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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Aspects of Consciousness :: Temporal Consciousness

See also:
Andersen, Holly & Grush, Rick (forthcoming). A brief history of time consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy.   (Google | Edit)
Antony, Michael V. (2001). On the temporal boundaries of simple experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):263-286.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences — those I call ‘simple experiential events’ (SEEs) — have a different character than the temporal boundaries of the events most frequently associated with experience: neural events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are sharper than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of complexity higher than that of elementary particle physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or other complex) events play key roles through identification or correlation) — are mistaken. More positively, the conclusion supports recent approaches that attempt to explain conciousness by appeal to quantum physics
Bennett, Jonathan (2004). Time in human experience. Philosophy 79 (308):165-183.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Bergmann, Gustav (1960). Duration and the specious present. Philosophy of Science 27 (January):39-47.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Bond, E. J. (2005). Does the subject of experience exist in the world? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):124-133.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither of change nor of motion. The subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and hence they have no objective reality
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1914). Time and the experience of time. Philosophical Review 23 (2):121-145.   (Google | Edit)
Brown, J. (2000). Mind and Nature: Essays on Time and Subjectivity. Whurr Publishers.   (Cited by 19 | Google | Edit)
Bruzina, Ronald (2000). There is more to the phenomenology of time than meets the eye. In John B. Brough (ed.), The Many Faces of Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google | Edit)
Burton, Robert G. (1976). The human awareness of time: An analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):303-318.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Butterfield, Jeremy (1998). Seeing the present. In Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links | Edit)
Chari, C. T. K. (1951). Some metaphysical questions about the doctrine of the 'specious present'. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 23 (October):129-138.   (Google | Edit)
Cobb-Stevens, Richard M. (1998). James and Husserl: Time-consciousness and the intentionality of presence and absence. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Dainton, Barry F. (2003). Time in experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In _Stream of Consciousness_ I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl were fundamentally flawed, and proposed a quite different account: the overlap model. While recognizing that the latter has merits, Gallagher argues that it too is fundamentally flawed; he also takes issue with some of my claims concerning Broad and Husserl. My reply comes in three main parts. I start by clarifying my use of certain terms, in particular _realism_ and _anti-realism_ as applied to theories of phenomenal temporality in general, and the accounts of Broad and Husserl in particular. I then turn to Gallagher’s main criticisms of the overlap theory. Gallagher argues that the theory is sunk by a problem with _ongoing contents_, that if our experience possessed the structures I ascribe to it, we would be aware of
Dennett, Daniel C. (1992). Temporal Anomalies of Consciousness. In Y. Christen & P.S. Churchland (eds.), Neurophilosophy and Alzheimer's Disease. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: As cognitive science, including especially cognitive neuroscience, closes in on the first realistic models of the human mind, philosophical puzzles and problems that have been conveniently postponed or ignored for generations are beginning to haunt the efforts of the scientists, confounding their vision and leading them down hopeless paths of theory. I will illustrate this claim with a brief look at several temporal phenomena which appear anomalous only because of a cognitive illusion: an illusion about the point of view of the observerix. Since there is no point in the brain where "it all comes together," several compelling oversimplifications of traditional theorizing must be abandoned
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-201.   (Cited by 394 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274
Dobbs, H. A. C. (1951). The relation between the time of psychology and the time of physics part I. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (6):122-141.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Dooley, Patrick K. (2006). William James's "specious present" and Willa cather's phenomenology of memory. Philosophy Today 50 (5):444-449.   (Google | Edit)
Dunlap, Knight (1911). Rhythm and the specious present. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (13):348-354.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Eames, Elizabeth R. (1986). Russell and the experience of time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):681-682.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Ewer, Bernard C. (1909). The time paradox in perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (6):145-149.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Falk, Arthur E. (2003). Perceiving temporal passage. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google | Edit)
Farrell, B. A. (1973). Temporal precedence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:193-216.   (Google | Edit)
Ferrari, Donald & Ferrari, Melanie (eds.) (2001). Consciousness in Time. Heidelberg: C Winter University Verlag.   (Google | Edit)
Findlay, J. N. (1956). Report on does it make sense to suppose that all events, including personal experiences, could occur in reverse? Analysis 16 (June):121.   (Google | Edit)
Franck, Georg (2004). Mental presence and the temporal present. In Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.), Brain and Being: At the Boundary Between Science, Philosophy, Language and Arts. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Gale, Richard M. (1997). From the specious to the suspicious present: The jack Horner phenomenology of William James. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 11 (3):163-189.   (Google | Edit)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience. Psyche 9 (10).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping experiences
