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2.2. Content Internalism and Externalism (Content Internalism and Externalism on PhilPapers)

• Is Content in the Head? [22]
• Social Externalism [24]
• Externalism and Psychological Explanation [18]
• Externalism and Mental Causation [6]
• Externalism and the Theory of Vision [3]
• Externalism and Computation [2]
• Externalism and Self-Knowledge [84]
• Narrow Content [28]
• The Extended Mind [53]
• Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc [30]

Is Content in the Head?

• Robert E. Cummins (1991). Methodological reflections on belief.   (More)
• Katalin Farkas (2003). Does twin earth rest on a mistake?   (More)
• Katalin Farkas (2003). What is externalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5114404&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XR39311N2T61WG02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000003/05114404
  
• Justin C. Fisher (2007). Why nothing mental is just in the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and histories are such that it is intuitively clear that they are mentally quite different, even while they are, for a moment, exactly alike with respect to whats in their heads. I offer positive reasons for thinking that the case I describe is indeed possible. I then consider ways in which mental internalists might attempt to account for this case, but conclude that the only plausible option is to reject mental internalism and to adopt a particular externalist alternative a history-oriented version of teleo-functionalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00649.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2007/00000041/00000002/art00009
  
• Juliet Floyd (2005). Putnam's 'the meaning of meaning': Externalism in historical context.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HHNrzP0kQYEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA17&ots=pD_aK8lR0H&sig=9pKMBI-I02mW5VBaqEIQ5flzJb8
  
• Bryan Frances (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
• Bryan Frances (online). Twin earth thought experiments.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose that you had always had a physical twin, Chris, who on a different planet went through life having physical characteristics, sensory experiences, utterances, and brain processes exactly the same as yours in every physical and sensory respect. Chris
• Mitchell S. Green (2000). The status of supposition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00216
  
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/../issues/103/10/2.pdf
  
• Joe Lau (online). Externalism about mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way
• Peter Ludlow (2003). Externalism, logical form, and linguistic intentions.   (More)
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Externalism, naturalism, and method.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)4<250:ENAM>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)4<250:ENAM>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522844.pdf
  
• Michael McGlone (forthcoming). Putnam on What Isn't in the Head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam argues, among other things, that “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”. Putnam’s central arguments in favor of this conclusion are unsound. The arguments in question are the famous intra‐world Twin Earth arguments, given on pages 223‐ 227 of the article in question.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g3103542832602p7/fulltext.pdf
  
• Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel (online). Multiple realizability revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions
• Michael Pelczar (forthcoming). Content internalism about indexical thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated possibility, but deny that it poses any threat to internalism. Despite their similarities, doppelgangers differ in some of their intrinsic properties, and it is to such intrinsic differences that differences of indexical content reduce.
• Hilary Putnam (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-zIsMB7H&sig=r5lLHU4I80039oLNPYtb0cJmHFk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-AKtLDcH&sig=zGWDJ_uKtm6vqJ2ifmStXrU7lz8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-xEqNA5I&sig=eMnnp4F_uXzdRgtZXJc9LG9a4_w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=+The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AHvMC6L&sig=l0CMfvrlOyXBlP6A8dIcf-xc00U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-AEsQC5D&sig=mG-ZCtj3rJniriIyK9tBNuEZ7QM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-xKqSy8H&sig=nrfzXwkUU2YQGI7pCHSSnWO7m-w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-BMuPz4I&sig=Y1w7uV5Joi6fNuQ5eDwFfnLXA-U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=+The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AErSC4H&sig=lg5ft6I9d-INpCItWgvwPvtOaBc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-yGrMC6F&sig=udP9z8weNmRnlJH-nBGE5SZBWrU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AJvNBcH&sig=5aLaRp0ZlkytqZ-fE-JCkgZ6VB0
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-yMrRF9J&sig=MBnPT9Cb2y13RWc3PvCyOwFS5Ig
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-CIuSB8E&sig=jVU5vGzH1WGDyhZAs6rVxmLXjak
  
• Howard M. Robinson (2003). Some externalist strategies and their problems.   (More)
• Alex Rosenberg (2001). On multiple realization: Comments and criticism and the special sciences.   (More)
• Lawrence A. Shapiro (2005). Can psychology be a unified science?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/PSAsubmission.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.htm
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.htm
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/508952
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS720536PDF
  
• Jaap van Brakel (2005). On the inventors of XYZ.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m4x672301927781l/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5267016&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M4X672301927781L.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foch/2005/00000007/00000001/05267016
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2005). Naming natural kinds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper discusses whether it can be known a priori that a particular term, such as water, is a natural kind term, and how this problem relates to Putnams claim that natural kind terms require an externalist semantics. Two conceptions of natural kind terms are contrasted: The first holds that whether water is a natural kind term depends on its a priori knowable semantic features. The second
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p6w65x777v328642/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5147013&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P6W65X777V328642.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000145/00000001/00007013
  
• Robert A. Wilson (2002). Individualism.   (More)

Social Externalism

• Jason Bridges (2006). Davidson's transcendental externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00619.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118586891/PDFSTART
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2006/00000073/00000002/art00002
  
• John M. Collins (2006). Temporal externalism, natural kind terms, and scientifically ignorant communities.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28209&layout=abstract
  
• Barry Loewer (2009). Why is there anything except physics?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible
• Ruth G. Millikan (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h75k4074305x1028/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H75K4074305X1028.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/1999/00000095/00000001/00207186
  
• Mitchell S. Green (2000). The status of supposition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00216
  
• John Haugeland (2004). Social cartesianism.   (More)
• Henry Jackman (2000). Deference and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/def-and-sk.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (1998). Individualism and interpretation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 'Interpretational' accounts of meaning are frequently treated as incompatible with accounts stressing language's 'social' character. However, this paper argues that one can reconcile interpretational and social accounts by distinguishing "methodological" from "ascriptional" individualism. While methodological individualism requires only that the meaning of one's terms ultimately be grounded in facts about oneself, ascriptional individualism requires that the meaning of one's terms be independent of how others use theirs. Interpretational accounts are committed only to methodological individualism, while arguments for languages social character are best understood as attacks on ascriptional individualism. As a result, one can recognize language's social character and still be an interpretationalist
• Henry Jackman (1996). Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such externalist theories within a methodologically individualistic framework by understanding semantic norms in terms of the need to reach, for each of one's terms, a type of "equilibrium." Each speaker's commitment to making her _own_ beliefs and applications consistent allows one to incorporate these 'external' factors into the contents of their thoughts and utterances in a way that remains methodologically individualistic. Methodologically individualistic accounts are typically taken to be unable to incorporate 'external' factors such as the world's physical make-up or communal usage because of arguments suggesting that the individual's own beliefs and usage underdetermine or even misidentify what, according to externalist accounts, they mean by their terms. These arguments, however, only seem plausible if one presupposes a comparatively impoverished conception of the individual's beliefs. The beliefs a speaker associates with a given term extend far beyond the handful of sentences they would produce if asked to list such beliefs. In particular, speakers have an implicit, but rich, understanding of their language, their world, and the relation between them. Speakers typically understand languages as shared temporally extended practices about which they can be, both individually and collectively, mistaken. Once this conception of language is taken into account, the ascriptions which purportedly forced 'non-individualistic' conceptions of content upon us (particularly ascriptions which seemed to tie what we meant to social use rather than our own beliefs) turn out to be ultimately grounded in the individual's own beliefs. Indeed, our self-conception does much more than merely underwrite 'non-individualistic' ascriptions..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/semanticnorms.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately re?ect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x
  
• Henry Jackman (2006). Temporal externalism, constitutive norms, and theories of vagueness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/CNV.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Temporal externalism, deference, and our ordinary linguistic practice.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/TE&OLP.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2005/00000086/00000003/art00005
  
