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3.4. Perception and the Mind (Perception and the Mind on PhilPapers)

• Perception and Thought [6]
• Perception and Action [53]
• Perception and Reference [5]
• Perception and Phenomenology [17]
• Perception and the Mind, Misc [0]

Perception and Thought

• Gl (2004). On perceiving that.   (More)
• Jack C. Lyons (2005). Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of looks. A standard view is that how things look, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of ones present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00061.x
  
• Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). 'Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? Ifone thinks that this can happen [at least in certain ways that are identWed in the paper] then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitivelv impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case ofcognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typicallv use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects’ beliefs about the typical colour of objects ajfects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitivelv penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generallv sympathetic to the idea ofcognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation ofthis plausible mechanism
• Alva Noe (1999). Thought and experience.   (More)
• James Pryor (online). An epistemic theory of acquaintance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For example, suppose you believe squirrels can live an extremely long time, like parrots and tortoises. You think to yourself, The oldest mammal in this town is probably a squirrel. Contrast that case to:

  (2b) believing some animal you seean animal that happens to be the oldest mammal in
  townto be a squirrel

  I said theres a philosophically important di?erence between the (a) examples and the (b) examples. In fact these examples illustrate more than one di?erence. Lets try to disentangle the di?erent di?erences
• Dustin Stokes (ms). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper considers an orectic perception hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic perception is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic perception hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It is of importance to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, epistemology, and general philosophy of science. The plausibility of orectic perception can be motivated by some hypothetical cases, some classic experimental studies, and some new experimental research inspired by those same studies. The general suggestion is that orectic perception thus defined, and evidenced by the relevant studies, cannot be deflected by the standard strategies of the cognitive impenetrability theorist.

Perception and Action

• Robin Allott (2001). Language, perception and action: Philosophical issues.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The earlier part of this book has been concerned with very specific questions arising in the field of linguistics (phonetics, semantics and syntax), with the results of research into visual perception (physiological and neurological) and with rather wider speculation about the organisation of bodily action and the relation between the bodily processes underlying action, vision and speech. The hypotheses, arguments, evidence and conclusions reached have not depended to any significant extent on philosophical doctrine or concepts and the question may be asked why should a book essentially concerned with linguistics conclude with a chapter devoted to philosophy. To this question there is a broad answer and a more specific one; the broad answer is that there has been prolonged and difficult discussion between philosophers over many centuries of the subjects dealt with earlier in this book, the origin and nature of language, the relation of language to reality, perception as based on sense-experience and providing the main basis for veridical knowledge, and voluntary human action (the notions of free will and determinism, of reasons and causes of action). The narrower answer, as an occasion and justification for having a philosophical chapter, is that in some respects totally new broad and specific hypotheses are presented about the functioning of language, perception and action, and particularly about their interrelation in human behaviour, and it is worth considering what implications these hypotheses, if true, may have for traditional or current philosophical views. It may be that they ought to involve some radical review of current theory but, in any case, it would be unsatisfactory simply to present a whole range of ideas bearing on language, perception and action without having regard to what relevant to these subjects has been said by philosophers (as in the same way it would be unsatisfactory not to have regard to work that has been done on these subjects by experts in the field of Artificial Intelligence)
• Tim Bayne, The sense of agency.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of agency. I conclude by defending the perceptual model against a number of objections to it, and by briefly exploring its implications for the question of how to approach the study of perception
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/12843/Sense_of_agency_web.pdf
  
• Ned Block (2005). Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and the environment and involves contributions from sensory systems other than the eye. He is at pains to note that vision is not passive. His analogy with touch is to the point: touch involves skillful probing and movement, and so does vision, although less obviously and in my view less centrally so. This much is certainly widely accepted among vision scientistsalthough mainstream vision scientists (represented, for example, by Stephen Palmers excellent textbook²) view these points as best seen within a version of the inverse optics view that takes inputs as non-static and as including motor instructions (for example, involving eye movements and head movements).³ The kind of point that No raises is viewed as important at the margins, but as not disturbing the main lines of the picture of vision that descendswith many changesfrom the pioneering work of David Marr in the 1980s (and before him, from Helmholtz). But No shows little interest in mainstream vision science, focusing on non-mainstream ideas in the science of perception, specifically ideas from the anti-representational psychologist J.J. Gibson, and also drawing on Wittgenstein and the phenomenology tradition. There is a sense throughout the book of revolution, of upsetting the applecart. This is a review from the point of view of the applecart
• Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric spatial representation in action and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=903
  http://cogprints.org/5780/1/ECSRAP.F07.pdf
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122594428/PDFSTART
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/ECSRAP.F07.pdf
  
• Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, action, and make-perceive.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements – an act of what I call ‘make-perceive.’
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=902
  http://cogprints.org/5781/1/VAMP.MS397.pdf
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121387369/PDFSTART
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/VAMP.MS397.doc
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/VAMP.MS397.pdf
  
• John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor knowledge and naïve realism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00162.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119395227/PDFSTART
  
• Tony Chemero (2001). What we perceive when we perceive affordances: Commentary on Michaels (2000), Information, Perception and Action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In her essay --?Information, Perception and Action--, Claire Michaels reaches two conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claims that affordances are not perceived, but simply acted upon; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based upon a misinterpretation of empirical evidence which is, in turn, based upon a conflation of two proper objects of perception: objectively with properties and affordances
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  
• Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (2001). Sensorimotor chauvinism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will be taken in a spirit of constructive questioning. Overall, we have two main reservations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/noecomm.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=125135&jid=BBS&volumeId=24&issueId=05&aid=125134
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01290116
  
• Andy Clark (1999). Visual awareness and visuomotor action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1323?mode=simple
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020011/987
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020011/987
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/f0020011
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/f0020011
  
• Andy Clark (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensorimotor contingency theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In _Action in Perception _Alva No develops and presents a sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor model faces three important challenges. The first is to negotiate a path between two prima facie unsatisfactory readings of the central claim that conscious perceptual experience is constituted by knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor dependence. The second is to convince us that the sensorimotor contribution, in such cases, is actually constitutive of perceptual experience rather than merely causally implicated in the origination of such experience.² And the third is to respond to the important challenge raised by what I will dub 'sensorimotor summarizing' models of the relation between conscious experience and richly detailed sensorimotor routines. According to such models³ conscious perceptual experience only rather indirectly reflects the rich detail of our actual sensorimotor engagements, which are instead lightly sampled as a coarse guide, optimized for planning and reasoning, and geared and filtered according to current needs and purposes
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1444?mode=simple
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources used for the on-line guidance of visuo-motor action, on the other. This ‘dual visual systems’ hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of conscious visual experience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/eafinal.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/clark.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3182592.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/110/4/495
  
• Shaun Gallagher (online). Perceiving others in action / la perception d'autrui en action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a New York Times article last month, entitled Cells that read minds, the neuroscience reporter, Sandra Blakeslee (January 10, 2006) provided a list of all the things that mirror neurons can explain. As we know, mirror neurons, discovered by Rizzolattis group in Parma, are neurons that are activated when we engage in action, and when we perceive intentional movement in another person. According to Blakeslee and the scientists she interviewed, mirror neurons explain not only how we are capable of understanding another persons actions, but also language, empathy, how children learn, why people respond to certain types of sports, dance, music and art, why watching media violence may be harmful and why many men like pornography. Let me set aside the controversial questions about whether mirror neurons can explain all of these things, and accept that mirror neurons are clearly smart little cells. But let me ask whether Blakeslee and her scientists are expressing things in the right way
• Vittorio Gallese (2000). The inner sense of action: Agency and motor representations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2000/00000007/00000010/1054
  
