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8.8. Consciousness and Psychology (Consciousness and Psychology on PhilPapers)

• Cognitive Models of Consciousness [46]
• Attention and Consciousness in Psychology [38]
• Metacognition and Consciousness [13]
• Control and Consciousness [13]
• Action and Consciousness in Psychology [25]
• Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology [40]
• Time and Consciousness in Psychology [6]
• Self-Consciousness in Psychology [28]
• Development of Consciousness [14]
• The Stream of Consciousness [14]
• Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues [2]
• Consciousness and Psychology, Misc [14]

Cognitive Models of Consciousness

• Bernard J. Baars, Thomas Zoega Ramsoy & Steven Laureys (2003). Brain, conscious experience, and the observing self.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2004/Ref77.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14624851&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14624851&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01662236/2003/00000026/00000012/art00334
  
• Bernard J. Baars & Katharine A. McGovern (1996). Cognitive views of consciousness: What are the facts? How can we explain them?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At this instant you, the reader, are conscious of some aspects of the act of reading --- the color and texture of THIS PAGE, and perhaps the inner sound of THESE WORDS. But you are probably not aware of the touch of your chair at this instant; nor of a certain background taste in your mouth, nor that monotonous background noise, the soft sound of music, or the complex syntactic processes needed to understand THIS PHRASE; nor are you now aware of your feelings about a friend, the fleeting events of several seconds ago, or the multiple meanings of ambiguous words, as in THIS CASE. Even though you are not currently conscious of them, there is good of evidence that such unconscious events are actively processed in your brain, every moment you are awake. When we try to understand conscious experience we aim to explain the differences between these two conditions: between the events in your nervous system that you can report, act upon, distinguish, and acknowledge as your own, and a great multitude of sophisticated and intelligent processes which are unconscious, and do not allow these operations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000944/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000944/00/BKintro.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:944
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:944
  
• Bernard J. Baars (1998). Metaphors of consciousness and attention in the brain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9498298&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9498298&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01662236/1998/00000021/00000002/art01171
  
• Bernard J. Baars (2002). The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/baars/other/BaarsTICS2002.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/csaba/downloads/tudateshzzaferes.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/Baars2002.pdf
  http://m0134.fmg.uva.nl/edu/Consc_NonConsc_processes/BaarsTICS2002.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11849615&dopt=Citation
  
• John Barresi & John R. Christie (2002). Consciousness and information processing: A reply to durgin.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which we purport to use to investigate consciousness. Furthermore, Durgin's own review of the history of research on metacontrast (Lachter & Durgin, 1999) shows that some researchers investigating metacontrast also thought that they were in the business of evaluating the role of consciousness in accounting for their effects. Yet, there is no doubt that metacontrast research is a paradigm case of research generated from an information processing perspective. So, prima facie, investigating consciousness and using information processing methodology are compatible
• William P. Bechtel (1995). Consciousness: Perspectives from symbolic and connectionist AI.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/~bill/research/CONSCIOU.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bechtel94consciousnes.html
  http://www.cs.umbc.edu/courses/graduate/691m/spring02/papers/bechtel-consciousness.ps
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7501130&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00283932/1995/00000033/00000009/art00049
  
• C. Browne, Robert W. Evans, N. Sales & Igor L. Aleksander (1997). Consciousness and neural cognizers: A review of some recent approaches.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00063
  
• R. A. Brown (1997). Consciousness in a self-learning, memory-controlled, compound machine.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12662520&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00057
  
• William H. Calvin (1998). Competing for consciousness: A Darwinian mechanism at an appropriate level of explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Treating consciousness as awareness or attention greatly underestimates it, ignoring the temporary levels of organization associated with higher intellectual function (syntax, planning, logic, music). The tasks that require consciousness tend to be the ones that demand a lot of resources. Routine tasks can be handled on the back burner but dealing with ambiguity, groping around offline, generating creative choices, and performing precision movements may temporarily require substantial allocations of neocortex. Here I will attempt to clarify the appropriate levels of explanation (ranging from quantum aspects to association cortex dynamics) and then propose a specific mechanism (consciousness as the current winner of Darwinian copying competitions in cerebral cortex) that seems capable of encompassing the higher intellectual function aspects of consciousness as well as some of the attentional aspects. It includes features such as a coding space appropriate for analogies and a supervisory Darwinian process that can bias the operation of other Darwinian processes
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://williamcalvin.com/1990s/1998JConscStudies.htm
  
• Fu Chang (online). A theory of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepage.iis.sinica.edu.tw/~fchang/paper/consci.pdf
  
• Rodney M. J. Cotterill (1997). On the mechanism of consciousness.   (More)
• L. Andrew Coward & Ron Sun (2004). Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to modify a complex functionality without excessive side effects. Such a hierarchy would make it possible to establish a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness. The causal relationships implicit in definitions of access consciousness and phe- nomenal consciousness are made explicit, and the corresponding causal relationships at the more detailed levels of perception, memory, and skill learning described. Extension of these causal relationships to physiological and neural levels is discussed. The general capability of a range of current consciousness models to support a modular hierarchy which could generate these causal relationships is reviewed, and the specific capabilities of two models with good general capabilities are compared in some detail. Ó 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15134761&dopt=Citation
  
• Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/24/14529
  http://www.annalsnyas.org/cgi/content/abstract/929/1/152
  http://www.nada.kth.se/kurser/kth/2D1436/2005/lasmaterial/f10/Dehaene.pdf
  http://www.pasteur.fr/recherche/unites/neubiomol/ARTICLES/Dehaene1998.pdf
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Dehaene_NeuronalWorkspaceSimulation_PNAS1998.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/95/24/14529?maxtoshow=&HITS=20&hits=20&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=consciousness&searchid=QID_NOT_SET&FIRSTINDEX=
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9826734&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19981124)95:24<14529:ANMOAG>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24407
  
• D. C. Dennett & C. F. Westbury (1999). Stability is not intrinsic.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A pure vehicle theory of the contents of consciousness is not possible. While it is true that hard-wired tacit representations are insufficient as content-vehicles, not all tacit representations are hard-wired. The definition of stability offered for patterns of neural activation is not well-motivated, and too simplistic. We disagree in particular with the assumption that stability within a network is purely intrinsic to that network. Many complex forms of stability within a network are apparent only when interpreted by something external to that network. The requirement for interpretation introduces a necessary functional element into the theory of the contents of consciousness, suggesting that a pure vehicle theory of those contents will not succeed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=31138&jid=BBS&volumeId=22&issueId=01&aid=31137
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99271798
  
• Philip Dorrell (ms). Computation vs. feelings and the production/judgment model.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Functional versus Subjective Consciousness The Example of Pain Dieting and Free Will The Production/Judgement Model Judgement is not Reward Feelings are Judgements Low-Bandwidth Channels Candidate Neural Control Channels Timing of Intention and Action Conclusion References Abstract
• Stan Franklin (online). Action selection and language generation in "conscious" software agents.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.dfki.de/imedia/workshops/i3-spring99/w4-contributions/franklin.txt
  
• Stan Franklin & Art Graesser (1999). A software agent model of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Baars (1988, 1997) has proposed a psychological theory of consciousness, called global workspace theory. The present study describes a software agent implementation of that theory, called ''Conscious'' Mattie (CMattie). CMattie operates in a clerical domain from within a UNIX operating system, sending messages and interpreting messages in natural language that organize seminars at a university. CMattie fleshes out global workspace theory with a detailed computational model that integrates contemporary architectures in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Baars (1997) lists the psychological ''facts that any complete theory of consciousness must explain'' in his appendix to In the Theater of Consciousness; global workspace theory was designed to explain these ''facts.'' The present article discusses how the design of CMattie accounts for these facts and thereby the extent to which it implements global workspace theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10487784&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000003/art90391
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1999/00000008/00000003/art00391
  
• Stan Franklin (ms). Conscious software: A computational view of mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.msci.memphis.edu/~franklin/bbs_target_2.html
  
• Stevan Harnad (1982). Consciousness: An afterthought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There are many possible approaches to the mind/brain problem. One of the most prominent, and perhaps the most practical, is to ignore it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/385/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001570/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/70/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/385/02/harnad82.consciousness.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad82.consciousness.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad82.consciousness.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad82.consciousness.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000385/02/harnad82.consciousness.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:385
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001570/00/harnad82.consciousness.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1570
  http://cogprints.org/1570/1/harnad82.consciousness.html
  http://cogprints.org/1570/0/harnad82.consciousness.html
  
• Tiago V. Maia & Axel Cleeremans (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cmbi.bjmu.edu.cn/news/report/2005/neuro/11.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16005677&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661305001889
  
• D. W. Mathis & M. Moxer (1995). On the computational utility of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/mathis95computational.html
  
• Josh McDermott (1995). Global workspace theory: Consciousness explained?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The subject of consciousness, long shunned by mainstream psychology and the scientific community, has over the last two decades become a legitimate topic of scientific research. One of the most thorough attempts to formulate a theory of consciousness has come from Bernard Baars, a psychologist working at the Wright Institute. Baars proposes that consciousness is the result of a Global Workspace in the brain that distributes information to the huge number of parallel unconscious processors that form the rest of the brain. This paper critiques the central hypothesis of Baars' theory of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hcs.harvard.edu/~husn/BRAIN/vol2/consciousness.html
  
• George McKee (online). The engine of awareness: Autonomous synchronous representations.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Objections to functional explanations of awareness assert that although functional systems may be adequate to explain behavior, including verbal behavior consisting of assertions of awareness by an individual, they cannot provide for the existence of phenomenal awareness. In this paper, a theory of awareness is proposed that counters this assertion by incorporating two advances: (1) a formal definition of representation, expressed in a functional notation: Newell's Representation Law, and 2) the introduction of real time into the analysis of awareness. This leads to the definition of phenomenal awareness as existing whenever an object contains an autonomously updated configuration satisfying the Representation Law with respect to some aspects of its environment. The relational aspect of the Representation Law permits the development of multiple levels of awareness, which provides for the existence of illusions and hallucinations, and permits the identification of a new measure, accuracy of awareness . The relational perspective also permits the incorporation of referential concepts into the framework. Qualia can then be identified with referentially opaque elements of awareness. The functional form of the Representation Law is linked to neurophysiology and the underlying phenomena of chemistry and physics by phenomena involving activity-dependent connectivity
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000731/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/07/31/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000731/00/ASR9.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/07/31/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:731
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:731
  http://cogprints.org/731/1/ASR9.htm
  http://cogprints.org/731/0/ASR9.htm
  
• Ezequiel Morsella (2005). The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory.   (More)
• Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1412/3/A_connectionist_theory_of_phenomenal_experience.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/1412/0/A_connectionist_theory_of_phenomenal_experience.pdf
  
• Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2001). Connectionist vehicles, structural resemblance, and the phenomenal mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”) to be constituted by their representational content.2 Together these two theories suggest that phenomenal consciousness might be explicable in terms of the representational content of the neurally realised representing vehicles that are generated and manipulated in the course of cognition. The simplest and most elegant hypothesis that one might entertain in this regard is that conscious experiences are identical to (i.e., are one and the same as) the brain’s representing vehicles
• Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1466
  http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/philosophy/publications/Putting_content_into_a_vehicle_theory_of_consciousness.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=31856&jid=BBS&volumeId=22&issueId=01&aid=31855
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99531798
  http://cogprints.org/1466/3/Putting_content_into_a_vehicle_theory_of_consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/1466/0/Putting_content_into_a_vehicle_theory_of_consciousness.pdf
  