• Henry Jackman (1999). We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's terms mean, there is little reason not to let its future usage to do so as well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/T-ext.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/t-ext.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00078
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00003
  
• Jeeloo Liu (2002). Physical externalism and social externalism: Are they really compatible?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Putnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one's psychological state is determined by what is in the head . Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam's view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical environment play a role in determining the meanings of natural kind terms. Burge, on the other hand, is regarded as following up Putnam's argument to bring in factors in the social environment for the determination of belief. Burge's view has been commonly referred to as 'social externalism.' The general consensus in the field is that physical externalism and social externalism are compatible views. Furthermore, both Putnam and Burge seem to endorse each other’s position for the most part. In this paper, however, I shall argue against this general view to show that the two theories are deep down incompatible
• Kirk A. Ludwig (ms). The myth of social content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Social externalism is the view that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are logically determined at least in part by her linguistic community's standards for the use of her words. If social externalism is correct, its importance can hardly be overemphasized. The traditional Cartesian view of psychological states as essentially first personal and non-relational in character, which has shaped much theorizing about the nature of psychological explanation, would be shown to be deeply flawed
• Christian Onof & Leslie Marsh (2008). Introduction to the special issue “perspectives on social cognition”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years.
• Michael McKinsey (1993). Curing folk psychology of arthritis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial thought experiment nor a second type of example that Burge describes supports either of these conclusions. Second, I will identify the proper conclusion to draw from Burge's discussion and show that this conclusion does not really pose a serious problem for individualism about the mental. And finally, I will argue that Burge's discussion does not in fact provide a conclusive reason for believing its proper conclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M1W49825V7173XW7.pdf
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2003). In defense of public language.   (More)
• Peter Pagin (2006). Intersubjective externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in T. Marvan (ed) What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, 39-54, 2006
• David Pitt (ms). The Burgean intuitions.   (More)
• Sarah Sawyer (2003). Conceptual errors and social externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.sussex.ac.uk/1588/01/Conceptual_Errors_and_Social_Externalism_Final.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00311
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000211/art00008
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2004). Externalism and incomplete understanding.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00352.x
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2001). Social externalism and conceptual errors.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist can opt for a
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x/abs/
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200104)51:203<217:SEACE>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200104)51:203<217:SEACE>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660569.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000203/art00006
  
• Andrew Woodfield (1998). Social externalism and conceptual diversity.   (More)

Externalism and Psychological Explanation

• Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Let's assume there are psychological generalizations that the folk rely upon in explaining and predicting the behavior of their fellows. Let's further assume these generalizations are intentional, in that they do their explanatory and predictive work by attributing to the subjects in their domain intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, and the like. Then we can define a broad intentional psychology as one that adverts only to broad, viz. purely denotational/truth-conditional, mental contents in its generalizations; so the sentences expressing its generalizations should be transparently read. A narrow psychology is one that is not so restricted. [1] Accordingly, the sentences expressing narrow generalizations will contain opaque contexts, indicated by `that'-clauses (`believes that ...', `desires that ...', and the like). Here is an example of the sort of generalization we have in mind:

  (G) If S desires that P and believes that S can bring it about that P, then, ceteris paribus, S will try
  to bring it about that P.

  In recent years, the question of whether such generalizations are broad or narrow has received considerable attention in philosophy of psychology. The general consensus among theorists has been that because generalizations like (G) are false when construed transparently, intentional psychology cannot be broad. For example, when read transparently, (G) seems to be falsified by Oedipus's story. Oedipus wished not to marry Mom and believed that he could achieve this, yet he did not avoid marrying her -- on the contrary. So Oedipus satisfied the antecedent and flouted the consequent of (G). In this way, Frege puzzles have served to motivate a narrow intentional psychology, where the intentional properties attributed to mental states are individuated more finely than denotations or truth-conditions
• David J. Buller (1997). Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/28/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000328/00/indy&ep.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:328
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199703)64:1<74:IAEP(I>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199703)64:1<74:IAEP(I>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392536
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/188370.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/328/1/indy%26ep.htm
  http://cogprints.org/328/0/indy%26ep.htm
  
• David J. Buller (1992). "Narrow"-mindedness breeds inaction.   (More)
• Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2185131.pdf
  
• Tyler Burge (1982). Two thought experiments reviewed.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093870087&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Jerry A. Fodor (1982). Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093883623&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Pierre Jacob (online). Belief attribution and rationality: A dilemma for Jerry Fodor.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/60/index.html
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/60/ijn_00000360_00/ijn_00000360_00.htm
  
• Pierre Jacob (2002). Can mental content explain behavior?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000280/en/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/80/ijn_00000280_00/ijn_00000280_00.htm
  
• Michael Losonsky (1995). Emdedded systems vs. individualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational theorizing. Recent work in computational developmental psychology (by A. Karmiloff-Smith and J. Rutkowska) as well as artificial agents or embedded artificial systems (by L.P. Kaelbling, among others) casts doubt on these claims. In these computational models, the environment does not just trigger and sustain input for computational operations, but some computational operations actually involve environmental structures
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l0hl738085561524/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L0HL738085561524.pdf
  
• Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental
• Karen Neander (ms). The narrow and the normative.   (More)
• Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). False consciousness of intentional psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the agent. In the first part of the paper, I show that some powerful arguments designed to demonstrate the incoherence of explanatory nonindividualism fail. In the second part of the paper, I offer a nonindividualist explanation of the apparent obviousness of belief-desire psychology. I argue that there are two levels of the intelligibility of our actions. On the more fundamental (explanatory) level, the question "Why did the agent do something?" admits a variety of folk-psychological categories. But there is another (formation-of-self) level, at which the same question admits only of answers that ultimately appeal only to the agent's own desires. Explanatory individualism results from the confusion of the two levels
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690569~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/JEMJLF93TFKTCQNQ.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/JEMJLF93TFKTCQNQ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2002/00000015/00000003/art00003
  
• John Perry (1998). Broadening the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~jperry//PHILPAPERS/elm.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/elm.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199803)58:1<223:BTM>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199803)58:1<223:BTM>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653644.pdf
  
• Bradley Rives (2009). Concept cartesianism, concept pragmatism, and Frege cases.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’ are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’ treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations, but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/qg48778p14463402/fulltext.pdf
  
• Mark Rowlands (1995). Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made to show how these principles can be extended to cognition as a whole. It is suggested that these principles may have a foundation in evolutionary biology
• Sarah Sawyer (2006). The role of object-dependent content in psychological explanation.   (More)
• Stephen P. Stich (1978). Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis.   (More)
• J. Wallace & H. E. Mason (1990). On some thought experiments about mind and meaning.   (More)
• Robert A. Wilson (2004). Recent work on individualism in the social, behavioural, and biological sciences.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The social, behavioral, and a good chunk of the biological sciences concern the nature of individual agency, where our paradigm for an individual is a human being. Theories of economic behavior, of mental function and dysfunction, and of ontogenetic development, for example, are theories of how such individuals act, and of what internal and external factors are determinative of that action. Such theories construe individuals in distinctive ways
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/rnr0798115309k31/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/RNR0798115309K31.pdf
  

Externalism and Mental Causation

• Anthony B. Dardis (2002). Individualism and the new logical connections argument.   (More)
• Wim de Muijnck (2002). Causation by relational properties.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=skEGFPOVZ4cC&oi=fnd&pg=PA123&ots=TBdxr9PIB0&sig=w0YckxSDth1wWXv4VcGw-_G7VDQ
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2003/00000065/00000001/art00007
  
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Causal relevance and thought content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199407)44:176<334:CRATC>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199407)44:176<334:CRATC>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2219613.pdf
  
