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Boly, Melanie; Faymonville, Marie-Elisabeth E. & Peigneux, Philippe (2004). Auditory processing in severely brain injured patients: Differences between the minimally conscious state and the persistent vegetative state.Archives of Neurology 61 (2):233-238. (Google)
Coleman, Diane; Shewmon, D. Alan & Giacino, J. T. (2002). "The minimally conscious state: Definition and diagnostic criteria": Comments and reply.Neurology 58 (3):506-507. (Google)
Giacino, Joseph T. & Kalmar, Kathleen (2005). Diagnostic and prognostic guidelines for the vegetative and minimally conscious states.Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):166-174. (Google)
Giacino, Joseph T. & Kalmar, Kathleen (1997). The vegetative and minimally conscious states: A comparison of clinical features and functional outcome.Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 12:36-51. (Cited by 45 | Google)
Gill-Thwaites, H. & Munday, R. (2004). The sensory modality assessment and rehabilitation technique (SMaRT): A valid and reliable assessment for vegetative state and minimally conscious state patients.Brain Injury 18 (12):1255-1269. (Google)
Abstract: Neurostimulation to restore cognitive and physical functions is an innovative and promising technique for treating patients with severe brain injury that has resulted in a minimally conscious state (MCS). The technique may involve electrical stimulation of the central thalamus, which has extensive projections to the cerebral cortex. Yet it is unclear whether an improvement in neurological functions would result in a net benefit for these patients. Quality-of-life measurements would be necessary to determine whether any benefit of neurostimulation outweighed any harm in their response to different degrees of cognitive and physical disability. These measures could also indicate whether the technique could be ethically justified and whether surrogates could give proxy consent to its use on brain-injured patients
Laureys, Steven; Faymonville, Marie-Elisabeth E. & Ferring, M. (2003). Differences in brain metabolism between patients in coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state and locked-in syndrome.European Journal of Neurology 10. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Naccache, Lionel (2006). Is she conscious?Science 313 (5792). (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Recent progress in neurosciences has improved our understanding of chronic disorders of consciousness. One example of this advancement is the emergence of the new diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS). The central characteristic of MCS is impaired consciousness. Though the phenomenon now referred to as MCS pre-existed its inclusion in diagnostic classifications, the current medical ethical concepts mainly apply to patients with normal consciousness and to non-conscious patients. Accordingly, how we morally should stand with persons in minimally conscious state remains unclear. In this paper, I examine whether the notion of human dignity could provide us with guidance with the moral difficulties MCS gives rise to. More precisely, I focus on the question of whether we are justified in holding that persons in minimally conscious state possess human dignity
Abstract: In this article, I consider whether the advance directive of a person in minimally conscious state ought to be adhered to when its prescriptions conflict with her current wishes. I argue that an advance directive can have moral significance after its issuer has succumbed to minimally conscious state. I also defend the view that the patient can still have a significant degree of autonomy. Consequently, I conclude that her advance directive ought not to be applied. Then I briefly assess whether considerations pertaining to respecting the patient's autonomy could still require obedience to the desire expressed in her advance directive and arrive at a negative answer