• Alva Noë (2006). Experience without the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world
• Melvyn A. Goodale & A. David Milner (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRdWR4JnS&sig=3tPM_o4BKfAdIcDQlB7y6utqw2Q
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ei_hVW8BpQ&sig=3SYZjocbq5Y0cs3JpTBjZlraqEQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ei_hSSdInR&sig=_6iza5Fl7ywsh42Mo7-74sXLloQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ei_hXW8HpV&sig=2Z0Eq-nTSSO6rbjv6Gh49tZgH_M
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRhSTdDsV&sig=D8nM04pe2oCHKL_-KD-5E_wvZno
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRgWT9CoO&sig=4VLABY-gDRkeeDTuCHCnqreQbXs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRf_T4GrW&sig=p4NgETSpnBneCCPlyJPuG63GGAU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejReSR9GmX&sig=TadTjdBt-nLX--wqoi0UkwQnY5o
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRi_VbEmV&sig=WBV4ExTDai7tMrlTTIBUwtaWEHk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejReYS4GqV&sig=1zty9sE2r9tYWXjfOG9cpuAoCoc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRjWW5DrU&sig=0fVyRJXG5RyhaMArNn9ZyHNBVFQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRiUV7JmW&sig=ow96qNDPoT4wx9exRSvKMTwII9w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRhYU7KmU&sig=tqB-MhbjM_sDcjYga5VrBN7mp4o
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1374953&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=1374953&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Rick Grush (forthcoming). Skill theory v2.0: Dispositions, emulation, and spatial perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism’s sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formation of dispositions, and a capacity for emulation. The former, the formation of dispositions, is argued to by the central pivot of spatial content. I provide a neural information processing interpretation of what these dispositions amount to, and describe how dispositions, so understood, are an obvious implementation of Gareth Evans’ proposal on the topic. Furthermore, I describe what sorts of contribution are made by emulation mechanisms, and I also describe exactly how the emulation framework differs from similar but distinct notions with which it is often unhelpfully confused, such as sensorimotor contingencies and forward models
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/50478717314t6630/fulltext.pdf
  
• Ryan Hickerson, Knowing how to possibly act: Alva noë's action in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alva Noë is a modern-day empiricist. His book Action in Perception is chockablock with contemporary cognitive science; its preface and notes (not to mention general erudition) point to on-going collaboration with Evan Thompson, Kevin O’Regan, and Susan Hurley. Their research investigates the sensorimotor bases of consciousness, and Action in Perception is offered as its philosophical backdrop. As such, the book presents a series of ideas and interpretations that constitute what Noë calls the “enactive approach” to perception, many of which are explicitly phenomenological in orientation. So those on the lookout for imaginative philosophy of mind will find Noë's work particularly compelling. (Noë would prefer "already feeling about for imaginative philosophy of mind," because on his account paradigmatic perceptual activity is tactile rather than visual.) In this review I will not address the empirical details concerning Noë and his compatriots, but will instead focus on the way Noë’s enactive approach should be situated vis-à-vis traditional phenomenology. Action in Perception is part of the grand project of a robustly scientific knowledge of human perceptual experience, but it is clearly also a philosophical theory, so I will address it philosophically. I address it as I take it to be: one of the best works in the philosophy of perception to appear in a very long time
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.wou.edu/~hickersr/Hickerson%20on%20Noe.pdf
  
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
• Susan L. Hurley (online). Consciousness in action: Clarifications.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such a distinguished neuropsychologist as Marcel Kinsbourne to find added value in the result
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/D4KR70P9T4D0BUT9.pdf
  
• Susan L. Hurley (2001). Perception and action: Alternative views.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected.Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and action are seen as instrumentallyinterdependent. It is argued here that a betteralternative is to reject both assumptions, resultingin a two-level interdependence view in whichperception and action co-depend on dynamicallycircular subpersonal relations and as a result may bemore than merely instrumentally interdependent. Thisis illustrated by reference to motor theories ofperception and control theories of action
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/pa.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/hurley (2001) perception and action. alternative views.pdf
  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/mmm/readings/Hurley - Perception and Action.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l015777n34g15167/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=271323&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L015777N34G15167.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000001/00271323
  
• Daniel D. Hutto (2005). Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m02ltj7008017271/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M02LTJ7008017271.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000004/00009001
  
• Pierre Jacob (2005). Grasping and perceiving objects.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA241&ots=JljUmyR0Zu&sig=ng2uUGFbmB1iMyaNBn7tfnpX1Tw
  