• Jonathan Opie (2000). Consciousness in the loops. Review of Cotterill, Enchanted Looms: Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness is a pretty sexy topic right now, as the plethora of recent books on the subject demonstrate. Everyone is having a go at it: philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and physicists, to mention just a few. And for every discipline or sub-discipline that pretends to some insight on the matter we find not only a different explanatory strategy, but a different take on the explanandum – there is widespread disagreement about _what_ a theory of consciousness should actually explain. However, one thing seems to be agreed by all concerned: consciousness, whatever it is, is deeply mysterious
• Mitch Parsell (2005). Review of P.o. Haikonen's The Cognitive Approach to Conscious Machines.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Haikonen (2003) is an attempt to explicate a platform for modelling consciousness. The book sets out the foundational concepts behind Haikonen’s work in the area and proposes a particular modelling environment. This is developed in three parts: part 1 offers a brief analysis of the state of play in cognitive modelling; part 2 an extended treatment of the phenomena to be explained; part 3 promises a synthesis of the two preceding discussions to provide the necessary background and detail for the proposed modelling environment. This final part covers a broad range of technical details from the nature of the representational-computational economy instantiated, to the control of motor output, to the means of implementing emotions in artefacts. Haikonen proposes an environment based on a distributed representational economy, instantiated in a neural network architecture and trained using associative learning regimes, but which also has symbolic processing abilities to handle the critical task of generating inner language
• Frederic Peters (2010). Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness.
• R. H. Phaf & G. Wolters (1997). A constructivist and connectionist view on conscious and nonconscious processes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent experimental findings reveal dissociations of conscious and nonconscious performance in many fields of psychological research, suggesting that conscious and nonconscious effects result from qualitatively different processes. A connectionist view of these processes is put forward in which consciousness is the consequence of construction processes taking place in three types of working memory in a specific type of recurrent neural network. The recurrences arise by feeding back output to the input of a central (representational) network. They are assumed to be intemalizations of motor-sensory feedback through the environment. In this manner, a subvocal-phonological, a visuo-spatial, and a somatosensory working memory may have developed. Representations in the central network, which constitutes long-term memory, can be kept active by rehearsal in the feedback loops. The sequentially recurrent architecture allows for recursive symbolic operations and the formation of (auditory, visual, or somatic) models of the external world which can be maintained, transformed and temporarily combined with other information in working memory. Moreover, the quasi-input from the loop directs subsequent attentional processing. The view may contribute to a formal framework to accommodate findings from disparate fields such as working memory, sequential reasoning, and conscious and nonconscious processes in memory and emotion. In theory, but probably not very soon in practice, such connectionist models might simulate aspects of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a793922690~fulltext=713240930
  
• Edmund T. Rolls (1997). Consciousness in neural networks?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ouls.ox.ac.uk/archive/00001019/
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=310102CI
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12662513&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12662513&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00049
  
• Ricardo Sanz, Ignacio Lopez, Manuel Rodriguez & Carlos Hernandez (2007). Principles for consciousness in integrated cognitive control.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this article we will argue that given certain conditions for the evolution of bi- ological controllers, these will necessarily evolve in the direction of incorporating consciousness capabilities. We will also see what are the necessary mechanics for the provision of these capabilities and extrapolate this vision to the world of artifi- cial systems postulating seven design principles for conscious systems. This article was published in the journal Neural Networks special issue on brain and conscious- ness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/5941/1/ASLAB-A-2007-011.pdf
  http://www.aslab.org/documents/controlled/ASLAB-A-2007-011.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/5941/1/ASLAB%2DA%2D2007%2D011.pdf
  
• Ron Sun (1999). Accounting for the computational basis of consciousness: A connectionist approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper argues for an explanation of the mechanistic (computational) basis of consciousness that is based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation, the ideas of which have been put forth in the connectionist literature. A model is developed to substantiate and test this approach. The paper also explores the issue of the functional roles of consciousness, in relation to the proposed mechanistic explanation of consciousness. The model, embodying the representational difference, is able to account for the functional role of consciousness, in the form of the synergy between the conscious and the unconscious. The fit between the model and various cognitive phenomena and data (documented in the psychological literatures) is discussed to accentuate the plausibility of the model and its explanation of consciousness. Comparisons with existing models of consciousness are made in the end
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/sun.CC99.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/sun99accounting.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10600249&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000004/art90405
  
• Ron Sun (2004). Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to modify a complex functionality without excessive side effects. Such a hierarchy would make it possible to establish a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness. The causal relationships implicit in definitions of access consciousness and phe- nomenal consciousness are made explicit, and the corresponding causal relationships at the more detailed levels of perception, memory, and skill learning described. Extension of these causal relationships to physiological and neural levels is discussed. The general capability of a range of current consciousness models to support a modular hierarchy which could generate these causal relationships is reviewed, and the specific capabilities of two models with good general capabilities are compared in some detail. Ó 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/public_html/rsun/public_html/coward-sun-CC2004-f.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15134761&dopt=Citation
  
• Ron Sun (2001). Computation, reduction, and teleology of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper aims to explore mechanistic and teleological explanations of consciousness. In terms of mechanistic explanations, it critiques various existing views, especially those embodied by existing computational cognitive models. In this regard, the paper argues in favor of the explanation based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation (as formulated in the connectionist literature), which reduces the phenomenological difference to a mechanistic difference. Furthermore, to establish a teleological explanation of consciousness, the paper discusses the issue of the functional role of consciousness on the basis of the aforementioned mechanistic explanation. A proposal based on synergistic interaction between the conscious and the unconscious is advanced that encompasses various existing views concerning the functional role of consciousness. This two-step deepening explanation has some empirical support, in the form of a cognitive model and various cognitive data that it captures. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/sun.jcsr01.ps
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/sun.jcsr01.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/sun01computation.html
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/public_html/rsun/public_html/sun.jcsr01.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/public_html/rsun/public_html/sun.jcsr-cons10.ps
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1389041700000139
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/search/expand?pub=infobike://els/13890417/2001/00000001/00000004/art00013&unc=
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13890417/2001/00000001/00000004/art00013
  
• Ron Sun (1997). Learning, action, and consciousness: A hybrid approach toward modeling consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _role, especially in learning, and through devising hybrid neural network models that (in a qualitative manner) approxi-_ _mate characteristics of human consciousness. In doing so, the paper examines explicit and implicit learning in a variety_ _of psychological experiments and delineates the conscious/unconscious distinction in terms of the two types of learning_ _and their respective products. The distinctions are captured in a two-level action-based model C_larion_. Some funda-_ _mental theoretical issues are also clari?ed with the help of the model. Comparisons with existing models of conscious-_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/115434.html
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/sun.nn97.ps
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=282400
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/sun.nn97.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/sun96learning.html
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/public_html/rsun/public_html/sun.nn97.pdf
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=310108CI
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12662519&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12662519&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00050
  
• John G. Taylor (1996). A competition for consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09252312/1996/00000011/00000002/art00069
  
• John G. Taylor (1998). Constructing the relational mind.   (More)
• John G. Taylor (ms). Modeling consciousness.   (More)
• John G. Taylor & H. Mueller-Gaertner (1997). Non-invasive analysis of awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00055
  
• John G. Taylor (1997). Neural networks for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=831462
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=310101CI
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12662512&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12662512&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00064
  
• Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (2007). The information integration theory of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
  http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2202-5-42.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:pubmedcentral.gov:543470
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:biomedcentral.com:1471-2202-5-42
  http://w02.biomedcentral.com/profiles/authorindex/default.asp?action=display&id=9787560782135090
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15522121&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=543470&tools=bot
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=543470
  
• Christoph von der Malsburg (1997). The coherence definition of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I will focus in this essay on a riddle that in my view is central to the consciousness issue: How does the mind or brain create the unity we perceive out of the diversity that we know is there? I contend this is a technical issue, not a philosophical one, although its resolution will have profound philosophical repercussions, and although we have at present little more than the philosophical method to attack it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1487/00/Mal1997.pdf
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/14/87/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001487/01/Mal1997.ps
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001487/00/Mal1997.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1487
  http://cogprints.org/1487/1/Mal1997.ps
  http://cogprints.org/1487/0/Mal1997.pdf
  
• Rodrick Wallace (ms). Entering the blackboard jungle: Canonical dysfunction in conscious machines.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The central paradigm of Artificial Intelligence is rapidly shifting toward biological models for both robotic devices and systems performing such critical tasks as network management and process control. Here we apply recent mathematical analysis of the necessary conditions for consciousness in humans in an attempt to gain some understanding of the likely canonical failure modes inherent to a broad class of global workspace/blackboard machines designed to emulate biological functions. Similar problems are likely to confront other possible architectures, although their mathematical description may be far less straightforward
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4610/01/canonical3.pdf
  

Attention and Consciousness in Psychology

• Adam K. Anderson (2005). Affective influences on the attentional dynamics supporting awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15869349&dopt=Citation
  
• Paolo Bartolomeo (2002). Commentary: Can attention capture visual awareness?   (More)
• Andrew Botterell (2003). Continuing commentary.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Color experiences have representational content. But this content need not include a propositional component, particularly for reflectance physicalists such as Byrne and Hilbert. Insisting on such content gives primacy to language where it is not required, and makes the extension of the argument to non-human animals suspect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/colorrealismrevisited.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/colorrealismrevisited.pdf
  http://tigger.uic.edu/~hilbert/papers/colorrealismrevisited.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=/BBS/BBS26_06/S0140525X03000189a.pdf&code=80738416a1068d02bcc11dafcdd37ae9
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X03250184
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X03230181
  
• James A. Cheyne, Jonathan S. A. Carriere & Daniel Smilek (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16427318&dopt=Citation
  
• Marvin Chun & Jeremy Wolfe (2001). Visual attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/new/pubs/VisualAttention.pdf
  http://camplab.psych.yale.edu/articles/Chun_01Blackwell.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/chun (2000) visual attention.pdf
  http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~xh1/Referece/Visual-search/VisualAttention-chun.pdf
  
• Diego Fernandez-Duque & Mark Johnson (1999). Attention metaphors: How metaphors guide the cognitive psychology of attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog2301_4
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1999v23/i01/p0083p0116/MAIN.PDF
  http://www18.homepage.villanova.edu/diego.fernandezduque/Publications/FernandezDuqueMetaphorsCogSci99.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/03640213/1999/00000023/00000001/art80053
  
• Diego Fernandez-Duque (2001). Brain imaging of attentional networks in normal and pathological states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The ability to image the human brain has provided a new perspective for neuropsychologists in their efforts to understand, diagnose, and treat insults to the human brain that might occur as the result of stroke, tumor, traumatic injury, degenerative disease, or errors in development. These new ®ndings are the major theme of this special issue. In our article, we consider brain networks that carry out the functions of attention. We outline several such networks that have been studied in normal and pathological states. These include networks for orienting to sensory stimuli, for maintaining the alert state, and for orchestrating volitional control
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11320446&dopt=Citation
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/BAAA419XUTQ1532U.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/BAAA419XUTQ1532U.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psych/jcen/2001/00000023/00000001/art00006
  
