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8.2. States of Consciousness (States of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

• Consciousness, Sleep, and Dreaming [10]
• Hypnosis and Consciousness [9]
• Meditation and Consciousness [9]
• Drugs and Consciousness [3]
• Other Altered States of Consciousness [5]
• States of Consciousness, Misc [2]

Consciousness, Sleep, and Dreaming

• Susan J. Blackmore (1991). Lucid dreaming: Awake in your sleep?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What could it mean to be conscious in your dreams? For most of us, dreaming is something quite separate from normal life. When we wake up from being chased by a ferocious tiger, or seduced by a devastatingly good-looking Nobel Prize winner we realize with relief or disappointment that "it was only a dream."
• Bill Brewer (2001). Precis of perception and reason, and response to commentator (michael ayers).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge? My central claim is that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experiences contribute to our understanding of the most basic beliefs about particular things in the mind-independent world around us reveals how such experiences provide peculiarly fundamental reasons for such beliefs. There are, I claim, epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experiences lies in their essential contribution to the subject’s understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. Part I of my book argues that this must be so; Part II explains in detail how it is so
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://bbsonline.cup.cam.ac.uk/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.pdf
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/44/bbs00000544-00/bbs.hobson.html
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://assets.cambridge.org/052181/0442/excerpt/0521810442_excerpt.pdf
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2003). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson & Edward F. Pace-Schott (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal systems, consciousness and learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12209117&dopt=Citation
  
• S. LaBerge (1998). Dreaming and consciousness.   (More)
• S. LaBerge (1990). Lucid dreaming: Psychophysiological studies of consciousness during Rem sleep.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lucidity.com/SleepAndCognition.html
  
• S. LaBerge & D. DeGracia (2000). Varieties of lucid dreaming experience.   (More)
• S. Makeig, T. Jung & Terrence J. Sejnowski (2000). Awareness during drowsiness: Dynamics and electrophysiological correlates.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cnl.salk.edu/~scott/canexp00.html
  http://www.sccn.ucsd.edu/~scott/canexp00.html
  http://www.cnl.salk.edu/~scott/pdf/CanExp00.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/makeig00awareness.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11195717&dopt=Citation
  
• C. W. Simon & W. Emmons (1956). Consciousness, and sleep.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD0604651
  

Hypnosis and Consciousness

• Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977)
• Ned Block (2002). Behaviorism revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that don’t essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the ‘sensory’ in ‘sensorimotor’ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, experience is a matter of what mediates between input and output, not input-output relations all by themselves. However, instead of mounting a head-on collision with their view, I think it will be more useful to consider a consequence of their view that admits of obvious counterexamples. The consequence consists of two claims: (1) any two systems that share that highly restricted set of input-output relations are therefor experientially the same and (2) conversely, any two systems that share experience must share these sensorimotor contingencies. Once stated, the view is so clearly wrong that my ascription of it to them might be challenged. At least it is a consequence of a major strand in their view. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for them to disassociate themselves from it. I will limit myself to (1)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/BehaviorismRevisited.htm
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=125123&jid=BBS&volumeId=24&issueId=05&aid=125122
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01270113
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01270113
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Erik Myin (1999). A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which perception, action and environment are deeply intertwined
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/325301.html
  http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~emyin/Hurley.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  
• Zoltán Dienes & Josef Perner (2007). Executive control without conscious awareness: The cold control theory of hypnosis.   (More)
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition
  
  and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to
  
  the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences
  
  between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,
  
  beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17208259&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393206004313
  http://www.bm-science.com/team/art44.pdf
  
• Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
• Shaun Gallagher (2005). Review of Alva noë's Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”
• Graham A. Jamieson, Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective.   (More)
• Pierre Rainville, Rrrobert K. Hofbauer, M. Catherine Bushnell, Gary H. Duncan & Donald D. Price (2002). Hypnosis modulates activity in brain structures involved in the regulation of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/089892902760191117
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/089892902760191117
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/089892902760191117?cookieSet=1&journalCode=jocn
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191456&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2002/00000014/00000006/art00011
  

Meditation and Consciousness

• L. I. Aftanas & S. A. Golosheikin (2003). Changes in cortical activity in altered states of consciousness: The study of meditation by high-resolution EEG.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=465639&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K3176514H2240M45.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/maik/hump/2003/00000029/00000002/00465639
  
• Daniel Goleman (1976). Meditation and consciousness: An asian approach to mental health.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1259055&dopt=Citation
  
• N. Humphrey (2000). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What unites the many selves that constitute the human mind? How is the self-binding problem solved? I argue that separate selves come to belong together as one Self as a result of their dynamic participation in creating a single life, rather as the members of an orchestra come to belong together as a result of their jointly creating a single work of music
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1121
  http://cogprints.org/1121/1/OneSelf.htm
  http://cogprints.org/1121/0/OneSelf.htm
  