• Pierre Jacob (2006). Why visual experience is likely to resist being enacted.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action
• Thomas Johanson (online). Imprinted on the mind: Passive and active in Aristotle's theory of perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: B.Saunders and J. van Brakel (eds.), Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Colour, University Press of America 2002, 169-188
• Sean D. Kelly (2002). Merleau-ponty on the body: The logic of motor intentional activity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2002/00000015/00000004/art00198
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2002/00000015/00000004/art00004
  
• Colin Klein & Gabriel Love (2007). Kicking the Kohler habit.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Kohler's experiments with inverting goggles are often thought to support enactivism by showing that visual re-inversion occurs simultaneous with the return of sensorimotor skill. Closer examination reveals that Kohler's work does not show this. Recent work by Linden et al. shows that re-inversion, if it occurs at all, does not occur when the enactivist predicts. As such, the empirical evidence weighs against enactivism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782009436~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782009436.pdf
  
• David A. Leopold & Nikos K. Logothetis (1996). Activity changes in early visual cortex reflect monkeys' percepts during binocular rivalry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psych.jwatch.org/cgi/content/full/1996/401/14
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v379/n6565/abs/379549a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?Db=pubmed&Cmd=ShowDetailView&TermToSearch=8596635&ordinalpos=6&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8596635&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8596635&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Erik Lumer & Geraint Rees (1999). Covariation of activity in visual and prefrontal cortex associated with subjective visual perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/96/4/1669
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9990082&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19990216)96:4<1669:COAIVA>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=15554
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/47260.pdf
  
• William G. Lycan (2006). Enactive intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/noe/Lycan.pdf
  
• Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
• Pete Mandik (2005). Action-oriented representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Often, sensory input underdetermines perception. One such example is the perception of illusory contours. In illusory contour perception, the content of the percept includes the presence of a contour that is absent from the informational content of the sensation. (By “sensation” I mean merely information-bearing events at the transducer level. I intend no further commitment such as the identification of sensations with qualia.) I call instances of perception underdetermined by sensation “underdetermined perception.” The perception of illusory contours is just one kind of underdetermined perception. The focus of this chapter is another kind of underdetermined perception: what I shall call "active perception". Active perception occurs in cases in which the percept, while underdetermined by sensation, is determined by a combination of sensation and action. The phenomenon of active perception has been used by several to argue against the positing of representations in explanations of sensory experience, either by arguing that no representations need be posited or that far fewer than previously thought need be posited. Such views include, but are not limited to those of Gibson (1966, 1986), Churchland
• Pete Mandik (forthcoming). Control consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. On such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of nonsensory, motor elements. More specifically, I will be arguing for the view that the neural basis of control consciousness is constituted by states of recurrent activation in relatively intermediate levels of the motor hierarchy.
• Christopher Mole (2009). The Motor Theory of Speech Perception.   (More)
• Alva Noë (2001). Experience and the active mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are ''internal'' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person''s oranimal''s perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural processes on which they depend. I propose aconception of perceptual experience as a form ofskillful engagement with the environment on the partof the whole person or animal
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n84kr20t22441086/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/N84KR20T22441086.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000001/00271324
  
• Andy Clark (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We seem, or so it seems to some theorists, to experience a rich stream of highly detailed information concerning an extensive part of our current visual surroundings. But this appearance, it has been suggested, is in some way illusory. Our brains do not command richly detailed internal models of the current scene. Our seeings, it seems, are not all that they seem. This, then, is the Grand Illusion. We think we see much more than we actually do. In this paper I shall (briefly) rehearse the empirical evidence for this rather startling claim, and then critically examine a variety of responses. One especially interesting response is a development of the so-called ‘skill theory’, according to which there is no illusion after all. Instead, so the theory goes, we establish the required visual contact with our world by an ongoing process of active exploration, in which the world acts as a kind of reliable, interrogable, external memory (Noe, Pessoa and
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/jcsrev.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/F0020005/1276
  
• Alva Noe (ms). Perception, action, and nonconceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see (and generally to perceive). This is confirmed by the fact that we can disrupt a person
• Alva Noë & Susan L. Hurley (2003). The deferential brain in action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/replytogray.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12757819&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661303000780
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000005/art00078
  
