. In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Strawson, Galen (2003). Real materialism. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell Publishing. (Cited by 19 | Google | Edit)

Stubenberg, Leopold (1997). Austria vs. australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In Keith Lehrer & Johann Christian Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Kluwer. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Stubenberg, Leopold (1998). Consciousness and Qualia. John Benjamins. (Cited by 73 | Google | More links | Edit)

Stubenberg, Leopold (1996). The place of qualia in the world of science. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)

Unger, Peter K. (1998). The mystery of the physical and the matter of qualities. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):75–99. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: For some fifty years now, nearly all work in mainstream analytic philosophy has made no serious attempt to understand the _nature of_ _physical reality,_ even though most analytic philosophers take this to be all of reality, or nearly all. While we've worried much about the nature of our own experiences and thoughts and languages, we've worried little about the nature of the vast physical world that, as we ourselves believe, has them all as only a small part

1.4e	Functionalism [17]

1.4f	Eliminativism [21]

1.4g	Panpsychism [75]

1.4h	Russellian Monism [33]

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