MindPapers: 1.7f. Functionalism and Qualia, General

Brown, Mark T. (1983). Functionalism and sensations. Auslegung 10:218-28. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Chalmers, David J. (1995). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper I use thought-experiments to argue that functional organization fully determines conscious experience. These thought-experiments involve the gradual replacement of neurons by silicon chips, and similar scenarios. I argue that if "absent qualia" or "inverted qualia", are possible, then phenomena I call "fading qualia" and "dancing qualia" will be possible; but I argue that it is very implausible that fading or dancing qualia are possible. The resulting position is a sort of nonreductive functionalism

Clark, Andy (2000). A case where access implies qualia? Analysis 60 (1):30-37. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Block (1995) famously warns against the confusion of ‘access-conscious- ness’ and ‘phenomenal consciousness’. Access consciousness occurs when the content of a mental state is poised for the control of rational action, for verbal report and for use in reasoning. Phenomenal consciousness, by contrast, involves the harder-to-deﬁne presence of experiential properties, of there being ‘something it is like’ to see red, to hear a distant bell, and so on. It is the explanation of phenomenal consciousness that constitutes the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness highlighted in Chalmers 1996. Block, like Chalmers, believes that many attempted explanations of phenomenal consciousness are really just explanations of (various forms of) access- consciousness, and that the two notions are conceptually quite distinct (Block 1995: §3, Chalmers 1996: ch. 1). I shall argue, however, that there is at least one kind of case in which facts about access seem to imply the presence of full-blown phenomenal consciousness – a kind of case, that is, in which given the facts about access it is impossible to conceive of the absence of phenomenal consciousness

Dumpleton, S. (1988). Sensation and function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):376-89. (Google | More links | Edit)

Eshelman, L. J. (1977). Functionalism, sensations, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74. (Google | Edit)

Georgiev, Danko (ms). Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance makes consciousness fundamental but meaningless spectator of its own drama. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: It is argued that if consciousness is a fundamental ingredient of reality then no any psychophysical law such as Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance is needed to keep coherence between experience and function (conscious action). Indeed Chalmers' proposal suggests epiphenomenal consciousness and is regress to a nineteenth century absurd philosophy. The quantum mechanics is the most successful current physical theory and can naturally accommodate consciousness without violation of physical laws

Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1985). Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists? American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (January):73-80. (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Greenberg, William M. (1998). On Chalmers' "principle of organizational invariance" and his "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" thought experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):53-58. (Google | Edit)

Hill, Christopher S. (1991). The failings of functionalism. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69. (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Jarrett, Greg (1996). Analyzing mental demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 84 (1):49-62. (Google | More links | Edit)

Levine, Joseph M. (1999). Philosophy as massage: Seeking relief from conscious tension. Philosophical Topics 26:159-78. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Lycan, William G. (1981). Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50. (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Lycan, William G. (1987). Homunctionalism and qualia. In Consciousness. MIT Press. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Moor, James H. (1988). Testing robots for qualia. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Nemirow, Laurence (1979). Functionalism and the Subjective Quality of Experience. Dissertation, Stanford University (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Pettit, Philip (2003). Looks as powers. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions—and that the other colours sustain corresponding a priori biconditionals. But the explication of being red by reference to looking red is not complemented by a great deal of attention to what it is for an object to look red, or to look any other colour. And this paper is addressed to that less thoroughly discussed topic

Rey, Georges (1994). Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualia. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Seager, William E. (1983). Functionalism, qualia and causation. Mind 92 (April):174-88. (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). The first-person perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22. (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Van Gulick, Robert (2007). Functionalism and qualia. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google | Edit)

van Gulick, Robert (1988). Qualia, functional equivalence and computation. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

van Heuveln, B.; Dietrich, Eric & Oshima, M. (1998). Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument. Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: David Chalmers'' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers'' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even stronger, we will argue that the gap in the argument cannot be closed

White, Stephen L. (1986). Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68 (August):333-68. (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist1 holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist2 holds (1) and (3) but denies (2). The transcendentalist holds (1) and (2) and denies (3). I argue that both versions of physicalist-functionalism inherit the problem of property dualism which originally helped to motivate functionalist theories of mind. I also argue that neither version of physicalist-functionalism can distinguish in a principled way between those neurophysiological properties of a subject which are relevant to the qualitative character of that subject's mental states and those which are not. I conclude that the only alternative to a functionalist account of qualitative states is a transcendentalist account and that this alternative is not likely to appeal to the critics of functionalism

White, Stephen L. (1989). Transcendentalism and its discontents. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):231-61. (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Wright, Edmond L. (1993). More qualia trouble for functionalism: The Smythies TV-Hood analogy. Synthese 97 (3):365-82. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones

Zuboff, Arnold (1994). What is a mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19:183-205. (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

1.7a	Qualia, General [42]

1.7e	Absent Qualia [30]

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