• Alva Noë (2006). Précis of Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory stimulation. Examples are ready to hand. An object looms larger in the visual field as we approach it, and its profile deforms as we move about it. A sound grows louder as we move nearer to its source. Movements of the hand over the surface of an object give rise to shifting sensations. As perceivers we are masters of this sort of pattern of sensorimotor dependence. This mastery shows itself in the thoughtless automaticity with which we move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us. We spontaneously crane

  PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/

  our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses, or draw near to get a better look (or better to handle, sniff, lick or listen to what interests us). The central claim of what I call _the _ _enactive approach _is that our ability to perceive not only depends on, but is constituted by, our possession of this sort of sensorimotor knowledge.²
• J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The out- side world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the gov- erning laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Sev- eral lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/oregan.noe.pdf
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/oregan.noe.pdf
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/oregan.noe.pdf
  http://redwood.berkeley.edu/bruno/mindmachine/oregan.pdf
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/surprisesurprise.pdf
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/surprisesurprise.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/06/index.html
  http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/kuipers/readings/ORegan-bbs-01.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~NBP/PDFs_Publications/ORegan.BBS.01pdf.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=125085&jid=BBS&volumeId=24&issueId=05&aid=125084
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12239892&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12239892&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=12239892&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=125085
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01000115
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X01630115
  
• J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë (2006). Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness.   (More)
• J. Kevin O'Regan (2001). What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also ableto approach the issues of visual awareness andconsciousness in a satisfactory way. Finally weconsider a number of testable empirical consequences,one of which is the striking prediction of thephenomenon of ''''change blindness''''
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/nl361h8276502488/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=271326&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/NL361H8276502488.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000001/00271326
  
• Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Putting the brakes on enactive perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, not constitutive. I then address three other contentious hypotheses in the book. Noë argues that visual states are not pictorial; he argues that all perception is conceptual; and he argues that the external world makes a constitutive contribution to experience. I am unpersuaded by these arguments, and I offer reasons to resist Noë’s conclusions
• Yves Rossetti (2001). Implicit perception in action: Short-lived motor representation of space.   (More)
• Mark Rowlands (2006). Sensorimotor activity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper explores the concept of _sensorimotor activity_ that is central to the enactive model of visual perception developed in Alva Noë’s book, _Action in Perception_. The appeal to sensorimotor activity is, I shall argue, subject to a dilemma. On one interpretation, such activity presupposes representational states, and therefore is unable to aid us in the project of understanding how an organism is able to represent the world. On the other interpretation, sensorimotor activity fails to accommodate the essential normativity of representational states, and is therefore also unable to aid us in the project of understanding representation. The solution, I argue, lies in a new conception of sensorimotor activity, according to which such activity is normative, but where this normativity is not inherited from prior representational states
• Susanna Schellenberg (2007). Action and self-location in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/603
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/603
  
• Kieran Setiya (2009). Review of 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge'.   (More)
• Charles Siewert (2005). Attention and sensorimotor intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=1xVtpfQ-8dQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA270&ots=CoKezPij3_&sig=aPQLrBJWpV0MYca1_nxxwypyeic
  
• Charles Siewert (2006). Is the appearance of shape protean?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” account does not manage to avoid an unacceptable attribution of contradictory content to visual appearance. I argue also that my position here actually fits better with Noë’s critique of a “snapshot” conception of visual appearance than his own interpretation of visual constancy, and better supports his claim that experiential content is constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor understanding
• Cara Spencer (2007). Unconscious vision and the platitudes of folk psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Since we explain behavior by ascribing intentional states to the agent, many philosophers have assumed that some guiding principle of folk psychology like the following, which I call intentional states and actions (ISA), must be true: "If A and B are different actions, then the agents performing them must differ in their intentional states at the time they are performed." Recent results in the physiology of vision present a prima facie problem for this principle. These results show that some visual information that guides spatial manipulation and fine motor control is unavailable for verbal report. Plausibly, this information is not consciously available to the agent, and as such, not available to inform the content of intentional states. Thus, it is hard to see how every difference in action is subject to intentional explanation, as (ISA) requires. I articulate the prima facie problem and argue that the most plausible solution requires us to reject (ISA)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://caraspencer.net/Cara_Spencer/Online_Papers_I_files/Unconscious_vision_PP.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a778813815~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/778813815.pdf
  