• David Robb & John Heil (online). Mental Causation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Worries about mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how a mental substance (thought to be immaterial) could interact with a material substance, a body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental qua mental cause what it does? After looking at the traditional Problem of Interaction, we survey various versions of the property-based problem and look at proposed solutions to them.
• Nicholas Shea (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00306
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00306
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000211/art00003
  
• Vadim V. Vasilyev (2006). Brain and consciousness: Exits from the labyrinth.   (More)

Externalism and the Theory of Vision

• Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2185131.pdf
  
• Sarah Patterson (1996). Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision.   (More)
• Arnold Silverberg (2006). Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/e649774142n0n580/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/E649774142N0N580.pdf
  

Externalism and Computation

• Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2004). Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=18564&layout=abstract
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=18564&jid=190&layout=abstract
  
• Susan Schneider (2005). Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00294.x
  

Externalism and Self-Knowledge

• Dorit Bar-On (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00477.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00477.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2004/00000038/00000003/art00003
  
• Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200107)51:204<356:TOWBTQ>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200107)51:204<356:TOWBTQ>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00234
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3542694.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000204/art00005
  
• Paul A. Boghossian (1994). The transparency of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<33:TTOMC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<33:TTOMC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214162.pdf
  
• Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the externalist can know A Priori.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not merely at that of reference: what concepts we think in terms of -- and not just what they happen to pick out -- is said by the externalist to depend upon environmental facts. By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, what our thoughts are in our own case. Suppose I entertain a thought that I would express with the sentence `Water is wet'. According to the traditional doctrine, I can know without empirical investigation (a) that I am entertaining a thought; (b) that it has a particular conceptual content, and (c) that its content is that water is wet
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<197:WTECK">2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9264.00011/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9264.00011
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522971.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00010
  
• Bill Brewer (2000). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of empirical facts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00017
  
• Bill Brewer (2004). Self-knowledge and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
• J. Brown (2003). The reductio argument and transmission of warrant.   (More)
• Anthony L. Brueckner (2004). McKinsey redux?   (More)
• Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Transcendental arguments from content externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JnCPaM0KeG8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA229&ots=Nx4bk8WRSf&sig=WFXw5ZvKqKSSB72vO200Rl1YAVo
  
• Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Two recent approaches to self-knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1999)33<251:TRATS>2.0.CO;2-C
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.12
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676105.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1999/00000013/A00300s1/art00180
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1999/00000033/A013s013/art00012
  
• Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge.   (More)
• Andrew Cullison (2007). Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/b087376511363126/fulltext.pdf
  
• Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00012
  
• Martin Davies (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00016
  
• Martin Davies (2003). Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person
• Martin Davies (2003). The problem of armchair knowledge.   (More)
• Fred Dretske (2003). Externalism and self-knowledge.   (More)
• Gary Ebbs (2003). A puzzle about doubt.   (More)
• J. Edwards (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00014
  
• Jonathan Ellis (2007). Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fortytwo.ucsc.edu/~jellis/SelfKnowledgeAbstract.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/9675155563768212/fulltext.pdf
  
• Katalin Farkas (2003). What is externalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5114404&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XR39311N2T61WG02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000003/05114404
  
• Jordi Fernandez (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2004.00197.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2004/00000012/00000001/art00002
  
• Andr Gallois (1994). Deflationary self-knowledge.   (More)
• Brie Gertler (2004). We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00459.x
  
• John Gibbons (2001). Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200101)51:202<13:EAKOTA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200101)51:202<13:EAKOTA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00211
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00211
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660518.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000202/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Given anti-individualism, a subjectmight have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking thatp, have complete and exhaustiveexplicational knowledge of all of the conceptscomposing the content that p, and yetstill need empirical information (e.g.regarding her embedding conditions and history)prior to being in a position to apply herexhaustive conceptual knowledge in aknowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed byanti-individualists: it squares with everythingthat compatibilist-minded anti-individualistshave said regarding e.g. the compatibility ofanti-individualism and basic self-knowledge;and more importantly it contains the crux of aresponse to McKinsey-style arguments againstanti-individualism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/lw16173322454u25/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5139899&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/LW16173322454U25.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000116/00000001/05139899
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00643.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2007/00000041/00000002/art00003
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x?ai=2l8&mi=85vxf&af=R
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2006/00000087/00000003/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.t01-1-00403
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000004/art00403
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000004/art00004
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/mt277m670g227t02/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=190144&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/MT277M670G227T02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2000/00000100/00000001/00190144
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2004). Review of Maria Frapolli (ed.), Esther Romero (ed.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge.   (More)
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00078/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00078
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1997/00000057/00000255/art00078
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r128657034g5656p/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=200268&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R128657034G5656P.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/1999/00000118/00000002/00200268
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00077?prevSearch=fulltextfield:(burge+memory)
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00077
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00077
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). What do you know when you know your own thoughts?   (More)
• John Greco (2004). Externalism and skepticism.   (More)
• Lisa L. Hall (1998). The self-knowledge that externalists leave out.   (More)
• Jussi Haukioja (2006). Semantic externalism and A Priori self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which _aims_ to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a _Dry Earth _scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two-dimensional semantics, using the notion of 'considering a possible world as actual', I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian's question: which concept would 'water' express on Dry Earth?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00318.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2006/00000019/00000002/art00004
  
• Henry Jackman (2000). Deference and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/def-and-sk.pdf
  
• Pierre Jacob (2004). Do we know how we know our own minds yet?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000352/en/
  http://pierrejacob.hautetfort.com/files/self_ext.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (web). Incompatibility arguments and semantic self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/Incompatibility.pdf
  
• Pierre Jacob (ms). Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/38/HTML/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/00/43/ijn_00000043_00/ijn_00000043_00.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M2467LG425724043.pdf
  
• Matthew Kennedy (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
• Klaas (2002). Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge.   (More)
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/../issues/103/10/2.pdf
  
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/../issues/103/10/2.pdf
  
• Klaas J. Kraay (2002). Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/pp7alq1al44qjtuj/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=380317&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/PP7ALQ1AL44QJTUJ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2002/00000056/00000003/00380317
  http://www.ryerson.ca/%7Ekraay/Documents/Externalism.pdf
  
• William S. Larkin (ms). Burge on our privileged access to the external world.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (online). Comments on Pryor's “externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I. Pryor on McKinsey:

  A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning
  1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection.
  So
  I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone:

  McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_
• William S. Larkin (2000). Content skepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is compatible with privileged access and the distinctive epistemic character of introspective judgments
• William S. Larkin (online). Content skepticism and reliable self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint
• William S. Larkin (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and knowing the width of Water.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and brains in vats.   (More)
• Willian Larkin (ms). The non-apriority of concept width.   (More)
• Peter Ludlow (1999). First-person authority and memory.   (More)
• C. Macdonald (1998). Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.¹ In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation dependence of subjects' intentional states on factors beyond their bodies. His reason is that whereas externalism—the view that certain intentional states of persons are individuation-dependent on objects and/or phenomena external to their bodies—is a metaphysical thesis, authoritative self-knowledge is an epistemological matter. This being so, there is no reason to suppose that the two need conflict with one another
• Luca Malatesti (ms). Externalism and the knowledge of mental states.   (More)
• David Manley (2007). Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge the traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute 'strong privileged access', and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/issues/104/8/2.pdf
  http://beta.philosophyonline.orghttp://beta.philosophyonline.org/xtf/data/jph/104-8/jph_0104_0008_0403_0423.pdf
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/../issues/104/8/2.pdf
  
• Gregory McCulloch (1999). Content externalism and cartesian scepticism: A reply to Brueckner.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=W2Lr89ALdPQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA251&ots=_Q2NkRhJVC&sig=1W-MAdJkCkXyFB0AHDDXPIa0pNw
  
• Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of externalism and privileged access.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118944438/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.8
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/A0160s16/art00391
  
• Michael McKinsey (2003). Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.¹ One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmit to a known deductive consequence of that premise, and who contend that this fact under-mines my argument for incompatibilism. I will try to show here that the Davies/Wright point about transmission of warrant does not adversely affect my argument
• Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism.   (More)
• Yujin Nagasawa (2002). Externalism and the memory argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=206
  http://www.cappe.edu.au/people/nagayu/3Memory.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/pdf/Nagasawa/Memory.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/nagasawa_Memory.pdf
  http://www.ptr.bham.ac.uk/staff/docs/nagasawa_externalism.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2002.tb00249.x
  http://www.yujinnagasawa.com/resources/memory.pdf
  
• Paul Noordhof (2004). Outsmarting the McKinsey-brown argument?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has been re?ned. It is based on three claims (where A partially serves to characterise the content of some belief state for which Externalism is true and E is some proposition about the external world)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00460.x/enhancedabs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00460.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2004/00000064/00000281/art00009
  
• Susana Nuccetelli (2003). Knowing that one knows what one is talking about.   (More)
• David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism and scepticism: II--David Owens, scepticisms: Descartes and Hume.   (More)
• Ian Phillips (online). Reflections on externalism and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the mid-nineties a large number of philosophers (most famously, Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown and Paul Boghossian) raised and discussed a certain form of challenge to externalism. In Boghossian
• Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content externalism must be incompatible with epistemic internalism. In a recent and influential paper, however, James Chase has challenged this conventional wisdom by offering a subtle defence of the view that content externalism and epistemic internalism are, in fact, compatible after all.2 Our aim here is twofold. First, to show that Chase is only able to achieve this result because he focuses upon the internalist conception of justification, rather than knowledge. Second, to formulate one prima facie argument which shows that an internalist conception of knowledge is incompatible with an externalist conception of content, an argument which, moreover, is not touched by Chase
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy-dev.stir.ac.uk/staff/duncan-pritchard/documents/ContEpistExtPhilosophia.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/1412251270wxn712/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/1412251270WXN712.pdf
  
• Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on reasons, externalism and scepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy-dev.stir.ac.uk/staff/duncan-pritchard/documents/McDowellonScepticismFINAL.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0378.00187
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2003/00000011/00000003/art00002
  
• James Pryor (web). Externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn
• Klaus Puhl (1994). Davidson on intentional content and self-knowledge.   (More)
• Diana Raffman (1998). First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00013
  
• Sarah Sawyer (2004). Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00509.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2004/00000064/00000284/art00011
  
• Sarah Sawyer (1998). Privileged access to the world.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unl.edu/philosop/people/faculty/sawyer/PrivilAccespaper.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a739205756~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/W774848528107U98.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/W774848528107U98.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/1998/00000076/00000004/art00001
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/tajp/1998/00000076/00000004/art00001
  
• Sarah Sawyer (2003). Sufficient absences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00422
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2003/00000063/00000279/art00008
  
• Andrew F. Smith (2003). Semantic externalism, authoritative self-knowledge, and adaptation to slow switching.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I here argue against the viability of Peter Ludlow’s modified version of Paul Boghossian’s argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. Ludlow contends that slow switching is not merely actual but is, moreover, prevalent; it can occur whenever we shift between localized linguistic communities. It is therefore quite possible, he maintains, that we undergo unwitting shifts in our mental content on a regular basis. However, there is good reason to accept as plausible that despite their prevalence we are in fact able to readily adapt to such switches, as well as to the shifts in mental content that accompany them. The prevalence of slow switching between linguistic communities does not then necessarily entail incompatibility after all
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://transactionpub.metapress.com/index/871350P3124860J7.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/871350P3124860J7.pdf
  
• David Sosa (1996). Representing Thoughts and Language.   (More)
• Daniel Whiting, Fregean sense and anti-individualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The definitive version of this article is published in Philosophical Books 48.3 July 2007 pp. 233-240 by Blackwell Publishing, and is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/52404/1/Fregean_Sense_and_Anti-Individualism_-_Daniel_Whiting.pdf
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (online). Self-knowledge and knowledge of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_philosophy/v038/38.3.wikforss.pdf
  
• C. Wright (2000). Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.17/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.17
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/A00100s1/art00239
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/A00101s1/art00017
  
• C. Wright (2003). Some reflections on the acquisition of warrant by inference.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~arche/pages/papers/Nuccetelli final.pdf
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/philosophy/arche/pages/papers/Nuccetelli final.pdf
  
• Stephen Yablo (1998). Self-knowledge and semantic luck.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<219:S&SL>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<219:S&SL>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522973.pdf
  

Narrow Content

• Louise M. Antony (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (More)
• Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ABSTRACT. In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to the notion of narrow content in explaining Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. For his pure informational semantics fails to avoid assigning disjunctive content to twins, since nomic covariations take care not only actual but also counterfactual contexts into account. I show that none of the attempts made by Fodor to block this consequence of his theory works. The present notion of broad content he now operates with is therefore in a position to take over all the important jobs that his previous notion of narrow content could do
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00082.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119154914/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/F0020003/art00010
  
• Kent Bach (1996). Content: Wide vs. narrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: narrow content as a function from context to wide content.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/widenarr.html
  
• Ned Block (1995). Ruritania revisited.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1523040.pdf
  
• David M. Braun (2002). Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~braun/Papers/cogsig.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/ab2auf89b269d9kj/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=403549&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/AB2AUF89B269D9KJ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2002/00000108/F0020001/00403549
  
• Joao Branquinho (1999). The problem of cognitive dynamics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan?s account and Evans?s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000401/00/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:401
  http://cogprints.org/401/1/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.org/401/0/Cog.htm
  
• Curtis Brown (1993). Belief states and narrow content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00290.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119302062/PDFSTART
  
• Berit Brogaard, Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the day following the occurrence of my belief state in the actual world. Let us call propositional content which has a truth-value relative only to a possible world ‘non-relativistic content’. Non-relativistic content can be treated as either structured or unstructured. On the unstructured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set of possible worlds and bears the truth-value true just in case the actual world is a member of that set. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is working now’ at time t is the set of worlds in which Jim is working at t, and this content is true just in case the actual world is among those worlds. On the structured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set or conglomeration of properties and/or objects, where properties are features which objects possess regardless of who considers or observes them and regardless of when they are being considered or observed. Such properties are said to be (or represent) functions from possible worlds to extensions. Relative to a possible world they determine a set of objects instantiating the property. For example, relative to the actual world the property of being human determines the set of actual humans. Not all content is non-relativistic. Let us say that propositional content is relativistic just in case it possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world. A centered world is a possible world in which an individual and a time are marked, where the marked individual..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/TheContentofPerception.pdf
  http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/CenteredWorldsandtheContentofPercept.pdf
  http://sites.google.com/site/brogaardb/CenteredWorldsandtheContentofPercept.pdf
  
• David J. Chalmers (2002). The components of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/321/
  http://consc.net/papers/content.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/393071.html
  http://cogprints.org/321/0/content.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chalmers95components.html
  http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/pub/chalmers.content.ps
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/content.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/21/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000321/00/content.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:321
  http://cogprints.org/321/1/content.html
  
• David Chalmers (manuscript). The components of content (1995 version).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Is content in the head? I believe that water is wet. My twin on Twin Earth, which is just like Earth except that H2O is replaced by the superficially identical XYZ, does not. His thoughts concern not water but twin water: I believe that water is wet, but he believes that twin water is wet. It follows that that what a subject believes is not wholly determined by the internal state of the believer. Nevertheless, the cognitive similarities between me and my twin are striking. Is there some wholly internal aspect of content that we might share?
• David J. Chalmers (2003). The nature of narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/narrow.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showEnhancedAbstract&doi=10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00004/enhancedabs/
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710664/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  
• Bryan Frances (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1999). Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics.   (More)
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.sfs.nphil.uni-tuebingen.de/Alumni/Dissertationen/ullidiss/en_index.html
  