Gallagher, Shaun (1979). Suggestions towards a revision of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. Man and World 12:445-464.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Gallagher, Shaun (1998). The Inordinance of Time. Northwestern University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Greene, David B. (1984). Mahler: Consciousness And Temporality. Gordon & Breach.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Gregg, John R. (online). Time consciousness and the specious present.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Roger Penrose, in _The Emperor's New Mind_ (1989), writes about the way Mozart perceived music. Mozart did not play a piece in his mind in real time, or even speeded up, but could hold it before him all at once. We all do this, although usually for much shorter riffs than entire symphonies. I have argued that the all-at-onceness of our thoughts and perceptions is at least as inexplicable as what it is like to see red; I think the aural/temporal all-at-onceness makes the point at least as vividly as the visual/spatial all-at-onceness of the curl of smoke in an art nouveau poster
Grush, Rick (2005). Brain time and phenomenological time. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: ... there are cases in which on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness a unitary apprehension takes place which is spread out over a temporal interval (the so-called specious present). ... That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united "forthwith" in a common structure
Grush, Rick (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. Synthese 153 (3):417-450.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts
Hodson, Shadworth H. (1900). Perception of change and duration-a reply. Mind 9 (34):240-243.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Hoerl, Christoph (1998). The perception of time and the notion of a point of view. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):156-171.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Hoy, Ronald C. (1976). Science and temporal experience: A critical defense. Philosophy Research Archives 1156.   (Google | Edit)
Husserl, Edmund G. (1991). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Translated by John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links | Edit)
Hutt, Curtis M. (1999). Husserl: Perception and the ideality of time. Philosophy Today 43 (4):370-385.   (Google | Edit)
Ismael, Jenann (ms). Memory and temporal phenomenology.   (Google | Edit)
Iyer, Vijay (2004). Improvisation, temporality and embodied experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):159-173.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Johnson, David Martel (1974). The temporal dimension of perceptual experience: A non-traditional empiricism. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):71-76.   (Google | Edit)
Kates, Carol A. (1970). Perception and temporality in Husserl's phenomenology. Philosophy Today 14:89-100.   (Google | Edit)
Kelly, Sean D. (forthcoming). On time and truth. In Kurt J. Pritzl (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Catholic University of America Press.   (Google | Edit)
Kelly, Sean D. (2005). Temporal awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google | Edit)
Kelly, Sean D. (forthcoming). Time and experience. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge.   (Google | Edit)
Kelly, Sean D. (2005). The puzzle of temporal experience. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Kriegel, Uriah (online). Temporally token-reflexive experiences.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call _causal_ token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non- perceptual) experiences, which I will call _temporal_ token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable
Lafleur, Laurence J. (1942). The specious present. Personalist 23:407-415.   (Google | Edit)
Larrabee, Mary J. (1989). Time and spatial models: Temporality in Husserl. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):373-392.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
le Poidevin, Robin (2004). A puzzle concerning time perception. Synthese 142 (1):109-142.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract:   According to a plausible and influential account of perceptual knowledge, the truth-makers of beliefs that constitute perceptual knowledge must feature in the causal explanation of how we acquire those beliefs. However, this account runs into difficulties when it tries to accommodate time perception – specifically perception of order and duration – since the features we are apparently tracking in such perception are (it is argued) not causal. The central aim of the paper is to solve this epistemological puzzle. Two strategies are examined. The first strategy locates the causal truth-makers within the psychological mechanism underlying time perception, thus treating facts about time order and duration as mind-dependent. This strategy, however, is problematic. The second strategy modifies the causal account of perceptual knowledge to include a non-causal component in the explanation of belief-acquisition, namely chronometric explanation. Applying this much more satisfactory approach to perceptual knowledge of time, we can preserve the mind-independence of order and duration, but not that of time''s flow
Loveday, T. (1900). Perception of change and duration-some additional notes. Mind 9 (35):384-388.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Mabbott, J. D. (1951). Our direct experience of time. Mind 60 (April):153-167.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Mabbott, J. D. (1955). The specious present. Mind 64 (July):376-383.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Martin, J. L. (1973). The duality of the present. Man and World 6 (September):293-301.   (Google | Edit)
McGill, V. J. (1930). An analysis of the experience of time. Journal of Philosophy 27 (20):533-544.   (Google | More links | Edit)
McInerney, Peter K. (1991). Time and Experience. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Mcinerney, Peter K. (1988). What is still valuable in Husserl's analyses of inner time-consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):605-616.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
McKinnon, Neil (2003). Presentism and consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced
Mensch, James (online). Husserl's account of our consciousness of time.   (Google | Edit)
Miller, Izchak (1984). Husserl, Perception, And Temporal Awareness. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | Edit)
Mohanty, Jitendra N. (1988). Time: Linear or cyclic, and Husserl's phenomenology of inner time consciousness. Philosophia Naturalis 25:123-130.   (Google | Edit)
Mundle, Clement W. K. (1954). How specious is the 'specious present'? Mind 63 (January):26-48.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Myers, Gerald E. (1971). William James on time perception. Philosophy of Science 38 (September):353-360.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2006). On the temporal continuity of human consciousness: Is James's firsthand description, after all, "inept"? Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (2):121-148.   (Google | Edit)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1993). The stream of consciousness: William James's specious present. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 12:367-385.   (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)