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (1999). Are theories of imagery theories of imagination? An active perception approach to conscious mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the "traditional" symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent *situated cognition* and *active vision* approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and *seeing as*) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive and relates it closely to *seeing as*. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1555/1/im-im-cp.htm
  http://www.imagery-imagination.com/im-im/im-im.pdf
  http://www.imagery-imagination.com/im-im/im-im.htm
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog2302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog2302_3
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1999v23/i02/p0207p0245/MAIN.PDF
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/thomas (1999) are theories of imagery.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/1555/1/im%2Dim%2Dcp.htm
  http://cogprints.org/5018/1/im%2Dim%2Dcp.htm
  
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). New support for the perceptual activity theory of mental imagery.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Since the publication of my "Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An _Active Perception_ Approach to Conscious Mental Content," (Thomas, 1999 - henceforth abbreviated as ATOITOI on this page), a good deal of published material has appeared or has come to my attention that either provides additional support for the Perceptual Activity Theory PA theory) of mental imagery presented in ATOITOI, or that throws further doubt on the rival (picture and description) theories that are criticized there. Other relevant evidence was not mentioned in ATOITOI because I lacked the space for a proper explanation of its relevance. I hope eventually to write and publish a new account of

  PA

  theory, that will make use of much of this material. In the meantime this page provides citations (and, where possible, links) to the "new" support, and discussion sections that briefly explain the relevance of the cited material. Quite apart from presenting new lines of supporting evidence and argument, I hope this page will help to clarify many aspects of
• Evan Thompson (2005). Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective in- teraction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related (the body-body problem) via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, No¨e, and Myin that seek to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness in terms of 'bodiliness' and 'grabbiness' are considered. It is suggested that their account does not pay sufficient attention to two other key aspects of perceptual phenomenality: the autonomous nature of the experiencing self or agent, and the pre-reflective nature of bodily self-consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://individual.utoronto.ca/evant/PCSEnactive06pdf.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n2215w091335206r/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/N2215W091335206R.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000004/00009003
  
• Wayne Wright (2006). Visual stuff and active vision.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper examines the status of unattended visual stimuli in the light of recent work on the role of attention in visual perception. Although the question of whether attention is required for visual experience seems very interesting, this paper argues that there currently is no good reason to take a stand on the issue. Moreover, it is argued that much of the allure of that question stems from a continued attachment to the defective ‘inner picture view’ of experience and a mistaken notion that the ultimate goal of vision is to produce visual experience. The paper considers a promising general account of the content and structure of vision and presents reasons for not taking that account to be committed to any substantive claims about the experiential status of unattended visual stimuli. Also addressed are the active nature of vision and the role of vision in enabling our ecological success. These considerations highlight that visual experience is not the whole of vision and that a much more important question about unattended visual stimuli than whether they are consciously experienced is what contribution they make to how we interact with the world
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mindstuff.net/VisualStuffActiveVision-WTW.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a743786467~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/G06W2176J8504261.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/743786467.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~db=all~content=a743786467~fulltext=713240930
  

Perception and Reference

• John Campbell (web). Consciousness and reference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that you are thinking and talking about. But this connection between consciousness of the objects and properties around you, and knowledge of the references of the basic terms you use, has proven difficult to articulate. The connection cannot be recognized so long as you think of consciousness as a kind of glow with which representations are accompanied or enlivened. It is, though, also possible to think of perceptual experience as fundamentally a relation between the subject and the things experienced; and given such a conception, we can make visible the link between consciousness and reference
• John Campbell (1997). Sense, reference and selective attention.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jcampbel/documents/SenseReferenceSelectiveAttention.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8349.00019
  