• David Hunter, Gabriel Segal, a slim book about narrow content(mit press, 2000), 177 pp.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Mind-Body problem is the problem of saying how a person’s mental states and events relate to his bodily ones. How does Oscar’s believing that water is cold relate to the states of his body? Is it itself a bodily state, perhaps a state of his brain or nervous system? If not, does it nonetheless depend on such states? Or is his believing that water is cold independent of his bodily states? And, crucially, what are the notions of dependence and independence at issue here?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ryerson.ca/dhunter/my%20publications/A%20slim%20book%20about%20narrow%20content.pdf
  
• Frank Jackson (2003). Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of content, but for anyone who takes seriously the representational nature of intentional states, it must be one legitimate and central notion of content. To discover that DNA has a double helix structure is to make a selection from the various possible structures
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.latrobe.edu.au/philosophy/staff/Narrow content.pdf
  http://phil.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/~phidept/jackson/FJ Narrow content.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0065-972X(200311)77:2<55:NCAROT>2.0.CO;2-Q
  
• Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1993). Some content is narrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in 2. properly scicntiicm psychology 0r cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard t0 d0. The considerations—mcthod010gicaI solipsism, the principle 0f autonomy, 0r what:cvcr—invokcd to show that a broad notion 0f content cannot..
• Uriah Kriegel (2008). Real narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00345.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120085768/PDFSTART
  
• Uriah Kriegel & Terry Horgan (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
• Joe Lau (ms). Three motivations for narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed is the very same thing. According to the thesis of externalism that has been defended most notably by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, not all of the contents of our mental states are determined by our intrinsic properties. Instead, the contents of our beliefs and desires are often determined in part by our relations to the environment. They are, so to speak, "wide" contents that are "not in our heads." Although externalism is accepted by most philosophers, many have argued that mental states with wide contents must also have a kind of content wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of the individuals who are in those states. This kind of content is called "narrow content". The aim of this paper is to distinguish between three rather different motivations for postulating narrow content. I argue that, given a certain conception of narrow content that I shall explain below, none of these three motivations succeed in establishing the existence of narrow content
• Ernest LePore & Barry M. Loewer (1989). Dual aspect semantics.   (More)
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kludwig/web/users/kludwig/Abstracts/Abstract for Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind.htm
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2216113.pdf
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Content by courtesy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2027158.pdf
  
• Gabriel Segal (online). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person
• Gabriel Segal (2007). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (More)
• Timothy Williamson (1998). The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1998)32<389:TBOTMS>2.0.CO;2-Q
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676155.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0020s12/art00125
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0120s12/art00125
  

The Extended Mind

• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (ms). Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently allow for the possibility that cognition extends into the external world.[3] So, the (logical, conceptual, or nomological) possibility of extended cognition seems to us not the kind of radical view the advocates of this view have often implied. This is not, of course, to assess or pass judgment on the truth of these possibilities; it is only to note that they are not what most agitates people about the hypothesis of extended cognition. Framing the radical extended cognition hypothesis is a more delicate matter than framing the modal extended cognition hypothesis, but something like the following is in the ballpark. The radical extended cognition hypothesis maintains that, in many mundane cases of tool use, human cognitive processes extend into the tools. The principal reason this hypothesis is so delicate is that there remains much room for dispute about what constitutes a
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to active externalism.   (More)
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending non-derived content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Defending Nonderived Content (Blind).doc
  
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Defending the Bounds of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That about sums up what is wrong with Clark
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/publications/defendingtheboundsofcognition.doc
  http://stage.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/publications/defendingtheboundsofcognition.doc
  
• Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Why the mind is still in the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Murat Paper.doc
  
• Kenneth Aizawa (ms). Clark's conditions on extended cognition are too strong.   (More)
• Ken Aizawa (ms). Clark missed the mark: Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently allow for the possibility that cognition extends into the external world.[3] So, the (logical, conceptual, or nomological) possibility of extended cognition seems to us not the kind of radical view the advocates of this view have often implied. This is not, of course, to assess or pass judgment on the truth of these possibilities; it is only to note that they are not what most agitates people about the hypothesis of extended cognition. Framing the radical extended cognition hypothesis is a more delicate matter than framing the modal extended cognition hypothesis, but something like the following is in the ballpark. The radical extended cognition hypothesis maintains that, in many mundane cases of tool use, human cognitive processes extend into the tools. The principal reason this hypothesis is so delicate is that there remains much room for dispute about what constitutes a “mundane” case of tool use, such as keeping a notebook at hand at all times, versus an exotic case of tool use, such as having a computer memory chip implanted in one’s brain. Clark never in so many words defends the idea that there are actual cases of extended cognition. Rather, his tacit commitment must be inferred from such things as his proposal that the brain is made to use tools, so we should view tools as part of the mind (Cf., Clark, 2005, p. 8ff.)
• Ken Aizawa (ms). Defending the Bounds of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That about sums up what is wrong with Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark apparently thinks that the nature of the processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell phone, piece of string, or whatever, has nothing to do with whether that thing carries out cognitive processing.[1] Rather, what matters is how the thing interacts with a cognitive agent; the thing has to be coupled to a cognitive agent in a particular kind of way. Clark (20??) gives three conditions that constitute a rough or partial specification of the kind of coupling required
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/publications/defendingtheboundsofcognition.doc
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Persons and the extended-mind thesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122572787/PDFSTART
  
• John Campbell (1993). The role of physical objects in spatial thinking.   (More)
• J. Case (2004). Offloading memory to the environment: A quantitative example.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v38705833611179g/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V38705833611179G.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2004/00000014/00000003/05267380
  
• Anthony Chemero (2007). Asking what's inside the head: Neurophilosophy meets the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing its name, one that truly came of age in 1999 when Kath- leen Akins won a million-dollar fellowship to begin the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. The McDonnell Project put neurophilosophy at the forefront of philosophy of mind and cogni- tive science, yielding proliferating articles, conferences, special journal issues and books. In two major new books, neurophilosophers Patricia Churchland (2002) and John Bickle (2003) clearly feel this newfound prominence: Churchland mocks those who do not apply findings in neuroscience to philosophical problems as “no-brainers”; Bickle mocks anyone with traditional philosophical concerns, including “naturalistic philosophers of mind” and other neurophilosophers
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/bickchurchrev.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m812557162027h08/fulltext.pdf
  
• Tony Chemero & Michael Silberstein, Defending extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this talk, we defend extended cognition against several criticisms. We argue that extended cognition does not derive from armchair theorizing and that it neither ignores the results of the neural sciences, nor minimizes the importance of the brain in the production of intelligent behavior. We also argue that explanatory success in the cognitive sciences does not depend on localist or reductionist methodologies; part of our argument for this is a defense of what might be called ‘holistic science’
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003204/01/defendingextendedmindv3.doc
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/cogsci08pub.pdf
  
• Zoe Drayson & Andy Clark (forthcoming). Augmentation, Agency, and the Spreading of the Mental State.   (More)
• Andy Clark (2006). Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.msu.edu/DSS/2004-2005/Clark/The Extended Mind.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/Mementosrevenge2.pdf
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Reasons, robots and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~tiinam/clark.pdf
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1313?mode=simple
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/F0020002/art00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000015/00000002/art00162
  
• Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers (1998). The extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an _active externalism_ , based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/extended.html
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1312
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://www.lps.uci.edu/~johnsonk/philpsych/readings/clark.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/clark.html
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil951/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000320/00/extended.html
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/clark (1998) the extended mind.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil554/PAPERS/THE EXTENDED MIND.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:320
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00096
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000257/art00096
  http://cogprints.org/320/1/extended.html
  http://cogprints.org/320/0/extended.html
  