• Diego Fernandez-Duque (2002). Cause and effect theories of attention: The role of conceptual metaphors.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Scientific concepts are defined by metaphors. These metaphors determine what atten- tion is and what count as adequate explanations of the phenomenon. The authors analyze these metaphors within 3 types of attention theories: (a) --cause-- theories, in which attention is presumed to modulate information processing (e.g., attention as a spotlight; attention as a limited resource); (b) --effect-- theories, in which attention is considered to be a by-product of information processing (e.g., the competition meta- phor); and (c) hybrid theories that combine cause and effect aspects (e.g., biased- competition models). The present analysis reveals the crucial role of metaphors in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the efforts of scientists to find a resolution to the classic problem of cause versus effect interpretations
• Steve Franconeri & Daniel J. Simons (2003). Moving and looming stimuli capture attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14674628&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14674628&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psocpubs/prp/2003/00000065/00000007/art00001
  
• Steve Franconeri, Daniel J. Simons & J. Junge (2004). Searching for stimulus-driven shifts of attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://viscog.beckman.uiuc.edu/reprints/
  http://matrix.aklab.psych.ubc.ca/uploads/Jelena_stimulus-driven attention_PBR.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15732697&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psocpubs/pbr/2004/00000011/00000005/art00011
  
• S. Grossberg (1999). The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states and that these resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The models which summarize these concepts are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, models. Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of ART are presented from early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, somatosensory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that ART mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how these mechanisms are realized by known laminar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted that the same circuit realization of ART mechanisms will be found in the laminar circuits of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are summarized concerning how some visual percepts may be visibly, or modally, perceived, whereas amodal percepts may be consciously recognized even though they are perceptually invisible. It is also suggested that sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain obey top-down matching and learning laws that are often complementary to those used for spatial and motor processing in the brain's Where processing stream. This enables our sensory and cognitive representations to maintain their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appropriate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural memories are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that supports these spatial and motor processes cannot lead to resonance
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/Gro.concog98.pdf
  http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/Gro1999ConCog.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10072692&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000001/art90372
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1999/00000008/00000001/art00372
  
• S. He, P. Cavanagh & J. Intrilagator (1996). Attentional resolution and the locus of visual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v383/n6598/abs/383334a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=96404354&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8848045&dopt=Citation
  
• Jason Ivanoff & Raymond M. Klein (2003). Orienting of attention without awareness is affected by measurement-induced attentional control settings.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journalofvision.org/3/1/4/article.aspx
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12678623&dopt=Citation
  
• David LaBerge (1997). Attention, awareness, and the triangular circuit.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9245452&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9262407&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1997/00000006/00000002/art00305
  
• David LaBerge (1998). Defining awareness by the triangular circuit of attention.   (More)
• Victor A. F. Lamme (2004). Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention: A case for phenomenal awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/LammeNetworks.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15288903&dopt=Citation
  
• Victor A. F. Lamme (2003). Why visual attention and awareness are different.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/Lamme2003.pdf
  http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/almorris/519 readings/Lamme2003.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12517353&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12517353&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000001/art00013
  
• Nilli Lavie (2006). The role of perceptual load in visual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16413514&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0006899305013910
  
• L. Lou & Jianer Chen (2003). Attention and blind-spot phenomenology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v9/psyche-9-02-lou.html
  
• Philip M. Merikle & S. Joordens (1997). Parallels between perception without attention and perception without awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~pmerikle/papers/Merikle.ConsCogn.1997.pdf
  http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~pmerikle/papers/Merikle.ConsCogn.1997.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9245455&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9262410&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1997/00000006/00000002/art00310
  
• Christopher Mole (2008). Attention in the absence of consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A response to Christof Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya's 'Attention and Consciousness: Two Distinct Brain Processes'
• J. B. Newman, Bernard J. Baars & S. Cho (1997). A neural global workspace model for conscious attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sclab.yonsei.ac.kr/publications/Papers/NN97.pdf
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=310100CI
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00060
  
• W. T. Newsome (1996). Visual attention: Spotlights, highlights and visual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8723331&dopt=Citation
  
• J. M. Poolton, J. P. Maxwell, R. S. W. Masters & M. Raab (2006). Benefits of an external focus of attention: Common coding or conscious processing?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16368617&dopt=Citation
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/J88H71G6283NM373.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727713483.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/rjsp/2006/00000024/00000001/art00010
  
• Michael I. Posner (1994). Attention: The mechanisms of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/91/16/7398
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8052596&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8052596&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19940802)91:16<7398:ATMOC>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=44408&tools=bot
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=44408
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2365291.pdf
  
• W. Amiri Prinzmetal, I. Nwachuku, L. Bodanski & L. Blumenfeld (1997). The phenomenology of attention, part 2: Brightness and contrast.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~wprinz/research/PhenomenologyPt2.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9245463&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9262418&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1997/00000006/00000002/art00313
  
• Ronald A. Rensink (2006). Attention, consciousness, and data display.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent advances in our understanding of visual perception have shown it to be a far more complex and counterintuitive process than previously believed. Several important consequences follow from this. First, the design of an effective statistical graphics system is unlikely to succeed based on intuition alone; instead, it must rely on a more sophisticated, systematic approach. The basic elements of such an approach are outlined here, along with several design principles. An overview is then given of recent advances in our understanding of visual perception, including rapid perception, visual attention, and scene perception. It then is argued that the mechanisms involved can be successfully harnessed to allow data to be displayed more effectively than at present. Several directions of development are discussed, including effective use of visual attention, the display of dynamic information, and the effective use of nonattentional and nonconscious perceptual systems
• R. Rensink (2000). Visual search for change: A probe into the nature of attentional processing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found to be about 5 items, a value comparable to estimates of attentional capacity. Observers were able to filter out both static and dynamic variations in irrelevant properties. Analysis also indicated a memory for previously-attended locations. These results support the hypothesis that the process needed to detect change is much the same as the attentional process needed to detect complex static patterns. Interestingly, the features of orientation and polarity were found to be handled in somewhat different ways. Taken together, these results not only provide evidence that focused attention is needed to see change, but also show that change detection itself can provide new insights into the nature of attentional processing
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.psych.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/abs.00.11.html
  http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/download/VisCog_00.20.pdf
  http://www.rpi.edu/~grayw/courses/cogs6962/papers/Rensink00_VisCog.pdf
  http://www.psych.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/download/VisCog_00.20.pdf
  http://www.cs.ubc.ca/spider/rensink/publications/download/VisCog_00.20.pdf
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/8XMHDEHKC8W47L4J.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/8XMHDEHKC8W47L4J.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psych/pvis/2000/00000007/F0030001/art00020
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psych/pvis/2000/00000007/00000001/art00020
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Do you have constant tactile experience of your feet in your shoes? Or is experience limited to what's in attention?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they were to take note of the conscious experience, if any, they were having at the last undisturbed moment immediately prior to the beep. Some participants were asked to report any experience they could remember. Others were asked simply to report whether there was visual experience or not (and if so, what it was). Still others were asked about experience in the far right visual field, or tactile experience, or tactile experience in the left foot. A majority of participants in the full experience and the visual conditions reported visual experience in every single sample. Tactile and peripheral visual experience were reported less often. However, the proper interpretation of these results is uncertain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2007/00000014/00000003/art00001
  
• Claire Sergent & Stanislas Dehaene (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15482443&dopt=Citation
  
• Claire Sergent, Sylvain Baillet & Stanislas Dehaene (2005). Timing of the brain events underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/SergentBailletDehaene_AttentionalBlinkConsciousness_NatNeurosci2005.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16158062&dopt=Citation
  
• J. Smallwood, J. B. Davies, D. Heim, F. Finnigan, M. Sudberry & Obonsawin M. O'Connor R. (2004). Subjective experience and the attentional lapse: Task engagement and disengagement during sustained attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15522626&dopt=Citation
  
• Daniel Smilek, Jonathan Eastwood & Philip M. Merikle (2000). Does unattended information facilitate change detection?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~pmerikle/papers/Smilek.JEPHPP.2000.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10811158&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10811158&dopt=Citation
  
• Petroc Sumner, Pei-Chun Tsai, Kenny Yu & Parashkev Nachev (2006). Attentional modulation of sensorimotor processes in the absence of perceptual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/103/27/10520
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16793924&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1502490
  
• Rufin van Rullen & Christof Koch (2003). Competition and selection during visual procesing of natural scenes and objects.   (More)
• Jeremy Wolfe (2000). The deployment of visual attention: Two surprises.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/new/pubs/Deployment_of_Visual_Attent.pdf
  
• Jeremy Wolfe (2003). The level of attention: Mediating between the stimulus and perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/new/pubs/Festschrift.pdf
  http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~xh1/Referece/Visual-search/levels-of-attention.doc
  
• Jeremy Wolfe (2000). Visual Attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/pdf/DeValois Chapter ~approx p.pdf
  http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~xh1/Referece/Visual-search/visual-attention-wolfe.pdf
  

Metacognition and Consciousness

• Simon Baron-Cohen (2001). Consciousness of the physical and the mental: Evidence from autism.   (More)
• S. Brown (2000). Tip-of-the-tongue phenomena: An introductory phenomenological analysis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The issue of meaningful yet unexpressed background-to language and to our experiences of the body-is one whose exploration is still in its infancy. There are various aspects of ''invisible,'' implicit, or background experiences which have been investigated from the viewpoints of phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and linguistics. I will argue that James's concept of the phenomenon of fringes, as explicated by Gurwitsch, provides a structural framework from which to investigate and better understand ideas and concepts that are indeterminate, particularly those experienced in the sense of being sought-after. Johnson's conception of the image-schematic gestalt (ISG) provides an approach to bridging the descriptive gap between phenomenology and cognitive psychology. Starting from an analysis of the fringes, I will turn to a consideration of the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, as a kind of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) state, from a variety of approaches, focusing mainly on cognitive psychology and phenomenology. I will then integrate a phenomenological analysis of these experiences, from the James/Gurwitsch structural viewpoint, with a cognitive/phenomenological analysis in terms of ISGs, and further integrate that with a cognitive/functional analysis of the relation between consciousness and retrieval, employing Anderson et al's theory of inhibitory mechanisms in cognition. This synthesis of these viewpoints will be employed to explore the thesis that the TOT state and similar experiences may relate to the gestalt nature of schemas, and that figure/ground and other contrast-enhancing structures may be both explanatory and descriptive characterizations of the field of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ravett.com/articles/uploads/57/TOT.DOC
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/82/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000382/00/TOThtml.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:382
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11150221&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000004/art90421
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000004/art00421
  http://cogprints.org/382/1/TOThtml.html
  http://cogprints.org/382/0/TOThtml.html
  
• R. Brown & David N. McNeill (1966). The "tip of the tongue" phenomenon.   (More)
• Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird & Michael I. Posner (2000). Awareness and metacognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Kentridge and Heywood (this issue) extend the concept of metacognition to include unconscious processes. We acknowledge the possible contribution of unconscious processes, but favor a central role of awareness in metacognition. We welcome Shimamura's (this issue) extension of the concept of metacognitive regulation to include aspects of working memory, and its relation to executive attention
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924252&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90449
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00449
  
• Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird & Michael I. Posner (2000). Executive attention and metacognitive regulation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924249&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90447
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00447
  
• David Kirsh (2005). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition are part of a continuum and that both are highly interactive. The tenets of this view are explained by reviewing some of the core assumptions of the situated and distribute approach to cognition and then further elaborated by exploring the notions of active vision, visual complexity, affordance landscape and cue structure. The way visual cues are structured and the way interaction is designed can make an important difference in the ease and effectiveness of cognition and metacognition. Documents that make effective use of markers such as headings, callouts, italics can improve students' ability to comprehend documents and 'plan' the way they review and process content. Interaction can be designed to improve 'the proximal zone of planning' - the look ahead and apprehension of what is nearby in activity space that facilitates decisions. This final concept is elaborated in a discussion of how e-newspapers combine effective visual and interactive design to enhance user control over their reading experience.
• A. Koriat & R. Levy-Sadot (2000). Conscious and unconscious metacognition: A rejoinder.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this rejoinder we clarify several issues raised by the commentators with the hope of resolving some disagreements. In particular, we address the distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments and the idea that memory monitoring may be mediated by direct access to internal representations. We then examine the possibility of unconscious metacognitive processes and expand on the critical role that conscious metacognitive feelings play in mediating between unconscious activations and explicit-controlled action. Finally, several open questions are articulated for further scrutiny
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924238&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90436
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00436
  
• A. Koriat (2000). The feeling of knowing: Some metatheoretical implications for consciousness and control.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://research.haifa.ac.il/~iipdm/personal_homepages/Papers/fok_meta_implications.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924234&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90433
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00433
  
• L. A. Ricciardelli (1993). Two components of metalinguistic awareness: Control of linguistic processing and analysis of linguistic knowledge.   (More)
• A. P. Shimamura (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal lobe function. By integrating these domains and issues, significant progress could be made toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924251&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90450
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00450
  
• M. K. Spehn & L. M. Reder (2000). The unconscious feeling of knowing: A commentary on koriat's paper.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Koriat's paper ''The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,'' he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://act.psy.cmu.edu/~reder/00_mks_lmr.pdf
  http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/~reder/00_mks_lmr.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/spehn00unconscious.html
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90435
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00435
  
• Daniel M. Wegner (1997). Why the mind wanders.   (More)
• Tony Whetstone & Mark Cross (1998). Control of conscious contents in directed forgetting and thought suppression.   (More)

Control and Consciousness

• Tanya L. Chartrand (2005). The role of conscious awareness in consumer behavior.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15327663jcp1503_4
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources used for the on-line guidance of visuo-motor action, on the other. This ‘dual visual systems’ hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of conscious visual experience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/eafinal.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/clark.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3182592.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/110/4/495
  
• Iraj Derakhshan (2003). The preservation of consciousness, automatism, and movement control.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neuro.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/15/4/456.pdf
  http://www.neuro.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/15/4/456
  http://neuro.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/15/4/456
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14627776&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14627776&dopt=Citation
  
• Susan L. Hurley (2006). Bypassing conscious control: Media violence, unconscious imitation, and freedom of speech.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Why does it matter whether and how individuals consciously control their behavior? It matters for many reasons. Here I focus on concerns about social influences of which agents are typically unaware on aggressive behavior
• G. Knoblich & T. T. J. Kircher (2004). Deceiving oneself about being in control: Conscious detection of changes in visuomotor coupling.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://matrix.aklab.psych.ubc.ca/uploads/Amelia_Drawing_JEPHPP.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15301616&dopt=Citation
  
• Christopher Mole (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and the many psychologists and philosophers who have been influenced by their work, claim that ‘the visual system that gives us our visual experience of the world is not the same system that guides our movements in the world’. The arguments that have been offered for this surprising claim place considerable weight on two sources of evidence — visual form agnosia and the reaching behaviour of normal subjects when picking up objects that induce visual illusions. The present article shows that, if we are careful to consider the possibility that a demonstrative gesture can contribute content to a conscious experience, then neither source of evidence is compelling.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/118/472/995
  
• Lionel Naccache, Stanislas Dehaene, L. Jonathan Cohen, Marie-Odile Habert, Elodie Guichart-Gomez, Damien Galanaud & Jean-Claude Willer (2005). Effortless control: Executive attention and conscious feeling of mental effort are dissociable.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15949516&dopt=Citation
  
• Michael I. Posner & C. R. R. Snyder (1975). Attention and cognitive control.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aDE4o7CKTX&sig=qDsEen77vSG23bX3XELMbJD06p4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv6n6GEQS&sig=ykK6i5MM63Hh0oMlx9ch0xuhZPU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp10hTmje&sig=Aue4oVmwopjus2xDNFssLXBy1Ig
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp46kVtgg&sig=10wMa4fvJycWm5CojuoJMM5EMUU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv3n4zHPX&sig=8RG0VI0hDEG0riRSg9URdlJ-aq4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp34jRted&sig=Sa3A65K1JMB602q5ynQiYzIcZ2o
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv0n1GFRW&sig=UWTbKqnwfQQshsIlEHHY_gxMGhM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp-2fZndh&sig=1puoda2de_HY-hKs0m9Ugd2eF1M
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv1j2AIXS&sig=YMv32MgIizH8SPoSpe99lFQoo0M
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp40kRqcl&sig=LDAnkLmr0Y1aokKJdzaVe3Pe8ck
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv4j4EHSV&sig=ryRLMaBE9jzjMX74La4it52PdZo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp3_iXpeg&sig=uFdSNCZussnRC6tPNN-OMA0-BFs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp52kZmcd&sig=fpzqBtCwm1Tq6NdDIlf9A-svBCk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4qy33lVsfi&sig=hGFhwAxTSbGmtQIMv1LTRl9GUz4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv5l6yIQ_&sig=bO_Ml7BfCSRYG2yruOYAumQm-3A
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp04gYmbd&sig=YaAf-ldZ98H5HQwueQjyRTiyNWE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv4p5yLSS&sig=2gvA9_FGxNaDdq-cxjx7yB5oYY8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp22iSpbi&sig=T-8uctjbHCGXd5uvWSwgYGm-WFI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv1p2FEPS&sig=arwi2hsNtcOhpQRqDiI_Bbr3cX8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp0_gTqjd&sig=b7RKYjWy_gt6y9y6Htdyn3VimUo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv5r6CLUV&sig=yUBfUiT7_n7e4y321D_cdcTXCcM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ru0gwDwx_y0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=aEv2r3FFXS&sig=NThSUPl_ZSEx314bomjGr25aYQw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w0jjVEHoK20C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA205&ots=4rp16hYnjd&sig=6L62-gCpAR3wEWmLLzSXyTJ63zw
  
• Zenon W. Pylyshynb, Jacob Feldmanb & Brian J. Scholla (2001). What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in multiple object tracking.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The notion that visual attention can operate over visual objects in addition to spatial locations has recently received much empirical support, but there has been relatively little empirical consideration of what can count as an `object' in the ®rst place. We have investi- gated this question in the context of the multiple object tracking paradigm, in which subjects must track a number of independently and unpredictably moving identical items in a ®eld of identical distractors. What types of feature clusters can be tracked in this manner? In other words, what counts as an `object' in this task? We investigated this question with a technique we call target merging: we alter tracking displays so that distinct target and distractor loca- tions appear perceptually to be parts of the same object by merging pairs of items (one target with one distractor) in various ways ± for example, by connecting item locations with a simple line segment, by drawing the convex hull of the two items, and so forth. The data show that target merging makes the tracking task far more dif®cult to varying degrees depending on exactly how the items are merged. The effect is perceptually salient, involving in some conditions a total destruction of subjects' capacity to track multiple items. These studies provide strong evidence for the object-based nature of tracking, con®rming that in some contexts attention must be allocated to objects rather than arbitrary collections of features. In addition, the results begin to reveal the types of spatially organized scene components that can be independently attended as a function of properties such as connectedness, part struc- ture, and other types of perceptual grouping. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/scholl-p-f-reprint.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/pub/papers/Scholl-Pylyshyn-Feldman.pdf
  http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/people/wangjunl/Scholl-Pylyshyn-Feldman.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/~jacob/Papers/Scholl-ZP-JF-2001-Cognition.pdf
  http://taylor0.biology.ucla.edu/al/resource/reference/schollEtAl01.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11245843&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000080/00000001/art00157
  
• Richard M. Shiffrin & Walter E. Schneider (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycinfo.apa.org/doi/getuid.cfm?uid=1977-24785-001
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ161631
  
• Daniel M. Wegner (2005). Who is the controller of controlled processes?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Are we the robots? This question surfaces often in current psychological re- search, as various kinds of robot parts-automatic actions, mental mechanisms, even neural circuits-keep appearing in our explanations of human behavior. Automatic processes seem responsible for a wide range of the things we do, a fact that may leave us feeling, if not fully robotic, at least a bit nonhuman. The complement of the automatic process in contemporary psychology, of course, is the controlled process (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Bargh, 1984; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schnieder, 1977), and it is in theories of controlled processes that vestiges of our humanity reappear. Controlled processes are viewed as conscious, effortful, and intentional. and as drawing on more sources of information than automatic processes. With this power of conscious will, controlled processes seem to bring the civilized quality back to psychological explanation that automatic processes leave out. Yet by reintroducing this touch of humanity, the notion of a controlled process also brings us within glimpsing range of a fatal theoretical error-the idea that there is a controller
• Simon Wigley (2007). Automaticity, consciousness and moral responsibility.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive scientists have long noted that automated behavior is the rule, while consciousness acts of self-regulation are the exception to the rule. On the face of it automated actions appear to be immune to moral appraisal because they are not subject to conscious control. Conventional wisdom suggests that sleepwalking exculpates, while the mere fact that a person is performing a well-versed task unthinkingly does not. However, our apparent lack of conscious control while we are undergoing automaticity challenges the idea that there is a relevant moral difference between these two forms of unconscious behavior. In both cases the agent lacks access to information that might help them guide their actions so as to avoid harms. In response it is argued that the crucial distinction between the automatic agent and the agent undergoing an automatism, such as somnambulism or petit mal epilepsy, lies in the fact that the former can preprogram the activation and interruption of automatic behavior. Given that, it is argued that there is elbowroom for attributing responsibility to automated agents based on the quality of their will
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a777588421~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~db=all~content=a777588421~fulltext=713240930
  
• P. D. Zelazo (2004). The development of conscious control in childhood.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14697398&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661303002997
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2004/00000008/00000001/art00299
  

Action and Consciousness in Psychology

• Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone (2005). Beyond cartesian subjectivism: Neural correlates of shared intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neuro- physiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of view the problem is not 'how is it possible to share the intentions of others', but rather 'how one can distinguish one's own action/intention from those of other people'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000007/art00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000007/art00002
  
• Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Daniel M. Wolpert & Christopher D. Frith (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/sblakemore/SJ_papers/BlaWolFri_TICS02.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/Ref79.pdf
  http://141.30.40.94/allgpsy/Goschke/Goschke_Lehre/WS2003/Volition und Kontrolle/BalWolFri02.pdf
  http://psylux.psych.tu-dresden.de/allgpsy/Goschke/Goschke_Lehre/WS2003/Volition und Kontrolle/BalWolFri02.pdf
  http://www.psychologie.tu-dresden.de/allgpsy/Goschke/Goschke_Lehre/WS2003/Volition und Kontrolle/BalWolFri02.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12039604&dopt=Citation
  
• Sarah-Jane Blakemore (2003). Deluding the motor system.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How do we know that our own actions belong to us? How are we able to distinguish self-generated sensory events from those that arise externally? In this paper, I will briefly discuss experiments that were designed to investigate these questions. In particularly, I will review psychophysical and neuroimaging studies that have investigated how we recognise the consequences of our own actions, and why patients with delusions of control confuse self-produced and externally produced actions and sensations. Studies investigating the failure of this 'self-monitoring' mechanism in patients with delusions of control will be discussed in the context of the hypothesis that overactivity in the parietal cortex and the cerebellum contribute to the misattribution of an action to an external source ()
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14656507&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00078
  
• Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Chris Frith (2003). Self-awareness and action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12744977&dopt=Citation
  
• Axel Cleeremans (forthcoming). How do we know what we are doing?: Time, intention and awareness of action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here we ask the same question about a lower-level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start position, making a visuomotor adjustment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants’ intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness..
• E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod (1997). Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/28/PDF/ijn_00000587_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/36/28/PDF/ijn_00000587_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/05/87/ijn_00000587_00/ijn_00000587_00.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9455171&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/1997/00000065/00000001/art00039
  
• Christopher D. Frith (2002). Attention to action and awareness of other minds.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.psy.mpg.de/disvolition/Attention_to_Action.pdf
  http://www.mpipf-muenchen.mpg.de/disvolition/Attention_to_Action.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470618&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470618&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000004/art00022
  
• N. Georgieff & Marc Jeannerod (1998). Beyond consciousness of external reality: A ''who'' system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper offers a framework for consciousness of internal reality. Recent PET experiments are reviewed, showing partial overlap of cortical activation during self-produced actions and actions observed from other people. This overlap suggests that representations for actions may be shared by several individuals, a situation which creates a potential problem for correctly attributing an action to its agent. The neural conditions for correct agency judgments are thus assigned a key role in self/other distinction and self-consciousness. A series of behavioral experiments that demonstrate, in normal subjects, the poor monitoring of action-related signals and the difficulty in recognizing self-produced actions are described. In patients presenting delusions, this difficulty dramatically increases and actions become systematically misattributed. These results point to schizophrenia and related disorders as a paradigmatic alteration of a ''Who?'' system for self-consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pacherie.free.fr/COURS/MSC/Georgieff-Jeannerod_1998.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9787056&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1998/00000007/00000003/art90367
  
• Carl Ginsburg (1999). Body-image, movement and consciousness: Examples from a somatic practice in the Feldenkrais method.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020002/926
  
• E. Gonzalez, M. Broens & Pim Haselager (2004). Consciousness and agency: The importance of self-organized action.   (More)
• Patrick Haggard, P. Catledge, M. Dafydd & David A. Oakley (2004). Anomalous control: When "free will" is not conscious.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15336254&dopt=Citation
  
• Patrick Haggard (2005). Conscious intention and motor cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/cns120/Handout/Haggard-05.pdf
  http://www.psychologie.uni-oldenburg.de/hans.colonius/personal webpage/courses/seminare/haggard_TCogSci_05.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15925808&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661305001191
  
• Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally predicted effects. However, it remains unclear whether our conscious experience of action depends on a precise matching process, or a retrospective inference that ''I'' must have been responsible for a particular event. We report an experiment in which normal subjects judged the perceived time of either intentional actions, involuntary movements, or subsequent effects (auditory tones) of these. We found that the subject's intention to produce the auditory tone produced an intentional binding between the perceived times of the subject's action and the tone. However, if the intention was interrupted by an imposed involuntary movement, followed by the identical tone, no such binding occurred. The phenomenology of intentional action requires an appropriate predictive link between intentions and effects, rather than a retrospective inference that ''I'' caused the effect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14656511&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00052
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00052
  
• Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark & Jeri Kalogeras (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11896397&dopt=Citation
  
• Fahmeed Hyder (1997). "Willed action": A functional MRI study of the human prefrontal cortex during a sensorimitor task.   (More)
• Bruce Mangan (2003). Volition and property dualism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/00000012/1395
  
• Thomas Metzinger (2003). Motor ontology: The representational reality of goals, actions and selves.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unipr.it/~gallese/Gallese-Metzinger2003.pdf
  http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/publikationen/Gallese_Metzinger_2003.pdf
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/V2EU5UV206LW494K.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2003/00000016/00000003/art00001
  
• Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its ''phenomenal output'')? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionality-relation itself. We will show how such a complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as a functional building block for social cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fias.uni-frankfurt.de/~wwwphil/pub_2003_Metzinger_the emergence.pdf
  http://www.fias.uni-frankfurt.de/philosophie/pub_2003_Metzinger_the emergence.pdf
  http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/publikationen/Metzinger_Gallese_2003.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14656499&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14656499&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00072
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00072
  
• James Moore (2007). Awareness of action: Inference and prediction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential “sense-making” process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role. When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes
• Kevin J. O'Regan (ms). Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness.   (More)
• E. Pronin, Daniel M. Wegner, K. McCarthy & S. Rodriguez (2006). Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: These studies examined whether having thoughts related to an event before it occurs leads people to infer that they caused the event— even when such causation might otherwise seem magical. In Study 1, people perceived that they had harmed another person via a voodoo hex. These perceptions were more likely among those who had first been induced to harbor evil thoughts about their victim. In Study 2, spectators of a peer’s basketball-shooting performance were more likely to perceive that they had influenced his success if they had first generated positive visualizations consistent with that success. Observers privy to those spectators’ visualizations made similar attributions about the spectators’ influence. Finally, addi- tional studies suggested that these results occur even when the thought-about outcome is viewed as unwanted by the thinker and even in field settings where the relevant outcome is occurring as part of a live athletic competition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://weblamp.princeton.edu/~psych/psychology/research/pronin/pubs/2006MagicalPowers.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16881760&dopt=Citation
  
• Itamar Simonson (2005). In defense of consciousness: The role of conscious and unconscious inputs in consumer choice.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327663jcp1503_5
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15327663jcp1503_5
  
• Sean A. Spence (2001). Alien control: From phenomenology to cognitive neurobiology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://l3d.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/spence.pdf
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy_psychiatry_and_psychology/v008/8.2spence.html
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy_psychiatry_and_psychology/v008/8.2spence.pdf
  
• Daniel M. Wegner (2003). The mind's best trick: How we experience conscious will.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/wegner-trick.pdf
  http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Mind's_Best_Trick.pdf
  http://www.psychology.uiowa.edu/Classes/31174/Documents/Mind's_Best_Trick_copy.pdf
  http://www.psychologie.tu-dresden.de/allgpsy/Goschke/Goschke_Lehre/WS2003/Volition und Kontrolle/Mind's_Best_Trick.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000002/art00002
  
• Daniel M. Wegner & J. Erskine (2003). Voluntary involuntariness: Thought suppression and the regulation of the experience of will.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Participants were asked to carry out a series of simple tasks while following mental control instructions. In advance of each task, they either suppressed thoughts of their intention to perform the task, concentrated on such thoughts, or monitored their thoughts without trying to change them. Suppression resulted in reduced reports of intentionality as compared to monitoring, and as compared to concentration. There was a weak trend for suppression to enhance reported intentionality for a repetition of the action carried out after suppression instructions had been discontinued
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14656510&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00054
  

Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology

• Yuri I. Alexandrov & Mikko E. Sams (2005). Emotion and consciousness: Ends of a continuum.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroscience.ru/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=53&Itemid=88
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16183264&dopt=Citation
  
• Silke Anders, Niels Birbaumer, Bettina Sadowski, Michael Erb, Irina Mader, Wolfgang Grodd & Martin Lotze (2004). Parietal somatosensory association cortex mediates affective blindsight.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v7/n4/suppinfo/nn1213_S1.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15034586&dopt=Citation
  
• Lutz Antoine, J. Brefczynski-Lewis, T. Johnstone & R. J. Davidson (online). Regulation of the neural circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: Effects of meditative expertise.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: PLoS ONE 3(3): e1897. doi:10.1371/journal.pone
• Bernard J. Baars (2000). Conscious emotional feelings--beyond the four taboos: An introductory comment.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C_E_1_1&artid=641008244
  http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C_E_1_1&artid=641008244
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2000/00000001/00000001/art00002
  
• Allison Barnes & Paul Thagard, Emotional decisions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent research has yielded an explosion of literature that establishes a strong connection between emotional and cognitive processes. Most notably, Antonio Damasio draws an intimate connection between emotion and cognition in practical decision making. Damasio presents a "somatic marker" hypothesis which explains how emotions are biologically indispensable to decisions. His research on patients with frontal lobe damage indicates that feelings normally accompany response options and operate as a biasing device to dictate choice. What Damasio's hypothesis lacks is a theoretical model of decision making which can advance the conceptual connection between emotional and cognitive decision making processes. In this paper we combine Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis with the coherence theory of decision put forward by Thagard and Millgram. The juxtaposition of Damasio's hypothesis with a cognitive theory of decision making leads to a new and better theory of emotional decisions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/619/0/Emot_Decis.html
  
• Mario Beauregard, Johanne Lévesque & Pierre Bourgouin (2001). Neural correlates of conscious self-regulation of emotion.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/21/18/RC165
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/21/18/RC165
  http://psych.colorado.edu/~tito/f01/5606/Beauregard 2001.pdf
  http://141.30.40.94/allgpsy/Goschke/Goschke_Lehre/WS2003/Volition und Kontrolle/beauregard.pdf
  http://psylux.psych.tu-dresden.de/allgpsy/Goschke/Goschke_Lehre/WS2003/Volition und Kontrolle/beauregard.pdf
  http://www.psychologie.tu-dresden.de/allgpsy/Goschke/Goschke_Lehre/WS2003/Volition und Kontrolle/beauregard.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11549754&dopt=Citation
  
• Jennifer S. Beer & Dacher Keltner (2004). What is unique about self-conscious emotions?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15327965pli1502_02
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~keltner/publications/beer.keltner.2004.pdf
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (2000). Motivation and Emotion: An Interactive Process Model.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter, I outline dynamic models of motivation and emotion. These turn out not to be autonomous subsystems, but, instead, are deeply integrated in the basic interactive dynamic character of living systems. Motivation is a crucial aspect of particular kinds of interactive systems -- systems for which representation is a sister aspect. Emotion is a special kind of partially reflective interaction process, and yields its own emergent motivational aspects. In addition, the overall model accounts for some of the crucial properties of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/motemotion.html
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/MotandEmotion.pdf
  
• Alain Cardon (2006). Artificial consciousness, artificial emotions, and autonomous robots.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17016730&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T03M83873362716L.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/10339/2006/00000007/00000004/00000154
  