• Austen Clark (online). Sensing and reference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When I was revising _Sensory Qualities_ there was a period of about a year when I set the manuscript aside and did other things. When I returned to it I found that certain portions of the argument had collapsed of their own weight, like an old New England barn, and could be carted off the premises without compunction. Other parts were wobbling on their foundation, while some had weathered well and seemed nice and solid. My revision strategy was simple: I kept just the nice solid bits, thinking that I could go back and work on the wobbly portions later
• Adrian Cussins (1999). Subjectivity, objectivity, and theories of reference in Evans' theory of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?
• Kevin Mulligan (1997). How perception fixes reference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The answer I shall sketch is not mine. Nor, as far as I can tell, is it an answer to be found in the voluminous literature inspired by Kripke’s work. Many of the elements of the answer are to be found in the writings of Wittgenstein and his Austro-German predecessors, Martinak, Husserl, Marty, Landgrebe and Bühler. Within this Austro-German tradition we may distinguish between a strand which is Platonist and anti-naturalist and a strand which is nominalist and naturalist. Thus Husserl’s account of what he calls “directly referring” uses of singular terms invokes senses or individual concepts, albeit simple, not descriptive senses. But the account of reference fixing and reference given by Landgrebe, Bühler and Wittgenstein rejects senses.1 I confine further reference to these writers to footnotes since my aim here is to develop and unify some of their suggestions, in particular by comparing them with more recent work (cf. Mulligan 1997)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=zw5bshc9D24C&oi=fnd&pg=PA122&ots=18wM5eN5NG&sig=0LQdBJr1syOSbcMr22NUG6iYkWs
  

Perception and Phenomenology

• Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states with the same causal r
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(de)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/phben_ww.pdf
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/phben_ww.pdf
  
• Taylor Carman (2008). Review of Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception.   (More)
• Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). What Intuitions Are Like.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument.
• Christian Coseru (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist epistemologist, I claim, is operating on principles similar to those found in Husserl’s phenomenological tradition.
• Mark Crooks (2008). The Churchlands' war on qualia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The systematic phenomenology-denial within the works of Paul and Patricia Churchland is critiqued as to its coherence with the known elelmentary physics and physiology of perception. Paul Churchland misidentifies "qualia" with psychology's sensorimotor schemas, while Patricia Churchland illicitly propounds the intertheoretic identities of logical empiricism while rejecting the premises upon which those identities are based. Their analogies from such arguments to an identity of mind and brain thus have no inductive probability.
• Mr Tom Froese & Mr Adam Spiers, Toward a phenomenological pragmatics of enactive perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The enactive approach to perception is generating an extensive amount of interest and debate in the cognitive sciences. One particularly contentious issue has been how best to characterize the perceptual experiences reported by subjects who have mastered the skillful use of a perceptual supplementation (PS) device. This paper argues that this issue cannot be resolved with the use of third-person methodologies alone, but that it requires the development of a phenomenological pragmatics. In particular, it is necessary that the experimenters become skillful in the use of PS devices themselves. The "Enactive Torch" is proposed as an experimental platform which is cheap, non-intrusive and easy to replicate, so as to enable researchers to corroborate reported experiences with their own phenomenology more easily
• Jakob Hohwy, The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and to psychopathology. These elusive notions of the self are shown to be the natural upshots of general cognitive mechanisms whose fundamental purpose is to enable agents to represent the world and act in it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.theassc.org/files/assc/2668.pdf
  
• Sean D. Kelly (2005). Seeing things in Merleau-ponty.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The passage above comes from the opening pages of Merleau-Ponty’s essay on Edmund Husserl. It proposes a risky interpretive principle. The main feature of this principle is that the seminal aspects of a thinker’s work are so close to him that he is incapable of articulating them himself. Nevertheless, these aspects pervade the work, give it its style, its sense and its direction, and therefore belong to it essentially. As Martin Heidegger writes, in a passage quoted by Merleau-Ponty:

  The greater the work of a thinker – which in no way coincides with the breadth
  and number of writings – the richer is what is un-thought in this work, which
  means, that which emerges in and through this work as having not yet been
  thought.²

  The goal of Merleau-Ponty’s essay, he says, is “to evoke this un-thought-of element in Husserl’s thought”.³
• Brian Lancaster (1997). On the stages of perception: Towards a synthesis of cognitive neuroscience and the buddhist abhidhamma tradition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/00000002/752?token=003712f1f168263c7b6f7e2a46762c47745d3e666725502e6e5f5f7
  