• Terry Dartnall (2005). Does the world Leak into the mind? Active externalism, "internalism", and epistemology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/publisherurilogger?itemId=4248&uri=http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  
• Jerry Fodor (2009). Where is my mind?   (More)
• Joseph S. Fulda (ms). "The extended mind"--extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We review the argument made by Clark and Chalmers in _Analysis_ for a limited externalism and extend their argument from declarative knowledge to procedural knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1093/3/EXTENDED.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/1093/0/EXTENDED.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/363/0/EXTENDED.html
  
• Alva Noë (2006). Experience without the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world
• Brie Gertler (2007). Overextending the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:      Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to reveal the best alternative for those who remain skeptical about the existence – or, perhaps, even the possibility – of extended minds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999712
  
• C. Gershenson (ms). Where is the problem of “where is the mind?”?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We propose that the discussions about “where the mind is” depend directly on the metaphysical preconception and definition of “mind”. If we see the mind from one perspective (individualist), it will be only in the brain, and if we see it from another (active externalist), it will be embedded in the body and extended into the world. The “whereabouts” of the mind depends on our 1 of mind. Therefore, we should not ask if the mind is somewhere, but if it is somehow
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2620/1/PhilCogSci2%2DMind%2DEssay.pdf
  
• Mitchell S. Green (2000). The status of supposition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00216
  
• Joseph Heath & Joel Anderson, Procrastination and the extended will.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Less than a decade ago, “rational choice theory” seemed oddly impervious to criticism. Hundreds of books, articles and studies were published every year, attacking the theory from every angle, yet it continued to attract new converts. How times have changed! The “anomalies” that Richard Thaler once blithely cataloged for the Journal of Economic Perspectives are now widely regarded, not as curious deviations from the norm, but as falsifying counterexamples to the entire project of neoclassical economics. The work of experimental game theorists has perhaps been the most influential in showing that people do not maximize expected utility, in any plausible sense of the terms “maximize,” “expected,” or “utility.” The evidence is so overwhelming and incontrovertible that, by the time one gets to the end of a book like Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational,1 it begins to feel like piling on. The suggestion is pretty clear: not only are people not as rational as decision and game theorists have traditionally taken them to be, they are not even as rational as they themselves take themselves to be. This conclusion, however, is not self-evident. The standard interpretation of these findings is that people are irrational: their estimation of probabilities is vulnerable to framing effects, their treatment of (equivalent) losses and gains is asymmetric, their choices violate the sure-thing principle, they discount the future hyperbolically, and so on. Indeed, after surveying the experimental findings, one begins to wonder how people manage to get on in their daily lives at all, given the seriousness and ubiquity of these deliberative pathologies. And yet, most people do manage to get on, in some form or another. This in itself suggests an..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.uu.nl/~joel/research/publications/Procrastination-ExtendedWill%28Heath-Anderson%29Feb2009.pdf
  http://www.phil.uu.nl/%7Ejoel/research/publications/Procrastination-ExtendedWill%28Heath-Anderson%29Feb2009.pdf
  
• Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
• Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. This would be to confuse the personal and subpersonal levels
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/vccse.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000710/00/Vccse.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:710
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00095
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000257/art00095
  http://cogprints.org/710/1/Vccse.html
  http://cogprints.org/710/0/Vccse.html
  
• David Kirsh & P. Maglio (1995). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We present data and argument to show that in Tetris - a real-time interactive video game - certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world rather than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some translations and rotations are best understood as using the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions ñ actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal - from epistemic actions - actions performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris-cognition, and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game - even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we describe many such actions that are actually taken by players that are far from superfluous, and that play valuable roles in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action - an epistemic function - we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although, our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the one category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adrenaline.ucsd.edu/kirsh/articles/cogscijournal/DistinguishingEpi_prag.pdf
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1994v18/i04/p0513p0549/MAIN.PDF
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/302981.html
  
• Leslie Marsh (2005). Review Essay: Andy Clark's Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence_.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The notion of the cyborg has exercised the popular imagination for almost two hundred years. In very general terms the idea that a living entity can be a hybrid of both organic matter and mechanical parts, and for all intents and purposes be seamlessly functional and self-regulating, was prefigured in literary works such as Shelly
  s Frankenstein (1816/18) and Samuel Butler
  s Erewhon (1872). This notion of hybridism has been a staple theme of 20th century science fiction writing, television programmes and the cinema. For the most part, these works trade on a deep sense of unease we have about our personal identity – how could some non-organic matter to which I have so little conscious access count as a bona fide part of me? Cognitive scientist and philosopher, Andy Clark, picks up this general theme and presents an empirical and philosophical case for the following inextricably linked theses.
• Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (2008). Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To know is to cognize, to cognize is to be a culturally bounded, rationality-bounded and environmentally located agent. Knowledge and cognition are thus dual aspects of human sociality. If social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter, then its third party character is essentially stigmergic. In its most generic formulation, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment. Extending this notion one might conceive of social stigmergy as the extra-cranial analog of an artifcial neural network providing epistemic structure. This paper recommends a stigmergic framework for social epistemology to account for the supposed tension between individual action, wants and beliefs and the social corpora. We also propose that the so-called "extended mind" thesis offers the requisite stigmergic cognitive analog to stigmergic knowledge. Stigmergy as a theory of interaction within complex systems theory is illustrated through an example that runs on a particle swarm optimization algorithm.
• Richard Menary (2007). Writing As Thinking.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody 1968; McLuhan 1962, 1964; Ong 1982). This will give us a preliminary idea about possible pitfalls for a cognitive integrationist account. The second section outlines, firstly, how integrated cognitive systems function. Secondly, the model is applied to a hybrid mental act where writing allows us to complete complex cognitive tasks. The final section outlines the sense in which, following Harris, there is “a more realistic picture of how writing restructures thought” [Harris, R., 1989. How does writing restructure thought? Language and Communication 9 (2/3) 99–106] that is concealed by the ‘romantic fantasies’ of theorists such as the above. This picture is one of writing providing an autoglottic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent. The cognitive integrationist understands this in terms of the nature of the written vehicles and how we manipulate them.
• Gerard O'Brien (1998). The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark’s advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1451/3/Commentary_on_Clark_Being_There.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/1451/0/Commentary_on_Clark_Being_There.pdf
  
• Mitch Parsell (2006). The cognitive cost of extending an evolutionary mind into the environment.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Clark and Chalmers (1998) have argued that mental states can be extended outside an organism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16628462&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16628462&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W5656M501R410G26.pdf
  
• Mark Rowlands, 1. the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the view known variously as the extended mind (Clark & Chalmers 1998), vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003, 2006) active externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998), locational externalism (Wilson 2004) and environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), at least some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed, partly (and, on most versions, contingently), of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. More precisely, what I shall refer to as the thesis of the extended mind (EM) is constituted by the following claims: • The world is an external store of information relevant to processes such as perceiving, remembering, reasoning … (and possibly) experiencing. • At least some mental processes are hybrid – they straddle both internal and external operations. • The external operations take the form of action: manipulation, exploitation and transformation of environmental structures – ones that carry information relevant to the accomplishing of a given task. • At least some of the internal processes are ones concerned with supplying a subject with the ability to appropriately use relevant structures in its environment. As I shall understand it, therefore, the thesis of the extended mind is (1) an ontic thesis, of (2) partial and (3) contingent (4) composition of (5) some mental processes.[1] 1. It is ontic in the sense that it is a thesis about what (some) mental processes are, as opposed to an epistemic thesis about the best way of understanding mental processes. This ontic claim, of course, has an epistemic consequence: it is not possible to understand the nature of at least some of the mental processes without understanding the extent to which that organism is capable of manipulating, exploiting and transforming relevant structures in its environment (Rowlands 1999)..
• Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Clark, 2008), Andy Clark bolsters his case for the extended mind thesis and casts a critical eye on some related views for which he has less enthusiasm. To these ends, the book canvasses a wide range of empirical results concerning the subtle manner in which the human organism and its environment interact in the production of intelligent behavior. This fascinating research notwithstanding, Supersizing does little to assuage my skepticism about the hypotheses of extended cognition and extended mind. In particular, Supersizing fails to make the case for the extended view as a revolutionary thesis in the theoretical foundations of cognitive science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://spot.colorado.edu/~rupertr/Rupert_Phil_Studies_Supersized.doc
  
• Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Critical Study of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind.   (More)
• Robert D. Rupert (2009). Innateness and the situated mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge UP)
• Robert D. Rupert (ms). Keeping HEC in CHEC.   (More)
• Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind
• Robert D. Rupert (2010). Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Review essay contrasting Adams and Aizawa's approach to cognition with a functionalist, systems-based view.
• Larry Shapiro (web). Functionalism and mental boundaries.   (More)
• Mark Sprevak (2009). Extended cognition and functionalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head.1 Call this the “hypothesis of extended cognition” (HEC). HEC has been strongly criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert.2 In this paper I argue for two claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have supposed. A widely-held view about the nature of the mind, functionalism—a view to which Rupert, Adams and Aizawa appear to subscribe— entails HEC. Either HEC is true, or functionalism is false. The relationship between functionalism and HEC goes beyond support for the relatively uncontroversial claim that it is logically or nomologically possible for cognition to extend (the “can” part of HEC); functionalism entails that cognitive processes do extend in the actual world. Second, I argue that the version of HEC entailed by functionalism is more radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest. I argue that it is so radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism. If functionalism is modified to prevent these consequences, then HEC falls victim to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa’s original criticism. An advocate of HEC has two choices: (1) accept functionalism and radical HEC; (2) give up HEC entirely. Clark and Chalmers’ intermediate position of a modest form of HEC is unsustainable. The argument of this paper, although initially appearing to support Clark and Chalmers, ultimately argues against their position. The price of HEC is rampant expansion of the mind into the world, and the implausibility of such expansion is indicative of deep-seated problems with functionalism. The argument of this paper consequently speaks to wider issues than just the status of HEC. The reasons for..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/../issues/106/9/2.pdf
  
• Kim Sterelny (2004). Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A common picture of evolution by natural selection sees it as a process through which organisms change so that they become better adapted to their environment. However, agents do not merely respond to the challenges their environments pose. They modify their environments, filtering and transforming the action of the environment on their bodies A beaver, in making a dam, engineers a stream, increasing both the size of its safe refuge and reducing its seasonal variability. Beavers, like many other animals, are ecological engineers. They act to modify the physical challenges posed by their environment. Nests, burrows and other shelters reduce the impacts of adverse weather and of other agents. Animal also modify their exposure to biological risks. Hygienic behaviour reduces the impact of disease. Intensive grooming; moving to new roosts; using a
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/documents/sterelny-papers/artefacts.pdf
  
• John Sutton (2006). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind and the civilizing process.   (More)
• John Sutton (2006). Introduction: Memory, embodied cognition, and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, J
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/jsutton/Sutton_PP_Intro.pdf
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/1312Q202H7808RT3.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a747697835~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/P30W444011537529.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P816529H7705H410.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R727516236873154.pdf
  
• Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). Patrolling the mind's boundaries.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/c51u231h7v4ju770/fulltext.pdf
  
• Michael Wheeler (forthcoming). In defence of extended functionalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts (or more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status.1 According to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part” (Levin 2008). The respective fates of these two positions may not be independent of each other. The claim that ExC is in some way a form of, dependent on, entailed by, or at least commonly played out in terms of, functionalism is now pretty much part of the received view of things (see, e.g., Adams and Aizawa 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2005, 2008, this volume a, b, forthcoming; Menary 2007; Rupert 2004; Sprevak manuscript; Wheeler forthcoming). Thus ExC might be mandated by the existence of functionally specified cognitive systems whose boundaries are located partly outside the skin. This is the position that Andy Clark has recently dubbed extended functionalism (Clark 2008, forthcoming; see also Wheeler forthcoming)
• Michael Wheeler (ms). Minds, things, and materiality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55). As I understand this view, there are really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the things beyond the skin that make up material culture (in other words, the physical objects and artefacts in which cultural networks and systems of human social relations are realized) may be essential to the enactment of, and be partly constitutive of, certain cognitive systems or operations. The consequence of establishing this claim is supposed to be that we have a mandate to recast the boundaries of the mind so as to include, as proper parts of the mind, things located beyond the skin. Thus, in talking about the contribution of the world to cognition, Malafouris (2004, 58) concludes that ‘what we have traditionally construed as an active or passive but always clearly separated external stimulus for setting a cognitive mechanism into motion, may be after all a continuous part of the machinery itself; at least ex hypothesi’. This is the position that, in philosophical circles, is known increasingly as the extended mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary forthcoming). Henceforth I shall refer to this hypothesis as EM. A stock example will help bring the idea into view. Rumelhart et al. (1986) note that most of us solve difficult multiplication problems by using ‘pen and paper’ as an external resource. This environmental prop enables us to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of simpler ones, and to temporarily store the results of certain intermediate calculations. For the fan of EM, the distributed combination of this external resource and certain inner psychological processes constitutes a cognitive system in its own right
• Robert A. Wilson (2005). Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/collectmem.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K37446N775180100.pdf
  
• Robert A. Wilson (2010). Meaning making and the mind of the externalist.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers some defense of that argument. This second task occupies the core of the paper, and in completing it I distinguish _active _ _cognition_ from _cyborg fantasy arguments_ for externalism, and develop the analogy between the extended mind thesis in the cognitive sciences and developmental systems theory in developmental biology. The rethinking of the problem of intentionality on offer leads not so much to a solution as to a dissolution of that problem, as traditionally conceived
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/meaningmaking.pdf
  
• John Yates (ms). The Many Bubble Interpretation, externalism, the extended mind of David Chalmers and Andy Clark, and the work of Alva Noe in connection with Experimental Philosophy and Dreamwork.   (More)

Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc

• Jessica Brown (2003). Externalism and the Fregean tradition.   (More)
• Susan Brower-Toland (2007). Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, I claim that the causal thesis doesn’t square with Ockham’s account of supernaturally produced intuition and that the direct reference thesis sits uneasily with Ockham’s characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states.
• John Campbell (1987). Is sense transparent?   (More)
• Andrew Carpenter (1998). Davidson's externalism and the unintelligibility of massive error.   (More)
• Bryan Frances (2007). Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism
• Brie Gertler (2007). Content externalism and the epistemic conception of the self.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007361
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00121.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710746/PDFSTART
  