• John Cogan (2003). Emotion and the growth of consciousness: Gaining insight through a phenomenology of rage.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some attempts to understand emotion have failed to account for important features of our emotional experience ? notably, the experience of gaining insight when we express our emotions. In this essay I will hold that if we properly understand emotions, then we see that the expression of emotion contributes to the growth of consciousness by providing a process wherein consciousness can recognize and reclaim its inherent wholeness, and thereby overcome fragmentation. Hence, in this essay I will strive to: (1) demonstrate that we do get insight when we express our emotions, (2) offer a suggestion as to why this feature is often overlooked, (3) propose a model for understanding the emotions that helps to explain this holistic feature of emotion, and (4) show how this insight into the nature of emotion contributes to our understanding of the growth of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C&E 4:2&artid=540033139
  http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C&E 4:2&artid=540033139
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/jbp/ce/2003/00000004/00000002/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2003/00000004/00000002/art00004
  
• Hugo D. Critchley, Stefan Wiens, Pia Rotshtein, Arne Öhman & Raymond J. Dolan (2004). Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.psychology.su.se/staff/sws/CritchleyWiens04_HBDinfMRI.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14730305&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14730305&dopt=Citation
  
• Thomas C. Dalton (2000). The developmental roots of consciousness and emotional experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Charles Darwin is generally credited with having formulated the first systematic attempt to explain the evolutionary origins and function of the expression of emotions in animals and humans. His ingenious theory, however, was burdened with popular misconceptions about human phylogenetic heritage and bore the philosophical and theoretical deficiencies of the brain science of his era that his successors strove to overcome. In their attempts to rectify Darwin?s errors, William James, James Mark Baldwin and John Dewey each made important contributions to a theory of emotion, which attempted to put it on a more secure philosophical and scientific footing. My contention is that Dewey and his collaborator, infant experimentalist Myrtle McGraw, succeeded where their contemporaries failed. They pointed the way out of the morass of recapitulationism, and showed how a developmental theory of consciousness, mind and emotion could be formulated that avoided the epistemological and ontological pitfalls of Darwin?s theory. Drawing on an extensive body of research from contemporary experimental studies of infant development, this essay attempts to put the questions raised by these historical figures about the structure, function and value of emotions in a theoretical framework. A developmental theory is proposed about the complex, interacting neurobiological and neurobehavioral factors that contribute to human emotional development. This theory identifies the possible relationships among emotions, consciousness and mind and how their co-development influences the capacity of young children to form moral judgments
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C_E_1_1&artid=774008247
  http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C_E_1_1&artid=774008247
  http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C&E 1:1&artid=774008247
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2000/00000001/00000001/art00004
  
• Beatrice de Gelder & Nouchine Hadjikhani (2006). Non-conscious recognition of emotional body language.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.beatricedegelder.com/documents/deGelder2006b.pdf
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/fulltext.00001756-200604240-00006.htm
  http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/nouchinelab/pdfs/deGelder and Hadjikhani Neuroreport 2006.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16603916&dopt=Citation
  
• Ronald B. de Sousa (2002). Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotions.   (More)
• John D. Eastwood & Daniel Smilek (2005). Functional consequences of perceiving facial expressions of emotion without awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16091271&dopt=Citation
  
• Raphaël Gaillard, Antoine Del Cul, Lionel Naccache, Fabien Vinckier, Laurent Cohen, Stanislas Dehaene & Edward E. Smith (2006). Nonconscious semantic processing of emotional words modulates conscious access.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2006PNAS..103.7524G
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/103/19/7524
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/GaillardDehaene_NonconsciousEmotionalWordsThresholdModulation_PNAS2006.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16648261&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1464371
  
• Jonathan Grose, Genuine versus deceptive emotional displays.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper contributes to the explanation of human cooperative behaviour, examining the implications of Brian Skyrms’ modelling of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). Augmenting a PD with signalling strategies promotes cooperation, but a challenge that must be addressed is what prevents signals being subverted by deceptive behaviour. Empirical results suggest that emotional displays can play a signalling role and, to some extent, are secure from subversion. I examine proximate explanations and then offer an evolutionary explanation for the translucency of emotional displays. Selection acts on the basis of lifetime fitness consequences and, crucially for my argument, the intensity of selection decreases over the course of a lifetime. Hence we tend to possess traits that promote survival when young and, with regard to emotional displays, translucency allows successful maturation over our protracted period of nurturing by close kin. This is due to the vital role played by emotional interactions in the normal cognitive and social development of Homo sapiens
• Erin A. Heerey, Dacher Keltner & Lisa M. Capps (2003). Making sense of self-conscious emotion: Linking theory of mind and emotion in children with autism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14674831&dopt=Citation
  
• Gregory Johnson (2008). LeDoux's Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~db=all~content=a906069006~fulltext=713240930
  
• W. R. Kunst-Wilson & R. B. Zajonc (1980). Affective discrimination of stimuli that cannot be recognized.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycinfo.apa.org/doi/getuid.cfm?uid=1981-07090-001
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/207/4430/557
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=7352271
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7352271&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=7352271&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• John A. Lambie & Anthony J. Marcel (2002). Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: A theoretical framework.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11990318&dopt=Citation
  
• Marc D. Lewis & Rebecca M. Todd (2005). Getting emotional - a neural perspective on emotion, intention, and consciousness.   (More)
• M. Lewis (1997). The self in self-conscious emotions.   (More)
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  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9237469&dopt=Citation
  
• Stefan Linquist (2007). Prospects for a dual inheritance model of emotional evolution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A common objection to adaptationist accounts of human emotions is that they ignore the influence of culture. If complex emotions like guilt, shame and romantic jealousy are largely culturally determined, how could they be biological adaptations? Dual inheritance models of gene/culture coevolution provide a potential answer to this question. If complex emotions are developmentally ‘scaffolded' by norms that are transmitted from parent to offspring with reasonably high fidelity, then these emotions can evolve to promote individual reproductive interests. This paper draws on case studies of emotional development to illustrate how complex emotions satisfy these conditions. Many of the norms and parenting strategies influencing emotional development are absorbed during the early stages of life when a child is in primary contact with its parents and before the onset of complex cognition. These conditions make it likely that emotion-governing norms are transmitted vertically and with relatively little cognitive ‘contamination'. ‡Thanks to Mark Colyvan, Paul Griffiths, Alexander Rosenberg, and John Wilkins for helpful comments on previous drafts. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e-mail: s.linquist@uq.edu.au
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/525626
  
• J. S. Morris, A. Ohman & Raymond J. Dolan (1998). Conscious and unconscious emotional learning in the human amygdala.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1998Natur.393..467M
  http://psycinfo.apa.org/doi/getuid.cfm?uid=1998-04086-003
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=PubMed&cmd=Retrieve&list_uids=9624001&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9624001&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=9624001&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Richard Mullen, Lew Hardy & Andrew Tattersall (2005). The effects of anxiety on motor performance: A test of the conscious processing hypothesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.humankinetics.com/JSEP/viewarticle.cfm?jid=8h7M768g7r6J63Uz8b2E6P6d7w6J6YMu7g3V4VQH2j7J7wV&view=art&aid=4832&8h7M768g7r6J63Uz8b2E6P6d7w6J6YMu7g3V4VQH2j7J7wVsite=
  
• Jaak Panksepp (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans.   (More)
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  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15766890&dopt=Citation
  
• Jaak Panksepp (2005). On the embodied neural nature of core emotional affects.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/F0030008/art00009
  
• Jaak Panksepp (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: Implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2000/00000001/00000001/art00003
  
• Luiz Pessoa (2005). To what extent are emotional visual stimuli processed without attention and awareness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0959438805000346
  
• Luiz Pessoa, Shruti Japee & Leslie G. Ungerleider (2005). Visual awareness and the detection of fearful faces.   (More)
• Erik Rietveld (2008). The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual’s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.
• J. L. Schutter & J. van Honk (2004). Extending the global workspace theory to emotion: Phenomenality without access.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/fss/2006-0801-201648/Schutter_Van Honk_04_Consciousness_Cognition539_549.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15336246&dopt=Citation
  
• Ralph Stacey (2005). Affects and cognition in a social theory of unconscious processes.   (More)
• Thomas Suslow, Patricia Ohrmann, Jochen Bauer, Astrid V. Rauch, Wolfram Schwindt, Volker Arolt, Walter Heindel & Harald Kugel (2006). Amygdala activation during masked presentation of emotional faces predicts conscious detection of threat-related faces.   (More)
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  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16510224&dopt=Citation
  
• Remigiusz Szczepanowski & Luiz Pessoa (2007). Fear perception: Can objective and subjective awareness measures be dissociated?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17461694&dopt=Citation
  
• Naotsugu Tsuchiya & Ralph Adolphs (2007). Emotion and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17324608&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661307000551
  
• Rick B. van Baaren, Daniel A. Fockenberg, Rob W. Holland, Loes Janssen & Ad van Knippenberg (2006). The Moody chameleon: The effect of mood on non-conscious mimicry.   (More)
• Douglas F. Watt (2004). Consciousness, emotional self-regulation and the brain: Review article.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/00000009/art00007
  
• Piotr Winkielman & Kent C. Berridge (2004). Unconscious emotion.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/bec/papers/Winkielman_16.5.05_a.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00288.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00288.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/cdir/2004/00000013/00000003/art00008
  

Time and Consciousness in Psychology

• Harald Atmanspacher (ms). The significance of causally coupled, stable neuronal assemblies for the psychological time arrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Stable neuronal assemblies are generally regarded as neural correlates of mental representations. Their temporal sequence corresponds to the experience of a direction of time, sometimes called the psychological time arrow. We show that the stability of particular, biophysically motivated models of neuronal assemblies, called coupled map lattices, is supported by causal interactions among neurons and obstructed by non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons. This surprising relation between causality and stability suggests that those neuronal assemblies that are stable due to causal neuronal interactions, and thus correlated with mental representations, generate a psychological time arrow. Yet this impact of causal interactions among neurons on the directed sequence of mental representations does not rule out the possibility of mentally less efficacious non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons
• H. Eisler (1975). Subjective duration and psychophysics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1187910&dopt=Citation
  
• Stuart R. Hameroff (online). Time, consciousness, and quantum events in fundamental space-time geometry.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or vessel (e.g. minutes per what?) [1]. But if time is a dimension in which processes occurred, e.g. as one component of a 4 dimensional spacetime, then why would processes occur unidirectionally in time? Yet we perceive time as an orderly, unidirectional process. An alternative explanation is that time does not exist as either a process or dimension, but that reality is a collage of discrete, disconnected and haphazardly arranged configurations of the universe, e.g. as described in Julian Barbour's "The end of time" [2]. In this view our perception of a unidirectional flow of time occurs because each moment, or "Now" as Barbour terms them, involves memory of other conceptually relevant moments, and the orderly flow of time is an illusion. Barbour's deconstruction of time contrasts the Newtonian reality of objects moving deterministically through 4 dimensional spacetime. Newton's contemporary (and rival) Leibniz [3] viewed the world in a manner consistent with Barbour (and with Mach's principle that the spatiotemporal structure of the universe is dependent on the distribution of mass, a foundation of Einstein's general relativity). According to Leibniz the world is to be understood not as matter/mass moving in a framework of space and time, but of more fundamental snapshot-like entities that momentarily fuse space and matter into single possible arrangements or configurations of the entire universe. Such configurations, which can be fabulously rich and complex considering the vastness of the universe, are the ultimate "things" of reality, which Leibniz termed "monads"..
• Hudson Hoagland (1943). The chemistry of time.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(193407)1:3<351:TCOT>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(193407)1:3<351:TCOT>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/286333
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/184595.pdf
  
