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1.4j. Neutral Monism (Neutral Monism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Banks, Eric (2003). Ernst Mach's World Elements. Kluwer.   (Google | Edit)
Banks, Erik C. (2004). The philosophical roots of Ernst Mach's economy of thought. Synthese 139 (1):23-53.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Bhattacharya, Manjulekha (1972). Ernst Mach: Neutral monism. Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 4:145-182.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Bode, Boyd H. (1905). 'Pure experience' and the external world. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (5):128-133.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Bode, Boyd H. (1905). The concept of pure experience. Philosophical Review 14 (6):684-695.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1911). Experience as pure and consciousness as meaning. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (19):511-525.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1907). Pure experience and reality: A reassertion. Philosophical Review 16 (4):422-424.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Cooper, W. E. (1990). William James's theory of mind. Journal of the History of Philosophy (October) 571 (October):571-593.   (Google | Edit)
Drabinski, John E. (1993). Radical empiricism and phenomenology: Philosophy and the pure stuff of experience. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 7 (3):226-242.   (Google | Edit)
Hamilton, Andy (1990). Ernst Mach and the elimination of subjectivity. Ratio 3 (2):117-135.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
James, William (1904). A world of pure experience. Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):533-543.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links | Edit)
James, William (1904). A world of pure experience. II. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):561-570.   (Google | More links | Edit)
James, William & Perry, Ralph Barton (eds.) (1996). Essays in Radical Empiricism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.   (Cited by 158 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: William James believed that events could not be catalogued simply as a series of facts, but had to be considered through the lens of experience.
James, William (1905). How two minds can know one thing. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (7):176-181.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Lockwood, Michael (1981). What was Russell's neutral monism? Midwest Studes in Philosophy 6:143-58.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Lowe, Victor (1942). William James' Pluralistic Metaphysics of Experience. In Victor Lowe (ed.), In Commemoration Of William James: 1842-1942. Columbia University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Moller, Mark S. (2001). James, perception and the Miller-Bode objections. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37 (4):609-626.   (Google | Edit)
Seigfried, Charlene H. (1992). William James's concrete analysis of experience. The Monist 75 (4):538-550.   (Google | Edit)
Sellars, Roy Wood (1907). The nature of experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (1):14-18.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Stubenberg, Leopold (online). Neutral monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)
Taylor, Eugene & Wozniak, Robert H. (1996). Pure experience: The response to William James. In E.I. Taylor & R.H. Wozniak (eds.), Pure Experience: The Response to William James. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: The radical empiricism of William James was first formally presented in his seminal papers of 1904, 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'A World of Pure Experience'. In James's view, pure experience was to serve as the source for psychology's primary data and radical empiricism was to launch an effective critique of experimentalism in psychology, a critique from which the problem of experimentalism within science could be addressed more broadly. This collection of papers presents James's formal statements on radical empiricism and a representative sample of contemporary responses from psychologists and philosophers. With only a few exceptions, these responses indicate just how badly James was misread - psychologists ignoring the heart of James's message and philosophers transforming James's metaphysics into something quite unintelligible to the emerging generation of experimental psychologists
Tully, Robert (1988). Russell's neutral monism. Russell 8:209-224.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Tully, R. E. (1993). Three studies of Russell's neutral monism. Russell 13 (1):5-35.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Velmans, Prof Max (2008). Reflexive monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):5-50.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming 'out-thereness' of the phenomenal world and to how the 'phenomenal world' relates to the 'physical world', the 'world itself', and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by 'transparency theory' and by 'biological naturalism'. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense
Wood, Joanne A. (1994). Lighthouse bodies: The neutral monism of Virginia Woolf and Bertrand Russell. Journal of the History of Ideas 55 (3):483-502.   (Google | More links | Edit)