MindPapers: 4.3c. Machine Functionalism

Bender, John W. (1988). Knotty, knotty: Comments on Nelson's The New World Knot. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Google)

Eliasmith, Chris (2002). The myth of the Turing machine: The failings of functionalism and related theses. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 14 (1):1-8. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

Abstract: The properties of Turing’s famous ‘universal machine’ has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. Here, I show that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing’s powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, I further argue that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, I show that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation from function make multiple realizability claims untestable and uninformative. As a result, I conclude that the role of Turing machines in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered

Elugardo, Reinaldo (1981). Machine functionalism and the new lilliputian argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (March):256-61. (Annotation | Google)

Elugardo, Reinaldo (1983). Machine realization and the new lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43 (March):267-75. (Annotation | Google | More links)

Kane, Robert H. (1966). Turing machines and mental reports. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (December):344-52. (Google | More links)

Lycan, William G. (1979). A new lilliputian argument against machine functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):279-87. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Lycan, William G. (1974). Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):48-62. (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Lycan, William G. (1983). The moral of the new lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43 (March):277-80. (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Nelson, Raymond J. (1974). Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):365-86. (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Polger, Tom (web). Computational functionalism. In J. Symons & P. Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. (Google)

Abstract: An introduction to functionalism in the philosophy of psychology/mind, and review of the current state of debate pro and con. Forthcoming in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology (John Symons and Paco Calvo, eds.)

Pruss, Alexander R. (ms). Functionalism and counting minds. (Google)

Abstract: I argue that standard functionalism leads to absurd conclusions as to the number of minds that would exist in the universe if persons were duplicated

Putnam, Hilary (1960). Minds and machines. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. (Cited by 138 | Annotation | Google)

Putnam, Hilary (1975). Philosophy and our mental life. In Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 96 | Annotation | Google)

Putnam, Hilary (1987). Representation and Reality. MIT Press. (Cited by 473 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Abstract: Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his...

Putnam, Hilary (1967). The mental life of some machines. In Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.), Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Wayne State University Press. (Cited by 37 | Annotation | Google)

Putnam, Hilary (1967). The nature of mental states. In W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh University Press. (Cited by 126 | Annotation | Google)

Rorty, Richard (1972). Functionalism, machines and incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 64 (April):203-20. (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Shagrir, Oron (2005). The rise and fall of computational functionalism. In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge University Press. (Google | More links)

Tomberlin, James E. (1965). About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):295-99. (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Wagner, Steven J. (1988). The liberal and the lycanthrope. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):165-74. (Annotation | Google)

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