• Peter Lynds (ms). Subjective perception of time and a progressive present moment: The neurobiological key to unlocking consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The conclusion of physics, within both a historical and more recent context, that an objectively progressive time and present moment are derivative notions without actual physical foundation in nature, illustrate that these perceived chronological features originate from subjective conscious experience and the neurobiological processes underlying it. Using this conclusion as a stepping stone, it is posited that the phenomena of an in-built subjective conception of a progressive present moment in time and that of conscious awareness are actually one and the same thing, and as such, are also the outcome of the same neurobiological processes. A possible explanation as to how this might be achieved by the brain through employing the neuronal induced nonconscious cognitive manipulation of a small interval of time is proposed. The CIP phenomenon, elucidated within the context of this study is also then discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001360/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003125/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3125
  http://cogprints.org/3125/1/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003125/01/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3125/1/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_%2D_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001360/01/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  
• Helge Malmgren (online). Why the past is sometimes perceived, and not only remembered.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Updated abstract Historical landmarks Temporal Gestalts How does the sensory buffer ”retain” a temporal Gestalt? What is memory and what is perception in speech perception? Varieties of motor control Are ”ballistic” movements really ballistic? State or time representations? How to implement a temporal motor code Acknowledgments References
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/HMbuffer.pdf
  

Self-Consciousness in Psychology

• Susan M. Andersen, Inga Reznik & Noah S. Glassman (2005). The unconscious relational self.   (More)
• Alarik T. Arenander & Frederick T. Travis (2004). Brain patterns of self-awareness.   (More)
• J. B. Asendorpf, V. Warkentin & P. Baudonniere (1996). Self-awareness and other-awareness.   (More)
• Bernard J. Baars (1998). Attention, self, and conscious self-monitoring.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ?In everday language, the word ?attention? implies control of access to consciousness, and we adopt this usage here. Attention itself can be either voluntary or automatic. This can be readily modeled in the theory. Further, a contrastive analysis of spontaneously self?attributed vs. self?alien experiences suggests that ?self? can be interpreted as the more enduring, higher levels of the dominant context hierarchy, which create continuity over the changing flow of events. Since context is by definition unconscious in GW theory, self in this sense is thought to be inherently unconscious as well. This proposal is consistent with a great deal of objective evidence. However, aspects of self may become known through ?conscious self-monitoring,? a process that ??is useful for self-evaluation and self?control. The results of conscious self-monitoring are combined with self?evaluation criteria, presumably of social origin, to produce a stable ?self?concept?, which functions as a supervisory system within the larger self organization
• J. Decety & T. Chaminade (2003). When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging explorations of the neurophysiological substrate of shared representations between the self and others, using various ecological paradigms such as mentally representing one's own actions versus others' actions, watching the actions executed by others, imitating the others' actions versus being imitated by others. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in the essential ability to distinguish the self from others, and in the way the self represents the other. Interestingly, the right hemisphere develops its functions earlier than the left
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14656502&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14656502&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00076
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00076
  
• A. Fenigstein & M. F. Matthews Scheier (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory.   (More)
• Clive Fletcher & Caroline Bailey (2003). Assessing self-awareness: Some issues and methods.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/html/Output/Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Pdf/0500180502.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mcb/050/2003/00000018/00000005/art00002
  
• Walter J. Freeman & J. W. Watts (1941). The frontal lobes and consciousness of self.   (More)
• Christopher D. Frith (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: The case of auditory hallucinations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8941962&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8436(19961029)351:1346<1505:TROTPC>2.0.CO;2-V
  
• Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke (2007). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness.   (More)
• Sarah Malcolm & Julian Paul Keenan (2003). My right I: Deception detection and hemispheric differences in self-awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.atypon-link.com/SJP/doi/abs/10.2224/sbp.2003.31.8.767
  
• Robert W. Mitchell (1997). A comparison of the self-awareness and kinesthetic-visual matching theories of self-recognition: Autistic children and others.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9237464&dopt=Citation
  
• Alain Morin (2004). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15819305&dopt=Citation
  http://heldref-publications.metapress.com/index/P278505100265PR2.pdf
  
• Alain Morin (1995). Characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article raises the question of how self-talk mediates self-awareness. It is argued that the process of acquiring self-information can be seen as a problem-solving task, and that self-talk can facilitate this process (as it does for any other problem) by promoting a precise formulation and approach to the problem, by adequately focusing attention on the task, and through constant self-evaluations. A complementary analysis of the possible characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information is undertaken. Among other things, taking others' perspective through self-talk, possessing a rich vocabulary about oneself, and paying attention to the content of one's self-talk are believed to be important in that respect. Clinical implications raised by this analysis are also discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002485/01/ICP.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2485
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2485
  
• Alain Morin (1998). Imagery and self-awareness: A theoretical note.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article suggests that one possible function of imagery is its role as a mediator of self-awareness and its significance in the acquisition of self- information. Sparse allusions of a relation between imagery and self-awareness have been mentioned before, but no real attempt to account for the nature of the link has been undertaken. The following hypothesis is put forward: some cognitive processes are capable of internally reproducing social mechanisms responsible for self-awareness. One such mechanism is the opportunity to see oneself as one is seen by others. It is postulated that imagery internalizes this social mechanism because mental images empower us to literally see ourselves acting (or having behaved) in given ways as others could see (or have seen) us acting. When one mentally sees oneself behaving in a given fashion, one is self-aware; furthermore, when one reflects on past behaviors by using mental images, one can deduct aspects of one's past functioning from what is internally seen, that is, acquire self- information and build a self-concept. The importance for mental images to have in their content the organism's body image (especially one's facial features) is underlined, and experiences with self-reflecting devices (e.g., mirrors) are presumed to be crucial in that respect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2491
  
• Alain Morin & Jennifer Everett (1990). Inner speech as a mediator of self-awareness, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge: An hypothesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002559/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002559/01/NIP.PDF
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2559
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2559
  
• Alain Morin (2003). Inner speech and conscious experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Imagine that scientists have been successful at designing a drug that “freezes” brain areas producing our internal monologue. After taking the drug you can’t talk to yourself anymore. Every other mental activity is fine, but it’s now total silence in your head. Not a word. What would happen? What would it be like?
• Alain Morin (online). Language and self-awareness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In my 2003 SCR paper “Inner speech and conscious experience” (LINK) I put forward the notion that we most often need to talk to ourselves in order to understand who we are. That is, inner speech is frequently required to access self-information and to gradually build a self- concept. To illustrate, let’s imagine that you want to reflect on an abdominal pain you are currently experiencing. It is very likely that you will engage in an internal monologue, thinking “Why is it that my belly hurts? I feel cramps... Ha! I get it—I skipped breakfast...” You could go on and also notice: “I’ve been missing breakfast often lately... I tend to sleep in, I don’t eat breakfast, and by noon I’m starving... And I didn’t go to the gym as often as I should have... This is bad—I’m getting _lazy_...” Here the adjective “lazy” constitutes the conclusion that you have drawn from your inner monologue; it may then become a more or less permanent part of your self-concept
• Alain Morin (2006). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16260154&dopt=Citation
  
• Alain Morin (2004). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various views.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situ- ation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redun- dantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related informa- tion, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extend- ed, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in rela- tion to mirror self-recognition and language
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3808/
  http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/SAlevels.pdf
  http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/SAlevels.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003808/01/Levels.pdf
  http://www.societyofrobots.com/robottheory/self-awareness_review.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16260154&dopt=Citation
  
• Alain Morin (1999). On a relation between self-awareness and inner speech: Additional evidence from brain studies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this short paper I review past studies examining the neurological substrates of inner speech and self-awareness. The evidence points to a common neurological area: the left inferior frontal region. It is thus highly tempting to conclude that these two operations are deeply linked
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2557
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2557
  
• Alain Morin (2005). Possible links between self-awareness and inner speech: Theoretical background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: been recently proposed (Morin, 2003; 2004). The model takes into account most known mechanisms and processes leading to self-awareness, and examines their multiple and complex interactions. Inner speech is postulated to play a key-role in this model, as it establishes important connections between many of its ele- ments. This paper first reviews past and current references to a link between self-awareness and inner speech. It then presents an analysis of the nature of the relation between these two concepts. It is suggested that inner speech can inter- nally reproduce and expand social and physical (ecological) sources of self- awareness. Inner speech can also create a psychological distance between the self and mental events it experiences (thus facilitating self-observation) it can act as a problem-solving device where the self represents the problem and self-information the solution, and can label aspects of one’s inner life that would otherwise be difficult to objectively perceive. Empirical evidence supporting the role of inner speech in self-awareness is also presented
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/JCS.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003784/01/IS.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3784
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/F0020004/art00007
  
• Alain Morin & James Everett (1991). Self-awareness and introspective private speech in 6-year-old children.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002561/
  http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/Privatespeech.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002561/01/Privatespeech.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2561
  
• Alain Morin (1993). Self-talk and self-awareness: On the nature of the relation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002551/01/Relation.PDF
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2551
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2551
  
• Alain Morin (2002). Self-awareness review part 1: Do you "self-reflect" or "self-ruminate"?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We all spend time analyzing our inner thoughts and feelings; past research looked at this activity as being unitary in nature (i.e., simply focusing on the self), examined how frequently people introspect, and identified the effects of self-focus on behavior. Current studies indicate that people actually engage in two different types of self-analysis: self-reflection (enjoying analyzing the self) and self-rumination (not being able to shut off thoughts about the self), each leading to opposite consequences
• Alain Morin (2003). Self-awareness review part 2: Changing or escaping the self.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When we become self-aware we see who we are and what we would like to be. What do we do? Do we change who we are? Or do we escape self-awareness by watching TV—or worst, by drinking alcohol, doing drugs, or committing suicide?
• P. Rochat (2003). Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When do children become aware of themselves as differentiated and unique entity in the world? When and how do they become self-aware? Based on some recent empirical evidence, 5 levels of self-awareness are presented and discussed as they chronologically unfold from the moment of birth to approximately 4-5 years of age. A natural history of children's developing self-awareness is proposed as well as a model of adult self-awareness that is informed by the dynamic of early development. Adult self-awareness is viewed as the dynamic flux between basic levels of consciousness that develop chronologically early in life
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/lab/5 levels of self-awareness.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14656513&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00081
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00081
  