• Nicholas Humphrey (ms). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. Social research, 67, no. 4, 32-39, 2000.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I am looking at my baby son, as he thrashes around in his crib, two arms flailing, hands grasping randomly, legs kicking the air, head and eyes turning this way and that, a smile followed by a grimace crossing his face. . . And I’m wondering: what is it like to be him? What is he feeling now? What kind of experience is he having of himself?
• Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne & Richard J. Davidson (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness edited by Zelazo P., Moscovitch M. and Thompson E. (2007)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/Meditation_Neuroscience_2005_AL_JDD_RJD_2.pdf
  
• P. Novak (1996). Buddhist meditation and consciousness of time.   (More)
• Jonathan Shear & Ron Jevning (1999). Pure consciousness: Scientific exploration of meditation techniques.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020002/929
  
• N. Srinivasan & S. Baijal (2007). Concentrative meditation enhances pre-attentive processing: A MMN study.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/abstract.00001756-200710290-00015.htm;jsessionid=HS4JvQGwPlCbTBvBY9LCsvnQD2DMFFvGx6rJBt2SG1Mk4FzyhDrH!65375592!181195628!8091!-1
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=17921873&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• John D. Dunne, Antione Lutz & Richard Davidson (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness: An introduction.   (More)

Drugs and Consciousness

• T. Bresnick & R. Levin (2006). Phenomenal qualities of ayahuasca ingestion and its relation to fringe consciousness and personality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ayahuasca, a hallucinogen with profound consciousness- altering properties, has been increasingly utilized in recent studies (e.g., Strassman, 2001; Shanon, 2002a,b). However, other than Shanon's recent work, there has been little attempt to examine the effects of ayahuasca on perceptual, affective and cognitive experience, its relation to fringe consciousness or to pertinent personality variables. Twenty-one volunteers attending a seminar on ayahuasca were administered personality measures and a semi-structured interview about phenomenal qualities of their experience. Ayahuasca ingestion was associated with profound alterations of temporal- spatial experiences including expansive space and slowed time. Ayahuasca use was also associated with positive emotional states, higher levels of fantasy proneness and psychological absorption and a greater openness to mystical experiences. Conversely, quickened time was associated with negative emotionality. The results are discussed within a multi-faceted model of fringe consciousness with a particular emphasis on Hunt's (1995) models of cross-modal translation as the basis for higher-order symbolic cognition and support James' (1890/1950) contention that fringe consciousness is essential to human cognition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/00000009/art00001
  
• Michael Lyvers (2003). The neurochemistry of psychedelic experiences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://epublications.bond.edu.au/hss_pubs/10/
  http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=hss_pubs
  
• Leonid Ivanovich Spivak (1991). Psychoactive Drug Research in the Soviet Scientific Tradition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: During the past 200 years, Soviet scientists have extensively investigated and evaluated the effects of psychoactive drugs in humans. An examination of the resultant literature provides insight into the four distinct periods that comprise this era of research.

Other Altered States of Consciousness

• A. Dietrich (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis.   (More)
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition
  
  and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to
  
  the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences
  
  between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,
  
  beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17208259&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393206004313
  http://www.bm-science.com/team/art44.pdf
  
• Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
• Louis Tinnin (1990). Mental unity, altered states of consciousness, and dissociation.   (More)
• Dieter Vaitl, Niels Birbaumer, John Gruzelier, Graham A. Jamieson, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Dietrich Lehmann, Wolfgang H. R. Miltner, Ulrich Ott, Peter Pütz, Gebhard Sammer, Inge Strauch, Ute Strehl, Jiri Wackermann & Thomas Weiss (2005). Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mp.uni-tuebingen.de/mp/fileadmin/user_upload/Kotchoubey/Vaitl-2005-ASC.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15631555&dopt=Citation
  

States of Consciousness, Misc

• Alain Morin (2007). Consciousness is more than wakefulness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Merker’s definition of consciousness excludes self-reflective thought, making his proposal for decorticate consciousness not particularly groundbreaking. He suggests that brainstem sites are neglected in current theories of consciousness. This is so because broader definitions of consciousness are used. Split-brain data show that the cortex is important for full-blown consciousness; also, behaviors exhibited by hydranencephaly patients and decorticated rats do not seem to require reflective consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=1007780&jid=BBS&volumeId=30&issueId=01&aid=1007776
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17475070&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X07001069
  
• Craig D. Murray & Michael S. Gordon (2001). Changes in bodily awareness induced by immersive virtual reality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/109493101300210268
  http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/abs/10.1089/109493101300210268
  http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/109493101300210268
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11710261&dopt=Citation