• Eric Lormand (2005). Phenomenal impressions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA316&ots=_ol-wcvxAO&sig=w2fuz0p42C7KYUpUZgCqnay8MFM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WUW3sLZ9tIAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA316&ots=I0WGkBy6jy&sig=yEW2j3v7f6YumQj3VovotWnfvSQ
  
• Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
• David Morris, Andrew Robinson & Catherine Duchastel (ms). Concordance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a concordance of page numbers in the following editions of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: English editions prior to the Routledge Classics 2002; Routledge Classics edition, with the new pagination; the French edition from Gallimard, prior to 2005; the 2e edition from Gallimard, 2005, with new pagination.
• Ravi Prakash & Michele Caponigro (online). Inner Light Perception as a Quantum Phenomenon-Addressing the Questions of Physical and Critical Realisms, Information and Reduction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Subjectivity or the problem of ‘qualia’ tends to make the accessibility and comprehension of psychological events intangible especially for scientific exploration. The issue becomes even more complicated but interesting when one turns towards mystical experiences. Such experiences are different from other psychological phenomena in the sense that they don’t occur to every one, so are difficult to comprehend even for their qualifications of existence. We conducted a qualitative study on one such experience of inner-light perception. This is a common experience reported by meditators of all kinds. However, we chose to study this phenomenon in Vihangam Yoga practitioners because of frequent occurrence of this experience in them as well as their reports of having it for hours at a stretch. During this study, it was noted that it arose many questions there we need to answer not only to explain such phenomena but also for having a better understanding of philosophy of science. In the search for these answers, we proceeded towards another complicated branch of science, quantum mechanics. Our present work is about creating an interface between a unique subjective phenomenon and principles of philosophy as well as of quantum mechanics. We explore the constructs of physical and critical realisms and their coincidence, quantum information theory and the measurement problem of Copenhagen interpretation and their possible applications in such an experience. In this endeavour, we also address the possibility that inner-light perception as experienced by Vihangam Yogis is a quantum event in brain. For this purpose, we specifically analyse the Zeilingers information concept and try to apply it to this phenomena.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://none
  
• Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experience are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain unsaturated. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend a minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which the existence of any type depends on its tokens and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.
• Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~susanna/SchellenbergParticularityPhenomenology.pdf
  http://rsss.anu.edu.au/%7Esusanna/SchellenbergParticularityPhenomenology.pdf
  
• Gianfranco Soldati & Fabian Dorsch, The rational dimension of perceptual phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One influential focus of the recent debates about non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge something in opposition to seeing or imagining it, as well as on the extent to which how we subjectively experience our thoughts and judgements depends on how they present the world as being.1 Other non-sensory aspects of character, by contrast, have been largely neglected, despite two significant facts about them. The first is that they pertain, not only to judgements and similar thoughts, but also to perceptions and other sensory episodes — thus not raising the general issue of whether the episodes concerned possess a phenomenal character in the first place. And second, they are, in several respects, more interesting and perhaps also more basic than the sensory and the intellectual aspects usually discussed. In particular, they reflect or manifest the general nature of the type of episode concerned, rather than the specific differences among its instances. And, as part of this, they render especially the rational dimension of our mental episodes first-personally salient. Our aim in this essay is to describe the non-sensory and non-intellectual phenomenal aspects of perceptions and to highlight their link to the rational role of the latter. This will also involve an attempt at characterising the three kinds of phenomenal aspects at issue. More specifically, it is part of our proposal that the difference between the sensory and the intellectual aspects can be spelled out in terms of the non-neutrality and the reason-insensitivity of the presentational elements concerned. The phenomenal aspects of the third type — which may be called the rational aspects — may then be distinguished from the other two by reference to the fact that only the former concern the type of non-neutrality involved in the respective episodes, rather than what these episodes are non-neutral about..
• Evan Thompson, Alva Noë & Luiz Pessoa (1999). Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science.   (More)

Perception and the Mind, Misc