MindPapers: 2.4d. Object-Dependent Contents

Crawford, Sean (1998). In defence of object-dependent thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210. (Google | More links)

Levine, Joseph (1988). Demonstrating in mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Longworth, Guy (2003). Where should we look for the mind? Think 5. (Google)

Marques, Teresa (2006). On an Argument of Segal's Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts. Disputatio 2 (26). (Google | More links)

Abstract: This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.

McDowell, John (1990). Peacocke and Evans on demonstrative content. Mind 99 (394):255-266. (Google | More links)

Montague, Michelle (2009). The Content of Perceptual Experience. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. (Google)

Peacocke, Christopher (1991). Demonstrative content: A reply to John McDowell. Mind 100 (1):123-133. (Google | More links)

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