• Brie Gertler (2009). Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A few decades ago, in the wake of influential arguments by Putnam and Burge, prevailing opinion among philosophers shifted from internalism to externalism about thought contents. While there was always a vocal minority opposed to externalism, internalist opposition has grown markedly in the past several years. This book represents a major advance in the internalist campaign. Farkas’ ambitious agenda is to advance a strongly internalist account of the mental. She makes impressive strides towards achieving this goal. Along the way, she presents important new arguments on a number of topics, including: how best to understand the ‘twin’ cases used in debates about content, the alleged incompatibility of content externalism and privileged access, and the prospects for defending Frege’s claim that sense determines reference
• John Gregg (online). Language and meaning.   (More)
• Jussi Haukioja (2009). Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything substantial about the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by armchair reflection. In this paper I want to question this latter view and claim that, because of the way our standard methodology of doing theories of reference relies on semantic intuitions, typical externalists in fact presuppose that one can know the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by mere armchair reflection. The more interesting question is how substantial such knowledge can be. I also take some steps toward answering this question.
• H (2007). Externalism and a posteriori semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f7546421h6624466/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/F7546421H6624466.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Intuitions and semantic theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: While engaged in the analysis of topics such as the nature of knowledge, meaning, or justice, analytic philosophers have traditionally relied extensively on their own intuitions about when the relevant terms can, and can't, be correctly applied. Consequently, if intuitions about possible cases turned out not to be a reliable tool for the proper analysis of philosophically central concepts, then a radical reworking of philosophy's (or at least analytic philosophy's) methodology would seem to be in order. It is thus not surprising that the increasingly critical scrutiny that intuitions have received of late has produced what has been referred to as a "crisis" in analytic philosophy. This paper will argue, however, that at least those criticisms that stem from recent work on semantic externalism are not as serious as their proponents have claimed. Indeed, this paper will argue while the conceptual intuitions (and the analyses that result from them) will have to be recognized as fallible, they still have a prima facie claim to correctness. A naturalistic and externalistic account of concepts thus merely requires that the methodology of conceptual analysis be reinterpreted (from a 'Platonic' to a 'constructive' model) rather than given up
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00374.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00374.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118646789/PDFSTART
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/meta/2005/00000036/00000003/art00007
  
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/../issues/103/10/2.pdf
  
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/articles/../issues/103/10/2.pdf
  
• William S. Larkin (online). Content and metacognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: C. Theses: 1. Content Externalism strictly implies the possibility of acquiring a new concept as the result of an unwitting switch of environments. 2. This intuitively compels us to accept the possibility of someone possessing a concept without being aware that she does. 3. This possibility strictly favors causal models of meta-cognition over constitution models. 4. The possibility of possessing a concept unawares suggests that the contents of metacognitive
• B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the two worlds are subjectively indistinguishable for them, which is what matters on internalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that even if a standard moral of the New Evil Genius intuition is untenable due to considerations arising from content externalism, the case can be understood as supporting epistemic internalism in a way that is wholly compatible with content externalism. In short, epistemic internalism is committed to sameness of justificatory status between subjectively indistinguishable counterparts, not sameness of content of their justifiers.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p728856004224887/fulltext.pdf
  
• Helge Malmgren (online). The "internal/external" metaphor in the philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The being of the _cogitatio,_ or to be more exact, of the knowledge-phenomenon itself, cannot
  be questioned, and it is free from the riddle of transcendence. /.../ It is also obvious, that the
  _cogitationes_ represent a sphere of absolute immanent givens, in which sense we also interpret
  immanence. In the seeing [Schauen] of the pure phenomenon, the object is not outside the
  knowledge, outside consciousness, and at the same time it is given in the sense of the absolute
  self-givenness of a purely seen object."
• Ruth G. Millikan (2004). Existence proof for a viable externalism.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (1997). On cognitive luck: Externalism in an evolutionary frame.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "Paleontologists like to say that to a first approximation, all species are extinct (ninety- nine percent is the usual estimate). The organisms we see around us are distant cousins, not great grandparents; they are a few scattered twig-tips of an enormous tree whose branches and trunk are no longer with us." (p. 343-44). The historical life bush consists mainly in dead ends
• Derk Pereboom (1995). Conceptual structure and the individuation of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Current attempts to understand psychological content divide into two families of views. According to externalist accounts such as those advanced by Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, psychological content does not supervene on the physical features of the individual subject, but is fixed partially by the nature of the world external to her.¹ In the rival functional role theories developed by Ned Block and Brian Loar, content does supervene on the physical features of the individual, and is, in addition, determined solely by the role it plays in the causal network of an individual's sensations, behavior, and mental states.² Over the past fifteen years, criticism of these two types of views has often focussed on their capacity to individuate content in an acceptable way, and both seem to be deficient in this respect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<401:CSATIO>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<401:CSATIO>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214228.pdf
  
• Robert Rupert (2008). Causal theories of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00130.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119423024/PDFSTART
  
• Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Causal Theories of Intentionality.   (More)
• Gabriel Segal (2004). Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicorns.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter, I will compare and contrast singular concepts with what I call
• Alberto Voltolini (online). Internalism and externalism.   (More)
• Alberto Voltolini (2005). On the metaphysics of internalism and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I explore the consequences of the thesis that externalism and internalism are (possibly, but as we will see not necessarily, opposite) metaphysical doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought. If I am right, this thesis primarily entails that at least some naturalist positions on the ontology of the mind, namely the reductionistic ones, are hardly compatible with both externalism and a version of internalism so conceived, namely relational internalism. Indeed, according to both externalism and relational internalism, intentionality constitutes (or at least grounds) the relational content property providing the individuation conditions of a thought, as a relation to an outer or to an inner object respectively. Yet since intentionality turns out to be a modal, hence a nonnatural, property, both externalism and relational internalism deny to thoughts at least token-identity with physical states. Finally, I will give some support to the idea that externalism and internalism must be interpreted as doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought
• Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The internal and external components of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Timothy Williamson has presented several arguments that seek to cast doubt on the idea that cognition can be factorized into internal and external components. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to evaluate these arguments. My conclusion will be that these arguments establish several highly important points, but in the end these arguments fail to cast any doubt either on the idea that cognitive science should be largely concerned with internal mental processes, or on the idea that cognition can be analysed in terms of the existence of a suitable connection between internal and external components. I shall present an argument for the conclusion that cognition involves certain causal processes that are entirely internal
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/cognition.a4.pdf
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/cognition.ltr.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=OR-ApDfUMUkC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PT251&ots=LNjDUBT9sG&sig=FXQabA0NNHD6iQspcW88TprzzLc
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2006). Content Externalism and Fregean Sense.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can externalist concepts really capture an individual
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.su.se/%7Ewikforss/frege.pdf
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss & Soren Haggqvist (web). Externalism and a posteriori semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We have become accustomed to the idea that meaning is determined externalistically, that the meaning of certain types of terms, for example natural kind terms, depends on facts about the external environment.1 Recently, however, a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we shall dub
• Timothy Williamson (2006). Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 0. Platitudinously, cognitive science is the science of cognition. Cognition is usually defined as something like the process of acquiring, retaining and applying knowledge. To a first approximation, therefore, cognitive science is the science of knowing. Knowing is a relation between the knower and the known. Typically, although not always, what is known involves the environment external to the knower. Thus knowing typically involves a relation between the agent and the external environment. It is not internal to the agent, for the internal may be the same whether or not it is related to the external in a way that constitutes knowing. Cognition enables agents to achieve their goals by adjusting their actions appropriately to the environment. Such adjustment requires what is internal to the agent to be in some sense in line with what is external; that matching depends on both internal and external sides. Thus if cognitive science were restricted to what is internal to the agent, it would lose sight of its primary object of study. Although cognition depends on both the internal and the external, one can try to analyse it into internal and external factors. Call a state S narrow if and only if whether an agent is in S at a time t depends only on the total internal qualitative state of S at t, so that if one agent in one possible situation is internally an exact duplicate of another agent..
• Robert A. Wilson (2002). Individualism.   (More)
• Timothy Williamson (2004). Sosa on abilities, concepts, and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A kind of intellectual project characteristic of Ernest Sosa is to resolve an apparently flat-out dispute by showing that it is not after all a zero-sum game. His irenic goal is to do justice to both sides and give each of them most of what it wants. In his subtle paper ‘Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism’ he applies this strategy to the dispute between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. It is a pleasure to engage in discussion with a philosopher of Sosa’s fair-mindedness and analytical skills