• Kai Vogeley, M. Moskopp Kurthen, P. Falkai & W. Maier (1999). Essential functions of the human self model are implemented in the prefrontal cortex.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The human self model comprises essential features such as the experiences of ownership, of body-centered spatial perspectivity, and of a long-term unity of beliefs and attitudes. In the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, it is suggested that clinical subsyndromes like cognitive disorganization and derealization syndromes reflect disorders of this self model. These features are neurobiologically instantiated as an episodically active complex neural activation pattern and can be mapped to the brain, given adequate operationalizations of self model features. In its unique capability of integrating external and internal data, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) appears to be an essential component of the neuronal implementation of the self model. With close connections to other unimodal association cortices and to the limbic system, the PFC provides an internally represented world model and internal milieu data of the organism, both serving world orientation. In the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, it is the dysfunction of the PFC that is suggested to be the neural correlate for the different clinical schizophrenic subsyndromes. The pathophysiological study of psychiatric disorders may contribute to the theoretical debate on the neuronal basis of the self model
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.repraesentation.uni-bremen.de/Texte/Vogeley et al., Consc & Cogn 8, 343-363, 1999.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10487788&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000003/art90394
  

Development of Consciousness

• Simon Baron-Cohen (1999). Can studies of autism teach us about consciousness of the physical and the mental?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most scientists and theorists concerned with the problem of consciousness focus on our consciousness of the physical world (our sensations, feelings, and awareness). In this paper I consider our consciousness of the mental world (our thoughts about thoughts, intentions, wishes, and emotions).The argument is made that these are two distinct forms of consciousness, the evidence for this deriving from studies of autism. Autism is a severe childhood psychiatric condition in which individuals may be conscious of the physical world but not of the mental world. Relevant experimental evidence is described, including some recent neuroimaging studies pointing towards the neural basis of our consciousness of the mental
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782348468~fulltext=713240930
  
• Joe Becker (2008). Conceptualizing Mind and Consciousness: Using Constructivist Ideas to Transcend the Physical Bind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers and scientists seeking to conceptualize consciousness, and subjective experience in particular, have focused on sensation and perception, and have emphasized binding – how a percept holds together. Building on a constructivist approach to conception centered on separistic-holistic complexes incorporating multiple levels of abstraction, the present approach reconceptualizes binding and opens a new path to theorizing the emergence of consciousness. It is proposed that all subjective experience involves multiple levels of abstraction, a central feature of conception. This modifies the prevalent idea of sequential development from sensation through perception to conception. Further, this approach to mind and consciousness links constructivist theory to artistic activity and suggests that conception, subjective experience, aboutness (intentionality), and agency are linked together through separistic-holistic complexes. It also argues for change in the prevailing constructivist view that regards the process of production of new levels of conception as inherently directed towards better fit with the external environment. Copyright © 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel
• C. J. Brainerd, L. M. Stein & V. F. Reyna (1998). On the development of conscious and unconscious memory.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.idml.medicine.arizona.edu/Articles/On the development of conscious and unconscious memory 1998.pdf
  http://www.medicine.arizona.edu/idml/Articles/On the development of conscious and unconscious memory 1998.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9541786&dopt=Citation
  
• A. S. Briskin (1974). A developmental model of self-awareness.   (More)
• S. Derbyshire (2001). Fetal pain: An infantile debate.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11699551&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=11699551&dopt=Citation
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118982780/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8519.00213
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8519.00213
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/biot/2001/00000015/00000001/art00006
  
• John H. Flavell, F. L. Green & E. R. Flavell (2000). Development of children's awareness of their own thoughts.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327647JCD0101N_10
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/S15327647JCD0101N_10
  
• Shaun Gallagher & Andrew N. Meltzoff (1996). The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-ponty and recent developmental studies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~db=all~content=a793916621~fulltext=713240930
  
• Mauricio Infante & Lloyd A. Wells (2004). Children's dreaming and the development of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jaacap.com/pt/re/jaacap/abstract.00004583-200412000-00013.htm
  
• D. Kuhn (2000). Metacognitive development.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8721.00088
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8721.00088
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/cdir/2000/00000009/00000005/art00009
  
• M. Lewis (1990). The development of intentionality and the role of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1047-840X(1990)1:3<231:TDOIAT>2.0.CO;2-#
  
• L. McCune (1993). The development of play as the development of consciousness.   (More)
• P. Mounoud (1990). Consciousness as a necessary transitional phenomenon in cognitive development.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1047-840X(1990)1:3<253:CAANTP>2.0.CO;2-9
  
• Maurizio Tirassa, Francesca M. Bosco & Livia Colle (2006). Rethinking the ontogeny of mindreading.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take one's own mental states as mutually known to an i nteractant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes all of her mental states as shared with her caregivers. This a llows her to interact with her caregivers in a mentalistic way from the very beginning and provides the grounds on which the later maturation of mindreading will build. As the latter process occurs, the child begins to understand the mental world in terms of differences between the mental states of different agents; subjectively, this also corresponds to the birth of privateness. ?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/5214/1/2006concog.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16099174&dopt=Citation
  
• Dan Zahavi (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/the_embodied_self-awareness.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=s38ZIzXth5gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA35&ots=igjyPI_jAV&sig=S_97hshyvz6kf3jI3F6jDIGTQkY
  

The Stream of Consciousness

• Susan J. Blackmore (2002). There is no stream of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Throughout history there have been people who say it is all illusion. I think they may be right. But if they are right what could this mean? If you just say "It's all an illusion" this gets you nowhere - except that a whole lot of other questions appear. Why should we all be victims of an illusion, instead of seeing things the way they really are? What sort of illusion is it anyway? Why is it like that and not some other way? Is it possible to see through the illusion? And if so what happens next
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/jcs02.htm
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/F0020005/1274
  
• Barry Dainton, Précis: Stream of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states – our bodily sensations, thoughts, mental images and so on. Since once wakened we tend to stay awake for several hours, tracing out continuous routes through whatever environment we happen to find ourselves in, it is hardly surprising that our experience itself is continuous rather than discontinuous
• A. Dietrich (2004). Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow.   (More)
• Russell Epstein (2000). The neural-cognitive basis of the Jamesian stream of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: William James described the stream of thought as having two components: (1) a nucleus of highly conscious, often perceptual material; and (2) a fringe of dimly felt contextual information that controls the entry of information into the nucleus and guides the progression of internally directed thought. Here I examine the neural and cognitive correlates of this phenomenology. A survey of the cognitive neuroscience literature suggests that the nucleus corresponds to a dynamic global buffer formed by interactions between different regions of the brain, while the fringe corresponds to a set of mechanisms in the frontal and medial temporal lobes that control the contents of this global buffer. A consequence of this account is that there might be conscious imagistic representations that are not part of the nucleus. I argue that phenomenology can be linked to psychology and neuroscience and a meaningful way that illuminates both
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000004/art00486
  http://www.psych.upenn.edu/epsteinlab/pdfs/Epstein_2000_The_neural-cognitive_basis_of_the_Jamesian_steam_of_thought.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11150224&dopt=Citation
  
• David Galin (2000). Comments on Epstein's neurocognitive interpretation of William James's model of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://wernicke.ccn.upenn.edu/epstein_web/Galin_reply_PUBLISHED.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11150225&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000004/art90492
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000004/art00492
  
• John-Dylan Haynes & Geraint Rees (2005). Predicting the stream of consciousness from activity in human visual cortex.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16051174&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982205006615
  
• Alumit Ishai (2002). Streams of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/089892902760191036
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/089892902760191036
  http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/theo-20/www/10-731/Ishai_consciousness_JOCN2002.pdf
  http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/theo-20/www/10-731/Ishai_consciousness_JOCN2002.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191449&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2002/00000014/00000006/art00003
  
• D. Kleinfeld (2007). Wandering minds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: material on Science Online. 25. E. Salinas, T. J. Sejnowski, J. Neurosci. 20, 6193 (2000). 14. L. J. Borg-Graham, C. Monier, Y. Fregnac, Nature 393, 26. B. Haider, A. Duque, A. R. Hasenstaub, D. A. McCormick, 11 September 2006; accepted 23 November 2006
• Bruce Mangan (2001). Sensation's ghost: The nonsensory fringe of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not familiarity) is the feeling-of-knowing in implicit cognition. The experience of rightness suggests that neural mechanisms "compute" signals indicating the global dynamics of network integration
• Thomas Natsoulas (1993). The stream of consciousness: William James's specious present.   (More)
• Elisabeth Norman (2002). Subcategories of "fringe consciousness" and their related nonconscious contexts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _7(18)._ http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v7/psyche-7-18-mangan.html

  .

  ABSTRACT: In Mangan's (2001) account of fringe consciousness there is a tension between the proposal that fringe
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/mangan/pdf/norman.pdf
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/mangan/pdf/norman.pdf
  
• William S. Robinson (2004). Perception, affect and epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan's.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/mangan/pdf/robinson.pdf
  
• Jerome L. Singer (1974). Daydreaming and the stream of thought.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=4851267&dopt=Citation
  
• Luc Steels (2003). Language re-entrance and the 'inner voice'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/F0020004/1351
  

Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues

• Bernard J. Baars (1996). Understanding subjectivity: Global workspace theory and the resurrection of the observing self.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a subjective part . . . The objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking of, the subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://human-nature.com/articles/baars.html
  http://www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/online/baars.html
  http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/genre/baars/baarsJCS.htm
  
• Gustav Fechner (online). The measurement of sensation.   (More)

Consciousness and Psychology, Misc

• E. M. Bowden (1997). The effect of reportable and unreportable hints on anagram solution and the aha!   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9479484&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=9479484&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1997/00000006/00000004/art00325
  
• J. Delacour (1997). Object perception and recognition: A model for the scientific study of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/7/2/257
  
• Hermann Helmholtz (1878). The Facts in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The problems which that earlier period considered fundamental to all science were those of the theory of knowledge: What is true in our sense perceptions and thought? and In what way do our ideas correspond to reality? Philosophy and the natural sciences attack these questions from opposite directions, but they are the common problems of both. Philosophy, which is concerned with the mental aspect, endeavours to separate out whatever in our knowledge and ideas is due to the effects of the material world, in order to determine the nature of pure mental activity. The natural sciences, on the other hand, seek to separate out definitions, systems of symbols, patterns of representation, and hypotheses, in order to study the remainder, which pertains to the world of reality whose laws they seek, in a pure form. Both try to achieve the same separation, though each is interested in a different part of the divided field
• Ernest R. Hilgard (1980). Consciousness in contemporary psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.000245
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.000245
  
• Kurt Koffka (1922). Perception: An introduction to the gestalt theory.   (More)
• Wolfgang Kohler (1959). Gestalt psychology today.   (More)
• George Mandler & Yutaka Nakamura (1987). Aspects of consciousness.   (More)
• George Mandler (1997). Consciousness redux.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I start with a review of 20 years of proposals on the functions of consciousness. I then present a minimal number of functions that consciouness subserves, as well as as some remaining puzzles about its psychology. In the process I stress a psychologist's functional approach, asking what consciousness is for. The result is an attempt to place conscious processes within the usual flow of human information processing
• Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore (1996). Feelings and phenomenal experiences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sitemaker.umich.edu/norbert.schwarz/files/schwarz___clore_feelings_ch_ip.pdf
  
• Roger W. Sperry (1995). The Riddle of consciousness and the changing scientific worldview.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jhp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/2/7
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1921). Brentano and wundt: Empirical and experimental psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9556(192101)32:1<108:BAWEAE>2.0.CO;2-5
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189809)7:5<449:TPOASP>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189809)7:5<449:TPOASP>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2177110.pdf
  
• John B. Watson (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ492263
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=EJ492263&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=eric_accno&accno=EJ492263